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ABSTRACT 
The following thesis investigates the determinants of sovereign credit ratings and 
their effect on the corporate sector.  
Chapter 2 examines the effect of economic policy uncertainty on sovereign credit 
rating decisions made by the three leading rating agencies, namely Moody’s, S&P’s 
and Fitch by implementing a panel quantile regression. We find that regulatory 
quality and competitiveness have a more substantial impact on low rated 
countries whereas GDP per capita is a major driver of high rated countries. A 
reduction in the current account deficit leads to a rating or outlook upgrade for 
low rated countries. Economic policy uncertainty impacts negatively on credit 
ratings across the conditional distribution; however, the impact is stronger for the 
lower rated countries. In other words, the creditworthiness of low rated countries 
takes a much bigger ‘hit’ than that of high rated countries when European policy 
uncertainty is on the rise. 
Chapter 3 examines the joint behaviour of sovereign ratings and their 
macroeconomic/financial determinants (namely economic policy uncertainty, 
GDP growth, government debt-to-GDP ratio, investment-to-GDP ratio and the 
fiscal balance-to-GDP ratio) in a multivariate Panel Vector Autoregressive (PVAR) 
framework. We reveal another channel of interconnection between sovereign and 
banking credit risk by identifying a two-way relationship between non-
performing loans (NPLs) and sovereign ratings. Generalized impulse response 
functions (GIRFs) provide evidence of significant effects from NPLs on sovereign 
rating decisions over and above the impact of the remaining economic/financial 
variables. At the same time, sovereign rating decisions impact on NPLs and all 
other variables.  
Chapter 4 works on the adverse consequences of sovereign rating downgrades on 
firms’ operational efficiency. We approach our main question by exploiting 
exogenous variation in sovereign credit ratings through the so-called sovereign 
ceiling rule. We then trace our main effect by comparing the differential effect of 
sovereign rating changes on firms that are limited by the sovereign ceiling 
(treated firms) and on other firms in the same country that are not limited by the 
sovereign ceiling (nontreated firms). In particular, we compare firms that have a 
rating equal to or above the corresponding sovereign (treated firms) with similar 
firms that have a lower rating than the corresponding sovereign (nontreated 
firms).  We match treated and non treated firms in several categorical and non 
categorical covariates, namely firm size, investment, Tobin’s Q, cash flow, cash, 
leverage, Country of Domicile and Year. Our difference in difference estimation in 
the matched sample analysis shows that Sales growth of firms with a rating equal 
to or above the corresponding sovereign drop by 1.38% more than Sales growth 
of firms rated below their corresponding sovereign following a sovereign rating 
downgrade. Finally, chapter 5 concludes this thesis by summarizing the empirical 
results, pointing out their implications and developing ideas for future research.
1. Introduction 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
    “You could almost say that we live again in a two-superpower world. There is 
the U.S. and there is Moody's. The U.S. can destroy a country by leveling it with 
bombs; Moody's can destroy a country by downgrading its bonds". 
           Thomas L. Friedman 22/2/1995 New York Times1 
The abovementioned phrase is very representative of the power of rating agencies 
in financial markets.  The following thesis is primarily motivated by the role of 
credit rating agencies during the global financial crisis and the eurozone sovereign 
debt crisis. It examines their determination and their impact on financial markets, 
the banking sector and the real economy. It consists of three essay-style chapters 
covering both sovereign and corporate credit ratings.  
There is a very growing empirical literature that has discussed several 
quantitative and qualitative factors affecting the decisions of CRAs. However, an 
increasingly large number of decisions appear to remain unexplained. For 
instance, some of the downgrades of peripheral European debt which took place 
in 2010 and beyond have been scrutinized by the downgraded peripheral 
countries and by leading European policymakers. Speaking to the European 
parliament in May 2010, Jose Manuel Barroso, then the European Union 
Commission President, criticized the three main CRAs noting that “deficiencies in 
their working methods has led to ratings being too cyclical, too reliant on the 
general market mood rather than on fundamentals-regardless of whether market 
mood is too optimistic or too pessimistic” (Barroso, 2010).  
David Beers, Standard & Poor’s (at that time) Global head of sovereign ratings, 
defended the record of the CRAs. In a letter published in March 2011 by The 
Economist, he noted that credit ratings “provide a robust ranking of the risk of 
sovereign default” and “are independent opinions of creditworthiness based on 
fundamental analysis and therefore should be expected to change as credit risk 
evolves over the cycle.” Gärtner and Griesbach (2012) argued that "sovereign 
ratings, their meaning and their underlying procedures are rather opaque.” They 
also went on to argue that “the set of relevant fundamental variables is an open 
one, and the interpretation of ever evolving political institutions and processes in 
unprecedented environments are a dime a dozen.” Moritz Kraemer, Global Chief 
Rating Officer of Standard & Poor’s, dismissed the arguments of Gärtner and 
Griesbach (2012) as “simply wrong” and went on to note that S&P’s sovereign 
rating decisions are accompanied by comprehensive published rationales and, 
often, press releases that explain their reasoning and approach. Kraemer (2012) 
also pointed out that S&P’s explain on their website how they arrive at their 
ratings and how their ratings perform over time (see 
www.understandingratings.com) which makes their publications as transparent 
and complete as possible.  
 
1 https://www.nytimes.com/1995/02/22/opinion/foreign-affairs-don-t-mess-with-moody-s.html 
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The growing dissatisfaction across Europe about some of the recent credit rating 
decisions has given rise to talks amongst Eurozone member states about setting 
up a European credit rating agency which will increase competition in the rating 
business. Nevertheless, the European Central Bank (ECB) has been very cautious 
about how quickly such a project could be deployed. In February 2011, the ECB 
pointed out that a new credit rating agency will have to rely on extensive data, a 
number of models, experienced staff and go through building a sound track record 
for several years before it establishes itself as a credible agency in the rating 
business (Tait, 2011). In 2016, the European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA), which is the authority competent for the supervision of CRAs, published 
a report on sovereign rating processes which noted that because of a “switch to a 
regulated industry with a focus on the integrity of process…ESMA has driven 
significant changes in the credit rating process and the methodology…thereby 
strengthening their integrity, independence, quality, and transparency (ESMA 
2016 Report, page 16). 
In chapter 2, we examine the effect of economic policy uncertainty on sovereign 
credit rating decisions made by the three leading rating agencies namely Moody’s, 
Standard and Poors and Fitch for the Eurozone Economies from 2002 to 2015. 
This chapter is mostly motivated by the unprecedented S&Ps’ decision to remove 
AAA from the US economy for the first time in history in 2011. The biggest rating 
agency highlights economic policy uncertainty as one of the main drivers of this 
highly scrutinized decision. The chapter contributes to the growing literature of 
the determinants of sovereign credit ratings (see Afonso et al., 2011, Reusens and    
Croux, 2017 among others). We employ a panel quantile framework that allows 
us to observe the relative importance of quantitative and qualitative factors across 
the conditional distribution of sovereign credit ratings. We also augment the 
information set considered in previous studies by examining and identifying the 
significant impact of competitiveness and the European economic policy 
uncertainty index on the Eurozone sovereign credit ratings.  Our results show that 
Economic policy uncertainty impacts negatively on credit ratings across the 
conditional distribution; however, the impact is more substantial on the lower 
rated countries. In addition, the unemployment rate, regulatory quality, and 
competitiveness have a stronger impact on low rated countries, whereas GDP per 
capita is a significant driver of high rated countries. In particular, the impact of an 
improvement in regulatory quality on credit ratings is almost two times higher for 
countries rated at A1 and below for Moody’s than those rated at Aa3 and almost 
eight times higher than those rated at Aa1 or Aaa. Additionally, a reduction in the 
current account deficit or an increase in the current account surplus leads to a 
rating or outlook upgrade for low rated countries. In our main analysis, we 
incorporate Baker et al. 2016 economic policy uncertainty index. However, our 
results are robust to alternative uncertainty indices.  
We finally quantify our results the effects of uncertainty on credit ratings by using 
estimates of our model under uncertainty to infer what credit ratings would have 
been had uncertainty remained at its 2002-2007 pre-financial and pre-European 
1. Introduction 
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debt crisis average value. We find that economic policy uncertainty in the Euro 
area has reduced Greece’s credit rating by some three notches at the height of the 
Eurozone crisis in 2011 and 2012; the impact of uncertainty has been substantial 
but somewhat less severe for the remaining GIIPS and Cyprus. In other words, our 
empirical analysis suggests a pivotal role that economic policy uncertainty in the 
Euro area has played in downgrading the credit profile of Eurozone’s periphery.  
From a policy point of view and noting the higher relative importance of the 
competitiveness and regulatory quality indices for Eurozone countries with low 
credit ratings, our results suggest that structural reforms and improvements in 
the competitiveness profile of these very countries will improve significantly their 
low rating profile and therefore reduce their borrowing costs in financial markets. 
This is in line with policy recommendations recently put forward by the European 
Commission. 
In chapter 3, we reveal another channel of interconnection between sovereign and 
banking credit risk by identifying a two-way relationship between non-
performing loans (NPLs) and sovereign credit ratings. This chapter is primarily 
motivated by the dramatic increase of non-performing loans in Eurozone 
periphery economies following the massive sovereign rating downgrades 
between 2010 and 2015. It contributes to two different strands of the literature. 
Firstly, it creates a new channel of interconnection between banking and 
sovereign credit risk (see Acharya et al., 2014, Adelino and Ferreira, 2016, 
Gennaioli et al., 2014 among others). Secondly, it sheds some new light on what 
determines sovereign credit ratings (see Afonso et al., 2011, Reusens and Croux, 
2017 among others).   
In this chapter, we extend the literature by implementing a Panel Vector 
AutoRegressive (PVAR) model for 72 countries from 1998 to 2016 which allows 
us to examine the behaviour of sovereign ratings, non-performing loans and a 
number of macroeconomic/financial variables in a multivariate framework 
jointly.  We find a significant role for NPLs as a measure of banking risk in affecting 
sovereign credit rating decisions and vice versa. In particular, we rely on 
Generalized Impulse Response Functions to identify a significant and persistent 
effect of NPLs on sovereign credit ratings over and above the impact of other 
drivers, namely economic policy uncertainty, GDP growth, government debt-to-
GDP ratio, investment-to-GDP ratio, and the fiscal balance-to-GDP ratio. Second, 
we find that economic policy uncertainty shocks trigger a negative and persistent 
effect on sovereign rating decisions, following the financial turmoil and the 
subsequent Eurozone crisis.  Our results are robust to a logistic transformation of 
sovereign ratings to numbers and alternative measures of uncertainty and 
banking risk.   
This chapter provides additional insight towards understanding how CRAs make 
sovereign credit rating decisions by flagging the importance of NPLs in driving 
these decisions. With this in mind, our results should be useful to regulators like 
the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) who monitor CRAs in 
1. Introduction 
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order to understand their rating methodology and assess the quality of their 
ratings.  
In chapter 4, we move to the corporate sector by examining the adverse 
consequences of sovereign rating downgrades on firms’ operational efficiency 
through the so-called sovereign ceiling channel. Sovereign rating downgrades lead 
to an asymmetric effect on corporate ratings through the sovereign ceiling rule. In 
that sense, the probability of being downgraded is much higher for firms with a 
rating equal to or above their sovereign (treated firms) than firms rated below 
their sovereign (control firms). The chapter adds additional information on the 
very recent literature of the real effect of rating downgrades on firm outcomes 
(see Almeida et al., 2017, Wang and Yang, 2019).  
From a theoretical point of view, credit rating downgrades might directly affect 
operational efficiency by changing the profitability of available projects and 
through changes in capital structure under the agency costs hypothesis (Berger 
and Di Patti, 2006). They can also affect operational efficiency since the 
management team learns from credit rating decisions and adjust their strategy 
following them. We examine the question by incorporating a novel dataset of 
482,289 firm-year observations and 49,449 different firms from 81 developed and 
emerging market countries. We perform difference-in-differences estimations by 
comparing changes in the outcome variables between firms which have a rating 
equal to or above the corresponding sovereign (treated firms) and similar firms 
which have a lower rating than the corresponding sovereign (nontreated firms). 
Our linear regressions identify an adverse effect from credit rating downgrades 
on sales growth and Return on Assets, while we do not find any evidence from 
credit rating downgrades on the ratio of Sales to the Book value of Assets, the ratio 
of Sales to the book value of assets in place and the ratio of Selling, General and 
Administrative Costs to Sales. Moreover, our difference in difference estimation in 
the matched sample analysis shows that Sales growth of firms with a rating equal 
to or above the corresponding sovereign drop by 1.38% more than Sales growth 
of firms rated below their corresponding sovereign following a sovereign rating 
downgrade. However, the rest of the operational efficiency measures are not 
affected by a sovereign rating downgrade using the matched sample analysis. This 
chapter might be of interest for corporations since they show whether and how 
rating downgrades do matter for their efficiency, over and above the effect of 
macroeconomic fundamentals. It is also of interest for governments that should 
always consider the negative externalities of their sovereign downgrade in the 
corporate sector. 
The rest of the thesis proceeds as follows. In chapter 2, we examine the effect of 
economic policy uncertainty on sovereign credit rating decisions in a panel 
quantile framework, while in chapter 3, we investigate the two-way effect 
between sovereign credit ratings and non-performing loans in a multivariate 
framework. In chapter 4, we investigate the effect of sovereign rating downgrades 
on firm operational efficiency through the sovereign ceiling channel. Finally, 
chapter 5 offers concluding remarks and directions for further research. Chapters 
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2, 3 and 4 are self-contained in the sense that we (re)introduce variables, 
notations, and acronyms in each of them. Where possible, we use the same 
acronyms across chapters to aid readability. The purpose of this strategy is to 
enhance readability.
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2. ECONOMIC POLICY UNCERTAINTY AND SOVEREIGN CREDIT RATING 
DECISIONS: PANEL QUANTILE EVIDENCE FOR THE EUROZONE 
2.1 Introduction 
During the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 and the subsequent recession, 
Central Banks and governments responded by injecting additional liquidity into 
the system and pursuing expansionary fiscal policies, respectively. With the world 
economy in (the process of returning to) normality, fiscal positions are also being 
tightened up. Nevertheless, the significant deterioration of public finances post-
20072 has put on alert Credit Rating Agencies (hereafter CRAs). For instance, 
Moody’s Investor Services, a major credit rating agency, has downgraded over the 
2008-2013 period the debt rating of a number of peripheral European countries, 
namely Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (hereafter the GIIPS) and Cyprus 
by 63 notches in total.3 Similar decisions have been implemented by the other two 
main CRAs, namely Standard & Poor’s (S&P’s) and Fitch Ratings, respectively.4 
Sovereign credit ratings provide a measure of the probability that a country will 
default on its debt obligations. In that sense, they set the tone for borrowing costs 
in international markets both for a sovereign state and the financial institutions 
operating in that sovereign state (for recent evidence, see Drago and Gallo, 
2017a). This is vital for stimulating investments and supporting economic growth. 
Chen et al. 2013, show that a one-notch upgrade (downgrade) causes an increase 
(decline) of about 0.6% (0.3%) in re-rated countries’ five-year average annual 
growth rates after accounting for other determinants of economic growth. 
Changes in country rating affect economic growth via the interest-rate and capital-
flow channels: narrower sovereign bond yield spreads and increased capital 
inflows are associated with upgrades, which stimulate re-rated countries’ 
economic performance, and the converse holds for downgrades.  
Reputational concerns do discipline the decisions made by CRAs (see e.g. Bar-
Isaac and Shapiro, 2013 and Mariano, 2012). However, the value of reputation 
depends on economic fundamentals that vary over the business cycle. Using a 
theoretical model of credit ratings with endogenous reputation, Bar-Isaac and 
Shapiro (2013) relate credit rating decisions to the economic cycle. They find that 
CRAs are more likely to issue less accurate ratings when fee-income is high, the 
economy is booming and securities’ default probabilities are low. Indeed, during 
booms, hiring skilled analysts becomes more expensive for CRAs. At the same 
 
2 For instance, the International Monetary Fund estimates that gross debt in thirty-nine advanced 
economies deteriorated from 71.2% of GDP in 2007 to 107.5% in 2016 whereas gross debt in the 
Euro area deteriorated from 64.9% of GDP in 2007 to 91.7% of GDP in 2016. Data available from: 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/02/weodata/weoselagr.aspx.  
3 In particular, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Cyprus have been downgraded by 14, 10, 
6, 10, 9 and 14 notches, respectively by Moody’s. 
4 The three main CRAs have a total EU market share of 92.85% (see 
https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/20161662_cra_market_share_calculati
on.pdf).  
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time, CRAs can potentially charge higher fees and since bond issues are less likely 
to default, monitoring a CRA activity becomes less effective.  
This chapter attempts a comprehensive assessment of credit rating decisions 
made by the three main CRAs for the Eurozone economies in light of the ongoing 
criticism discussed above. The existing literature on the determinants of sovereign 
credit ratings has focused on several macroeconomic, qualitative and risk factors. 
Recent studies focus on time-varying models of credit ratings (Reusens and Croux, 
2017) and models with debt levels conditional on debt being above or below 
endogenously determined debt threshold levels (Hmiden et al., 2016). Prior to 
this, Afonso et al. (2011) examine differentiations across rating levels by splitting 
their dataset into two groups according to the ratings level, namely high-rated 
countries with credit grades BBB+ and above and low rated countries with credit 
grades BBB and below. 
Arguably, however, the actual degree of importance of the different explanatory 
variables across the conditional distribution of sovereign credit rating has not 
been explored in detail as most of the studies focus on the average responses.  
We fill the gap in the literature by implementing panel quantile estimation with 
nonadditive fixed effects as proposed by Powell (2016). The main advantage of 
Powell’s (2016) method relative to other quantile methods is that it provides 
point estimates which can be interpreted in the same way as the ones coming from 
cross-sectional regression. Our contribution to the existing literature is 
summarised as follows: First, we employ a panel quantile framework that allows 
us to observe the relative importance of quantitative and qualitative factors across 
the conditional distribution of sovereign credit ratings. Second, we augment the 
information set considered in previous studies by examining and identifying the 
significant impact of competitiveness and the European economic policy 
uncertainty index on the Eurozone sovereign credit ratings.   
The implementation of Economic policy uncertainty is mostly motivated by the 
unprecedented S&Ps’ decision to remove AAA from the US economy for the first 
time in history in 2011. Characteristically, S&P’s (2011) states “More broadly, the 
downgrade reflects our view that the effectiveness,  stability, and predictability of 
American policymaking and political  institutions have weakened at a time of 
ongoing fiscal and economic  challenges to a degree more than we envisioned 
when we assigned a  negative outlook to the rating on April 18, 2011”. 
Consequently, economic policy uncertainty captures the ability of policymakers to 
act quickly and decisively to face new economic and political challenges.  
The motivation for using competitiveness indicator arises from policymakers that 
have highlighted competitiveness as one of the main weaknesses of Eurozone 
periphery countries and from past studies that have connected weak 
competitiveness to high sovereign spreads. De Santis (2014) show that sovereign 
spreads of Eurozone countries with weaker fiscal fundamentals, a lower degree of 
competitiveness and a higher need of foreign financing were more exposed to 
spillover effects from Greece.  Moreover, Maltritz (2012) finds that the most likely 
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country specific drivers of yield spreads are fiscal variables such as budget balance 
and government debt, as well as external sector variables, such as terms of trade, 
trade balance and openness. All things considered, it is possible that 
competitiveness affect directly sovereign credit ratings. 
Among our findings, the unemployment rate, regulatory quality, and 
competitiveness have a stronger impact on low rated countries whereas GDP per 
capita is a major driver of high rated countries. A reduction in the current account 
deficit or an increase in the current account surplus leads to a rating or outlook 
upgrade for low rated countries. Economic policy uncertainty impacts negatively 
on credit ratings across the conditional distribution; however, the impact is 
stronger on the lower rated countries. We quantify the effects of uncertainty on 
credit ratings by using estimates of our model under uncertainty to infer what 
credit ratings would have been had uncertainty remained at its 2002-2007 pre-
financial and pre-European debt crisis average value. We find that economic policy 
uncertainty in the Euro area has reduced Greece’s credit rating by some 3 notches 
at the height of the Eurozone crisis in 2011 and 2012; the impact of uncertainty 
has been substantial but somewhat less severe for the remaining GIIPS and 
Cyprus. In other words, our empirical analysis suggests a pivotal role that 
economic policy uncertainty in the Euro area has played in downgrading the credit 
profile of Eurozone’s periphery. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 provides a review of the 
literature. Section 2.3 discusses the data. Section 2.4 introduces the model and 
Section 2.5 presents the empirical estimates. Section 2.6 provides a discussion of 
our findings and offers some policy implications. Finally, Section 2.7 offers some 
concluding remarks. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
The determinants of sovereign credit ratings were firstly monitored in the 
literature by Cantor and Packer (1996).  A set of macroeconomic variables such as 
GDP per capita, GDP growth, inflation, fiscal balance, external balance, external 
debt, economic development and default history used to explain the variation in 
sovereign credit ratings implementing Ordinary Least Squares for a set industrial 
and emerging countries.   That set of variables managed to explain 92% of the 
variation of sovereign credit ratings. Eliasson (2002), using the same set of 
explanatory variables, implements both a static and a dynamic panel model to 
explain sovereign ratings and concludes that the dynamic model had greater 
explanatory power than the static one.   Attention has also been given to the fit of 
alternative econometric models. Afonso et. al. (2009) compare ordered response 
models and conclude that the random effects ordered probit model is more 
preferable than the ordered probit and ordered logit models as it takes into 
account the additional cross-section error.  
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Recent studies also shed some light on the behaviour of CRAs across rating levels 
and over time.  Afonso et al. (2011) include time year averages to differentiate 
between short and long run effects. Moreover, they examine differentiations 
across rating levels by splitting their dataset into two groups according to the 
ratings level, namely high-rated countries with credit grades BBB+ and above and 
low rated countries with credit grades BBB and below. They also check 
differentiations through time by cutting their sample into two dub periods, before 
and after the East Asian crisis. Regarding their findings, per capita GDP, real GDP 
growth, government debt, and government deficit had a short-run impact on a 
country’s credit rating. On the other hand, government effectiveness, external 
debt, foreign reserves, and sovereign default dummies had only a long-run impact. 
Besides, the East Asian crisis had no fundamental change in the CRAs assessment 
method. Reusens and Croux (2017) estimate a multi-year ordered probit model 
by applying the composite marginal likelihood approach in order to examine the 
relative importance of explanatory variables over time.  They find, among others, 
that financial balance, economic development, and external debt gain greater 
significance after 2009. The impact of Eurozone membership turned out from 
positive to negative and the GDP growth rate became more crucial from highly 
indebted countries after 2009. 
Dimitrakopoulos and Kolossiatis (2016) examine the presence of persistence on 
sovereign credit ratings.  They also check if sovereign credit ratings were sticky or 
procyclical for the Eurozone Debt Crisis and the East Asian Crisis.  They find 
statistical evidence of stickiness and rating persistence by estimating a dynamic 
panel ordered probit model with autocorrelated disturbances and 
nonparametrically distributed random effects. Finally, Hmiden and Cheick (2016) 
test the existence of a debt threshold level on sovereign credit ratings. The 
appropriate level is estimated endogenously by implementing a nonlinear panel 
smooth transition model.  They conclude that sovereign credit rating 
determinants vary across different debt levels. In that sense, GDP per capita, 
Inflation rate, and External Debt have a stronger impact on highly indebted 
countries.  
Sovereign credit ratings are one of the most crucial drivers of sovereign spreads. 
Thus, we should also be aware of what drives sovereign spreads for Eurozone 
countries.  That kind of dependence analysed above exists not only on 
macroeconomic variables but also on sovereign spreads. De Santis (2014) finds a 
spillover effect on sovereign spreads from Greece to countries with higher fiscal 
deficits, a lower degree of competitiveness and a greater need for financing from 
abroad.  He also concludes that the risk of sovereign spreads in the Euro area is 
differentiated on aggregate, country-specific, liquidity and contagion risk. De 
Grauwe and Ji (2014) study and compare the determinants of sovereign spreads 
between the Eurozone and the European Monetary System, that existed between 
1979 and 1999.  
On the one hand, government debt, current account balance and changes in the 
exchange rate affect sovereign spreads for the EMS from 1987 to 1999. On the 
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other hand, for the case of the Eurozone, government debt has a nonlinear effect 
on sovereign spreads, GDP growth a linear one, while the accumulated current 
account balance has an impact only after 2008.  Maltritz (2012), by estimating a 
Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) for 10 EMU member countries with annual data 
from 1999 to 2009, concludes that fiscal balance terms of trade, trade balance, and 
countries’ openness are the most significant country-specific drivers of sovereign 
yield spreads.  Attinasi et al., (2009) emphasize the role of fiscal fundamentals and 
government announcements of substantial bank rescue packages. They use a 
dynamic panel approach in selected euro area countries during the period 
between July 2007 and March 2009.  They find, among others that the 
announcement of bank bailout programs has led investors to a reconsider of the 
sovereign credit risk. In that sense, a part of the risk is transferred from the private 
financial sector to the public sector. They also support that higher expected fiscal 
deficit and higher expected government debt have led to higher sovereign bond 
spreads, with the impact of the former being more robust. 
 
2.3 Data 
We use annual data from 2002 to 2015 for nineteen Eurozone countries (266 
observations in total). Our dependent variable is the sovereign credit rating 
published by the three main international rating agencies, Moody’s, Standard & 
Poor’s (S&P’s) and Fitch Ratings (attributed at the end of each calendar year). A 
linear transformation of credit ratings to numerical scale is implemented starting 
from 21 for the highest quality with a stable outlook (AAA for Fitch and S&P’s and 
Aaa for Moody’s) and ending to 1 for Default (D for Fitch and S&P’s and C for 
Moody’s). The difference between two continuous ratings with the same outlook 
is always equal to 1. Not only we account for changes in credit ratings, but we also 
consider changes in credit outlooks.5 The difference between two continuous 
outlooks is always equal to 1/3, so the difference between two continuous ratings 
with the same outlook is still equal to one. Table 2.1 reports the linear 
transformation of credit ratings. 
We adopt a set of explanatory variables previously used in the literature (see 
Reusens and Croux, 2017; Dimitrakopoulos and Kolossiatis, 2016, Aizenman et al., 
2013 and Afonso et al., 2011), namely GDP per capita, Government Debt, Current 
Account Balance, Inflation Rate, Unemployment Rate, and Regulatory Quality 
Index. Further, we consider two new explanatory variables. The first one is the 
Competitiveness Indicator; an increase in the index implies lower 
 
5 We do not account for watch positive and watch negative outlooks for two reasons. First, we 
assume that the positive (negative) outlook is conceptually very close to watch positive (watch 
negative) outlook and, second, the number of watch positive and watch negative observations in 
our dataset is very small. 
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competitiveness, which impacts negatively on credit rating decisions.6 Weak 
competitiveness is often highlighted by government authorities and international 
organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European 
Commission (EC) and the European Central Bank (ECB) as one of the main 
drawbacks of the Eurozone’s periphery relative to Eurozone’s core. The second 
explanatory variable is the European Policy Uncertainty Index. It captures the 
impact of uncertainty, generally on the behaviour of rating agencies over time and 
more specifically, on the cumulative downgrades of periphery’s bonds during the 
recent Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. The index is constructed based on 
newspaper articles regarding policy uncertainty from 10 leading European 
newspapers. It counts the number of newspaper articles containing the terms 
uncertain or uncertainty, economic or economy, and one or more policy-relevant 
terms; for more information see Baker et al. (2016) and 
http://www.policyuncertainty.com/index.html. Table 2.2 provides details on our 
data definitions and sources. 
Next, we discuss the expected impact of each explanatory variable on credit 
ratings: 
GDP per capita – positive response: Higher GDP per capita coincides with a larger 
tax base and, therefore, an increased ability of the government to repay its 
obligations. This variable can also reflect economic development.  The positive 
response has also been found in the literature (see Cantor and Packer, 1996, 
Afonso et al., 2011, Reusens and Croux, 2017, among others) 
Government debt – negative response: A high stock of government debt implies 
higher interest rates to accommodate it. Therefore, additional financial resources 
are needed to repay debt obligations. Higher government debt can increase the 
risk of default. The negative effect is also justified from past studies (see Cantor 
and Packer, 1996, Afonso et al., 2011, Reusens and Croux, 2017, among others) 
Current account balance – uncertain response: On the one hand, a higher current 
account deficit can signal overconsumption, undermining prosperity in the long 
run. On the other hand, it might have a positive effect, taking into account the 
productivity of the additional investments and their potentially positive economic 
impact in the short run. The theoretically uncertain response of credit ratings on 
current account balance changes is also justified from the existing literature. 
Cantor and Packer (1996) find a positive effect, while Afonso et al. (2011) and 
Reusens  and Croux (2017) find a negative and an insignificant effect respectively.  
Inflation rate – uncertain response: Higher inflation rates are a sign of structural 
and macroeconomic imbalances in the government’s finances. On the other hand, 
meager inflation might lead to a deflationary spiral (Reusens and Croux, 2017). If 
 
6 This is the harmonised competitiveness indicator based on unit labour costs indices for the total 
economy; available from: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/ecb_statistics/escb/html/table.en.html?id=JDF_EXR_HCI_ULC
T&period=index. 
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we were dealing with debt in domestic currency, high inflation reduces the real 
stock of government debt in domestic currency and partially offsets the negative 
impact of high inflation.  However, previous studies (Cantor and Packer 1996, 
Afonso et al. 2011, Reusens and Croux 2017) find a predominantly negative 
impact of Inflation Rate on sovereign credit ratings 
Unemployment rate – negative response: A country with lower unemployment 
has an efficient labour market. The lower is the unemployment, the greater is 
overall taxable income and the lower the fiscal burden for unemployment 
subsidies. Past studies (Cantor and Packer, 1996, Afonso et al., 2011, Reusens and 
Croux 2017, among others) also find a negative impact 
Regulatory quality7 – positive response: A high value of regulatory quality index 
reflects the ability of the government to implement necessary regulations that can 
boost private sector development and increase investment and GDP. Moreover, it 
can be a qualitative quantification of the government’s willingness to repay its 
obligations. Afonso et al. (2011) find a positive impact, in line with the theoretical 
argument. 
Competitiveness indicator – negative response: Competitiveness reflects a 
country’s ability to attract private investments in an international environment. 
European policy uncertainty – negative response: Higher uncertainty worsens the 
economic environment, makes consumers and investors more cautious and 
reduces future consumption and investment. In addition, economic policy 
uncertainty captures the ability of policymakers to act quickly and decisively 
against new economic challenges.  
 
2.4 Methodology 
Quantile regression is appropriate when the variables of interest potentially have 
varying effects at different points of the conditional distribution of the outcome 
variable. In recent years, there has been a growing literature that combines 
quantile estimation with panel data. In mean regression, panel data allow for the 
inclusion of fixed effects to capture within-group variation. Many quantile panel 
data estimators use an analogous method and include additive fixed effects. 
However, the additive fixed effects change the underlying model. We implement 
the quantile regression estimator for panel data (QRPD) with nonadditive fixed 
effects introduced by Powell (2016). The main advantage of this method relative 
 
7 Regulatory quality index is a combination of several individual variables such as investment and 
financial freedom, business regulatory environment, competition policy, tax inconsistency, 
financial institution's transparency, public sector openness to foreign bidders and easiness to start 
new business. See:  http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/rq.pdf.  
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to the existing quantile estimators with additive fixed effects (αi) is that it provides 
estimates of the distribution of Yit  given Dit instead of Yit – αi  given Dit.8  
Powell (2016) notes that in many empirical applications the latter is undesirable. 
This is because observations at the top of the (Yit − αi) distribution may be at the 
bottom of the Yit distribution and therefore additive fixed effect models cannot 
provide information about the effects of the policy variables on the outcome 
distribution. Thus, Powell’s (2016) method provides point estimates which can be 
interpreted in the same way as the ones coming from cross-sectional regression. 
It is also consistent for small T.  The underlying model is: 
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where Yit  is the sovereign credit rating for each CRA,  βj is the parameter of  
interest, Dit  is the set of explanatory variables and 
*
itU  is the error term that may 
be a function of several disturbance terms, some fixed and some time-varying.  The 
model is linear in parameters and 
' ( )itD    is strictly increasing in  . In general, 
for the th  quantile of itY , quantile regression relies on the conditional restriction:   
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Equation (2.2) states that the probability the outcome variable is smaller than the 
quantile function is the same for all Dit and equal to  . Powell’s (2016) QRPD 
estimator allows this probability to vary by individual and even within-individual 
as long as such variation is orthogonal to the instruments. Thus, QRPD relies on a 
conditional restriction and an unconditional restriction, letting 1( ,..., )i i iTD D D= : 
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Powell (2016) develops the estimator in an instrumental variables context given 
instruments ( ) 1,...,i i iTZ Z Z=  but notes that if the explanatory variables are 
exogenous (in which case i iD Z= ) many of the identification conditions are met 
 
8 That is due to the different structural quantile functions (SQF). The SQF of QRPD is 
' ( )d   . In 
contrast, the SQF of models using additive fixed effects is 
_ _
' ( )i d  +  where d denotes potential 
values of Dit and τ is the relevant quantile of Yit.  The notation 
_ _
( )    for the additive fixed effect 
model is used to highlight that these parameters are different than those used in the nonadditive 
fixed effects model. 
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trivially. The estimation uses the Generalized Method of Moments. Sample 
moments are defined as: 
1
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Using (2.3), the parameter set is defined as: 
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Then, the parameter of interest is estimated as 
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for some weighting matrix ˆ . The model is estimated using the Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo (MCMC) optimization method.9  
 
2.5 Empirical results 
2.5.1 Main estimates 
We capture the varying effects on credit ratings by estimating the model for the 
0.05, 0.10, 0.15,…, 0.75 quantiles for each of the three CRAs (the model also 
estimates time fixed effects).10 In order to control for potential endogeneity, we 
re-run the same model treating all explanatory variables as endogenous and using 
first-order lags as instruments. Estimated results (reported in Tables 2.9-2.11) are 
very similar to those reported below.  Mean regressions are also reported in the 
(Table 2.18) 
Tables 2.3-2.5 report estimated coefficients, associated p-values, the pseudo-R2 
and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) for each quantile and each CRA. All 
explanatory variables have the expected signs and are statistically significant at 
almost all quantiles. The impact of the unemployment rate, regulatory quality and 
competitiveness is stronger at low ratings. For instance, the coefficient of the 
unemployment rate reduces from -0.4446 at the 0.05 quantile to -0.2201 at the 
0.35 quantile and then to -0.0069 at the 0.75 quantile for Fitch. The estimates for 
 
9 All estimations are done in STATA using David Powell’s quantile estimator with nonadditive fixed 
effects  available at: 
https://sites.google.com/site/davidmatthewpowell/quantile-regression-with-nonadditive-fixed-
effects.  
10 Almost 25% of the observations are in the highest quality AAA. That is the reason why 0.75 is 
the highest quantile we employ in this chapter. 
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Moody’s and S&P’s follow a similar pattern. Based on the quantile distribution, the 
impact of an improvement in regulatory quality on credit ratings is almost two 
times higher for countries rated at A1 and below for Moody’s than those rated at 
Aa3 and almost 8 times higher than those rated at Aa1 or Aaa (Appendix Figures 
2.4-2.6 map the sovereign credit ratings to the quantile distribution for the three 
CRAs; these should be read together with Table 2.1). Additionally, ceteris paribus, 
an annual decrease in the cost competitiveness index by seven points of the index 
(such a move is not unusual in our dataset) brings about one half (≈7∗0.0687) of 
a notch upgrade at the 0.05 quantile for S&P’s, one quarter (≈7∗0.0324) of a notch 
upgrade at the 0.35 and only 0.05 (≈7∗0.0061) of a notch upgrade at the 0.75 
quantile. The impact of government debt on credit ratings is almost equally 
important for countries rated at adequate payment capacity and below and for 
those rated at high and highest quality, but impressively enough, is less strong for 
countries rated at strong payment capacity (that is, A1, A2, and A3 ratings for 
Moody’s, and A+, A, and A- ratings for S&P’s and Fitch) for all three CRAs. For 
example, the coefficient of Government Debt for S&P’s is -0.0398 at the 0.15 
quantile, -0.0370 at the 0.70 quantile but only -0.0209 and -0.0069 at the 0.45 and 
0.50 quantiles, respectively.  
CRAs attribute a higher weight on GDP per capita11 for high rated countries; the 
impact of GDP per capita on sovereign credit rating is almost five times higher for 
the 0.65 quantile relative to the 0.15 one and almost two times higher relative to 
the 0.30 and 0.35 quantiles for Fitch. Therefore, the high level of GDP per capita 
provides a ‘safety net’ safeguarding (to some extent) against downgrades in the 
case of high rated countries. 
The significance of the inflation rate varies across the rating distribution but 
without any specific trend pattern. Economic policy uncertainty impacts 
negatively on credit ratings across the quantile distribution and the impact is 
stronger on the lower rated countries; in other words, when European uncertainty 
kicks in, low rated countries take a much bigger ‘hit’ than high rated countries. 
Further, the uncertainty effect is stronger for Moody’s and weaker for Fitch at all 
quantiles. 
The impact of the current account balance is positive at the 0.05, 0.10 and 0.15 
quantiles for all agencies and remains positive at the 0.20, 0.25, and 0.30 quantiles 
for S&P’s and at the 0.20 and 0.30 quantiles for Fitch. The impact of the current 
account turns negative at all other quantiles for all CRAs. Hence, we find an 
asymmetric impact of the current account over the quantile distribution of 
sovereign ratings. Noting that the impact of the current account balance on 
sovereign credit ratings is theoretically uncertain, our analysis shows that a 
 
11 Moody’s GDP per capita coefficients at the 0.05 and 0.10 part of the distribution are counter-
intuitive as is the S&P's GDP per capita coefficient at the 0.05 one. This, however, does not apply to 
Fitch. One possibility for this result is that countries at this very low part of the distribution, mainly 
Greece after 2010 and Cyprus after 2012, have witnessed persistent recession in the second half 
of the sample. 
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reduction in the current account deficit or an increase in the current account 
surplus leads to a rating or outlook upgrade for low rated countries which have 
historically recorded high current account deficits.12 The effect is entirely different 
for countries with strong payment capacity, high and highest quality. In this case, 
a higher current account deficit or a lower current account surplus is associated 
with either higher creditworthiness or positive economic prospects of the 
economy and consequently a higher sovereign rating (Afonso et al., 2011). But 
why low rated countries (namely the GIIPS and Cyprus) are downgraded when 
they record higher current account deficits? Recalling that current account deficits 
reflect net borrowing from abroad, one might argue that there is nothing 
intrinsically wrong with current account imbalances if countries borrow from 
abroad to invest in capacity which consequently allows them to satisfy their debt 
obligations. Rather than doing this, Eurozone’s periphery funds from abroad 
largely ended up in non-traded sectors (like government consumption and 
housing); see, for instance, the discussion in Baldwin and Giavazzi (2015).  
 
2.5.2 Robustness checks 
As alternatives to the European policy uncertainty index, we use (a) the US policy 
uncertainty index of Baker et al. (2016) and (b) the Euro area uncertainty proxy 
of Girardi and Reuter (2017). Like the European policy uncertainty index, the US 
one captures the policy-related economic uncertainty by counting the number of 
newspaper articles containing the terms uncertain or uncertainty, economic or 
economy, and one or more policy-relevant terms of ten leading newspapers 
(including The Washington Post, The New York Times and The Wall Street 
Journal) and can be thought of as capturing spillover US economic policy effects to 
the Eurozone area. On the other hand, the Girardi and Reuter (2017) uncertainty 
measure pools information from 22 forward-looking business and consumer 
survey questions contained in the EU Business and Consumer Surveys program 
(see Girardi and Reuter, 2017).  
The correlation between the European and US policy indices is equal to 0.80 
whereas the correlation between the European policy index and the survey-based 
uncertainty measure of Girardi and Reuter (2017) is much weaker and equal to 
0.20. Figure 2.1 plots together with the three uncertainty measures. Notice that 
European policy uncertainty is much more volatile than the remaining uncertainty 
measures; it also shows a marked increase following from the 2008-2009 financial 
crisis and the most recent Eurozone debt crisis in 2011-2012. It drops after ECB 
 
12 Over 2002-2015, Greece recorded an average current account deficit of 7.61% as a share of its 
GDP. The corresponding deficit figures for Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Cyprus were 0.85%, 
0.87%, 6.63%, 4.02% and 6.45%. By contrast, the Euro area recorded an average current account 
surplus of 0.71% as a share of its GDP. 
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President Mario Draghi pledged in 2012 that the ECB was ‘ready to do whatever it 
takes’ to protect the Eurozone from collapse.13 
Tables 2.12-2.14 report the empirical estimates using the US economic policy 
uncertainty index. As can be seen from Tables 2.12-2.14, there is a spillover 
negative impact of US uncertainty on Eurozone’s credit ratings but the impact is 
smaller compared to the European uncertainty impact reported in Tables 2.3-2.5. 
There is mixed evidence in terms of whether the model using the European policy 
uncertainty index dominates the model using the US one. In the case of Moody’s, 
the model using the European uncertainty index delivers a lower Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) than the model using the US index in 7 out of the 15 
quantiles of the rating distribution. In the case of S&P’s, the model using the 
European uncertainty index delivers a lower AIC than the model using the US 
index in 6 out of the 15 quantiles of the rating distribution. In the case of Fitch, 
however, the dominance of the European index is much stronger; indeed, the 
model using the European uncertainty index delivers a lower AIC than the model 
using the US index in 11 out of the 15 quantiles of the rating distribution. To save 
space, we do not report our estimates using the uncertainty survey-based 
measure of Girardi and Reuter (2017); these estimates are available on request. 
We note, however, that the statistical evidence in favour of a negative impact of 
the uncertainty survey-based measure is much weaker (for Moody’s, this happens 
in 6 out of the 15 quantiles of the rating distribution; the corresponding figures 
for S&P’s and Fitch are 7 and 8, respectively).  
Compared to the alternative uncertainty measures, the stronger impact of the 
European policy uncertainty index should not necessarily come as a surprise. 
Policymakers have arguably been rather slow in putting together a workable plan 
dealing with the Eurozone crisis as planning requires in general parliamentary 
approval from all member states. In addition, the major institutions (nick-named 
as the ‘Troika’ of the International Monetary Fund, the European Commission and 
the European Central Bank) have not always agreed on how to deal with issues of 
the crisis, therefore, fuelling policy uncertainty in the Euro area.14 Indeed, 
Eurozone’s institutional infrastructure was not prepared to deal with the crisis. 
Baldwin and Giavazzi (2015, page 21) noted critically that “judging from market 
reactions, each policy intervention made things worse” and that it was only in the 
summer of 2012 with the ‘whatever it takes’ assertion by ECB President Mario 
Draghi that the corner was turned.   
Moreover, Girardi and Reuter (2017) Index captures uncertainty from the 
perception of businesses, which is different from the uncertainty arising from 
policymakers’ decisions. Furthermore, that Index is much less volatile than the 
European and the American Economic Policy Uncertainty Index. All the above 
 
13 See e.g. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/9428894/Debt-crisis-Mario-
Draghi-pledges-to-do-whatever-it-takes-to-save-euro.html. 
14 See e.g. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-33531845.  
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things considered might explain the less pronounced effect of Girardi and Reuter 
(2017) uncertainty Index.  As a direction of further research, it would be 
interesting to study the effect of economic uncertainty on sovereign rating 
decisions by using more refined and superior measures of uncertainty such as that 
of Jurado et al. (2015). The use of more accurate measures of uncertainty could 
potentially contribute to improve the accuracy of sovereign rating models. 
In the preliminary analysis, we added the growth rate of GDP as an extra 
explanatory variable but found very weak evidence of a positive and statistically 
significant impact on credit ratings; this might have to do with the persistently 
weak GDP growth rates observed in the Euro area over the recent years. Arguably, 
however, the impact of GDP growth on credit ratings is indirectly captured by the 
impact of the unemployment rate through an Okun’s-law type of approximation 
(in which case there is an inverse relationship between unemployment and GDP 
growth). 
Fiscal discipline has been on the agenda of policymakers in the Euro area after 
2009. Fiscal balance to-GDP-ratio was not a major concern for CRAs in making 
credit rating decisions for developed countries until the recent Eurozone debt 
crisis; Reusens and Croux (2017) identify a significant positive effect from the 
fiscal balance-to-GDP ratio on credit ratings only after 2009. In our case, we could 
only find some statistical evidence using the lagged fiscal balance-to-GDP ratio as 
an explanatory variable. Arguably, such a finding has to do with continuous 
revisions in the fiscal balance variable as well as the disagreement between 
authorities not only on the predicted fiscal balance but also on the actual 
outcome15 16; to this end, we mention the study of De Castro et al. (2013) who find 
that most preliminary European Union government balance data releases “are 
biased and non efficient predictors of subsequent releases, with later vintages of 
data tending to show lower budget balances than indicated by earlier data 
releases on average” (De Castro et al., 2013, page 1207). In light of this, CRAs might 
have been reluctant to monitor current fiscal balance for credit rating decisions 
which, in turn, might explain why lagged fiscal balance might play more of a role. 
Tables 2.15-2.17   suggest that there is a positive effect of the lagged fiscal balance 
throughout the distribution for Moody's, whereas, for S&P’s and Fitch, we find a 
negative effect at the 0.10 and 0.15 quantiles of distribution (estimates on the 
remaining variables are qualitatively similar to what we report in Tables 2.3-2.5).  
Our quantile panel model offers valuable and additional information compared to 
a standard panel model with fixed individual and time effects; detailed estimates 
of the latter model for all three CRAs are given in table 2.18. We illustrate some 
differences between the two models by focusing on the impact of regulatory 
quality in Figure 2.2 and on the impact of competitiveness in Figure 2.3. Figure 2.2 
plots the estimated impact of regulatory quality for Moody’s across the conditional 
distribution of credit ratings (based on the quantile panel model reported in Table 
 
15 See, for instance: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-deficits-idUSTRE63L1G420100422. 
16 See: http://ec.europa.eu/info/files/winter-2017-economic-forecast-greece_en.  
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2.3) together with the estimated impact of regulatory quality for a standard panel 
model with fixed individual and time effects (based on the fixed effect model 
presented on table 2.18); the latter focuses on the conditional mean response of 
credit ratings. Figure 2.3 plots the estimated impact of competitiveness for Fitch 
across the conditional distribution of credit ratings (based on the quantile panel 
model reported in Table 2.5) together with the estimated impact of 
competitiveness for the standard panel model with fixed individual and time 
effects (based on the fixed effect model presented on table 2.18). As can be seen 
from Figures 2.2 and 2.3, relying on the impact of the model with fixed effects 
misses valuable information across the quantile distribution that can only be 
captured by the quantile panel model discussed throughout this chapter. 
 
2.6 Discussion of results and policy implications 
From a policy point of view, and noting the higher relative importance of the 
competitiveness and regulatory quality indices for Eurozone countries with low 
credit ratings, our results suggest that structural reforms and improvements in 
the competitiveness profile of these very countries will improve significantly their 
low rating profile and therefore reduce their borrowing costs in financial markets. 
This is in line with policy recommendations recently put forward by the European 
Commission.17 In addition, a decrease in policy uncertainty in the Eurozone area 
could favour all countries, but low rated would gain more in terms of their credit 
rating score. We also note the potential of indirect spillover effects from sovereign 
credit rating decisions on low rated countries to Eurozone’s sovereign bond 
yields; for instance, De Santis (2014) identifies spillover effects in terms of the 
direct impact of a Greek credit rating downgrade on other Eurozone sovereign 
yields. 
We can illustrate the effects of European uncertainty on credit ratings by using 
estimates of our credit rating model under uncertainty to infer what credit ratings 
would have been had uncertainty remained at its 2002-2007 average value. To do 
this, we construct the difference between the fitted values of the estimates of 
credit rating model (2.1) for each CRA (as reported in Tables 2.3-2.5) and the 
fitted values of the counterfactual model (2.1) which sets the post-2007 values of 
the uncertainty variable equal to its 2002-2007 average.  
Tables 2.6-2.8 report the difference between the fitted and the counterfactual 
values for Eurozone’s periphery, namely all GIIPS (that is, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain) and Cyprus where a negative value of this difference indicates 
that credit ratings are lower because of the increased uncertainty.   
Our estimates suggest that economic policy uncertainty has impacted negatively 
on the credit ratings of all GIIPS and Cyprus during the 2008-2015 period. The 
impact has been more prolonged for Greece. Notice that uncertainty has reduced 
 
17 See: http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2016/cr2016_comm_en.pdf. 
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Greece’s credit rating by some 3 notches at the height of the Eurozone crisis in 
2011 and 2012 (the impact is higher in the case of Moody’s and Fitch and slightly 
lower in the case of S&P’s). This is not surprising. Greece has witnessed successive 
bail-outs and remains (at the time of writing this chapter) on bail-out support.18  
From Tables 2.6-2.8, the impact of uncertainty on the remaining GIIPS and Cyprus 
is still substantial but, in general, less severe than what Greece witnessed 
(Portugal suffered, due to uncertainty, the same rating downgrades as Greece in 
2011-2014; Cyprus suffered, due to uncertainty, the same rating downgrades as 
Greece in 2012-2015).19 Again, this should not come as a surprise as the remaining 
GIIPS and Cyprus witnessed less ‘expensive’ and ‘smoother’ bail-outs; in fact, all 
these countries are now off bail-out support.20 
Earlier work by Livingston et al. (2010) suggests that Moody’s is more 
conservative (in the sense that it gives more inferior ratings) than S&P’s using 
data on US corporate bond rating decisions. From Tables 2.6-2.8, the impact of 
uncertainty on the GIIPS and Cyprus is, in general, more severe for Moody’s than 
for S&P’s and Fitch. Hence, our findings support the work of Livingston et al. 
(2010) in the sense that, since the recent financial and Eurozone crises, Moody’s 
have remained more conservative than the other CRAs because of European policy 
uncertainty concerns. 
Returning to Greece, we note that the Boards of Directors of the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) and European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 21 adopted, in 
January 2017, a set of short-term debt relief measures for Greece aiming at a 
 
18 Greece, which was bailed-out twice (for €110bn in 2010 and then again for €109bn in 2011), 
negotiated, in February 2012, a new €130bn rescue package involving a voluntary haircut of some 
53.5% on the face value of its bonds held by the private sector. Eurozone ministers agreed (in 
November 2012) to cut Greece’s debt by a further €40bn. In July 2015, Greece was bailed-out for 
a third time for €86bn. 
19 Notice, in Tables 2.6-2.8, some overlapping for a number of countries in a number of years. This 
should not come as a surprise. For a given quantile, the difference between the fitted values of the 
estimates of our credit rating model and the fitted values of the counterfactual model is equal to 
the estimated coefficient on uncertainty (for the quantile in question) times the difference between 
uncertainty in time period t and mean uncertainty (over 2002-2007). Recall that European 
uncertainty does not vary at the cross-sectional dimension. When two (or more countries) are 
placed in the same quantile of the rating distribution for a given time period t, the difference 
between the fitted values of the estimates of our credit rating model and the fitted values of the 
counterfactual model is the same. 
20 Ireland was bailed-out for €85bn in November 2010. Portugal was bailed-out for €78bn in May 
2011. Spain was granted, in July 2012, financial assistance from the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) for up to €100bn. Cyprus was bailed-out for €10bn in March 2013. See, for instance, the 
discussion in Dergiades et al., 2015 and The Financial Times ‘dedicated’ website (at 
https://www.ft.com/topics/themes/Greece_Debt_Crisis). 
21 ESM is a European Union permanent agency that provides financial assistance, in the form of 
loans, to Eurozone countries or as new capital to banks in difficulty. It has replaced the temporary 
EFSF. 
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cumulative reduction of Greece’s debt-to-GDP ratio of around 20 percentage 
points until 2060.22 
Policymakers from the so-called ‘Troika’ have repeatedly pointed out that Greece 
needs to proceed with structural reforms and improve its competitiveness as 
prerequisites for getting substantial ‘medium-term relief’. At the time of writing, 
Greece stood at the 0.05 quantile of the rating distribution of S&P’s (and the 
remaining CRAs), some 5 notches deep into ‘junk status territory’ 23 faced with a 
7% servicing cost for its 10-year debt; this was some 3 percentage points higher 
than the 10-year Portuguese yield and 5 percentage points higher than the 10-
year Spanish yield. Future rating upgrades of Greece (triggered, for instance, by 
accelerating structure reforms) will definitely push down Greek borrowing 
costs.24  
Although a deep front ‘voluntary’ haircut on Greek debt is not on the ‘negotiating 
table’, our estimates (in Table 2.4 for S&P’s) suggest that a haircut of as many as 
36 percentage points in the debt-to-GDP ratio (that is, from 179.7% in 2016 to 
143.7% in 2017) will, ceteris paribus, raise Greece’s credit rating by only 1 notch 
(≈36∗0.0277; results are similar using the estimates in Table 2.2 for Moody’s and 
in Table 2.5 for Fitch, respectively). A speedier and much more realistic (since 
debt haircut is not on the ‘negotiating table’) Greek exit from the ‘junk status 
territory’ would indeed be triggered by structural reforms (and an improvement 
in competitiveness). For instance, our estimates (in Table 2.4 for S&P’s) suggest 
that Greece would witness an upgrade of almost 3 notches25 by S&P’s if it were to 
implement structural reforms that would raise its regulatory quality index to the 
level observed for Portugal.  
 
2.7 Conclusions 
This chapter examines the determinants of sovereign credit ratings for the 
Eurozone countries from 2002 to 2015 in a panel quantile framework which 
allows the relative significance of the explanatory variables to vary across the 
quantile distribution of sovereign ratings. Our results are summarised as follows: 
First, the impact of the unemployment rate, regulatory quality and 
competitiveness is stronger for low rated countries whereas GDP per capita is a 
major driver of high rated countries; in other words, the high level of GDP per 
capita provides a ‘safety net’ safeguarding (to some extent) against downgrades 
 
22 See: https://www.esm.europa.eu/press-releases/esm-and-efsf-approve-short-term-debt-
relief-measures-greece.  
23 In 2017, the S&P’s, Moody’s and Fitch credit rating scores for Greece were B-, Caa3, and CCC, 
respectively. From Table 2.1, junk (or high credit risk) sovereign bonds carry a credit rating of 
BB+ or lower for S&P’s and Fitch and a credit rating of Ba1 or lower for Moody’s.  
24 Gibson et al. (2017) discuss in detail the strong interaction between sovereign ratings, sovereign 
borrowing costs and bank ratings in the Eurozone area.  
25 We derive 3 notches as ≈[(0.940-0.397)*5.075]; 5.075 is the estimated coefficient on regulatory 
quality and 0.947 and 0.397 refer to the regulatory quality values for Portugal and Greece, 
respectively. 
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in the case of high rated countries. Second, a reduction in the current account 
deficit or an increase in the current account surplus leads to a rating or outlook 
upgrade for low rated countries which have historically recorded high current 
account deficits whereas, for countries with strong payment capacity, a higher 
current account deficit or a lower current account surplus is associated with either 
higher creditworthiness or positive economic prospects of the economy and 
consequently a higher sovereign rating. Third, economic policy uncertainty 
impacts negatively on credit ratings across the quantile distribution; however, the 
impact is stronger on the lower rated countries. In other words, the 
creditworthiness of low rated countries takes a much bigger ‘hit’ than that of high 
rated countries when European uncertainty is on the rise. 
Our model, which allows for differential impact across the rating distribution, 
could arguably go some way towards shedding some light on how CRAs assign 
sovereign credit ratings. For instance, our counterfactual analysis suggests the 
pivotal role that economic policy uncertainty in the Euro area has played in driving 
down sovereign credit ratings in Eurozone’s periphery. We believe that our 
empirical analysis and results provide valuable information that can potentially 
be used by a new credit rating agency towards making credit rating decisions if 
indeed European policymakers decide to set up such an agency soon. 
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3. NON-PERFORMING LOANS AND SOVEREIGN CREDIT RATINGS 
3.1 Introduction 
In its January 2019 World Economic Outlook, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) noted that while global growth of 3.7% in 2018 remained close to post-crisis 
highs, the global expansion will somewhat weaken to 3.5% in 2019. 26 In fact, 
policymakers around the world have little room for complacency about future 
economic growth; for instance, (former) IMF Economic Counsellor and Director of 
Research Maurice Obstfeld (2018) noted that “as important as they have been to 
the recovery, easy financial conditions and fiscal support have also left a legacy of 
debt – government, and in some cases, corporate and household – in advanced and 
emerging economies alike.” 27  
The ongoing debt hangover brings again into focus the issue of assessing the 
probability of a (sovereign) default. This remains an important and unresolved 
issue, not least because of the difficulty of providing an accurate estimate of such 
probability that can create information asymmetry between governments, banks, 
corporations, and investors. This information gap has been traditionally filled by 
Credit Rating Agencies (hereafter CRAs) that publish sovereign credit ratings as 
measures of the probability that a country will repay its debt in full and on time. 
Therefore, sovereign ratings influence to a large extent borrowing costs in 
international markets both for a sovereign state and the financial institutions 
operating in that sovereign state (see e.g. Drago and Gallo, 2017a) which, in turn, 
affects the lending supply of banks (Drago and Gallo, 2017b) as well as investment 
decisions and ultimately economic growth (see e.g. Chen et al., 2016).  
With so much at stake in terms of future financial repayments and investment 
planning, it is not surprising that the way CRAs assess credit scores has received 
increasing attention. Criticism has focussed on the inability of CRAs to predict 
corporate defaults that took place in the US during 2007-2008 (see e.g. Baghai et 
al., 2014), their potential role in the acceleration of the sovereign debt crisis by 
massively downgrading Eurozone periphery bonds and on the effect of 
subjectivity in their assessment methods (see De Moor et al., 2018). 28 Decisions 
by CRAs have indeed been questioned by policymakers. In 2012, for instance, both 
European Central Bank (ECB) President Mario Draghi and (at the time) Bank of 
 
26 See https://blogs.imf.org/2019/01/21/a-weakening-global-expansion-amid-growing-risks/.  
27 According to the IMF World Economic Outlook Database, general government gross debt in 
advanced economies, at 102.8% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2018, will remain some 32 
percentage points above its pre-crisis level in 2007. General government gross debt in emerging 
market and developing economies, at 51.0% of GDP in 2018, will remain some 15 percentage 
points above its pre-crisis level.  
28 Herding bahavior issues are also at play. For instance, Lugo et al. (2015) assess the herding 
behavior of CRAs in the US Home Equity Loan market to find that since the start of the subprime 
crisis, rating convergence is more likely when Fitch rather than the rival (Moody’s or S&P’s) has to 
adjust its evaluation downwards. 
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England Governor Mervyn King urged investors to pay less attention to CRAs and 
to make up their own minds about how much the region’s debt is worth.29  
This chapter takes the issues raised above to the data by modelling the behavior 
of sovereign ratings in the case of the three main CRAs, namely Moody’s Investor 
Services, Standard & Poor’s (S&P’s) and Fitch Ratings.30 We extend recent 
literature (see e.g. Reusens and Croux, 2017and references therein) by identifying 
a feedback loop between sovereign credit ratings and non-performing loans 
(NPLs) as a measure of banking risk over and above the impact of macroeconomic 
and financial determinants, namely economic policy uncertainty, GDP growth, 
government debt-to-GDP ratio, investment-to-GDP ratio, and the fiscal balance-to-
GDP ratio. This is done within a Panel Vector AutoRegressive (PVAR) model which 
allows us to tackle endogeneity issues that arise since sovereign ratings respond 
to but also cause country-specific macroeconomic and financial developments.  
There are good reasons to suggest a strong connection between sovereign and 
bank credit risk. In Acharya et al. (2014), for instance, a distressed financial sector 
induces government bailouts, whose cost increases sovereign credit risk. 
Increased sovereign credit risk, in turn, weakens the financial sector by eroding 
the value of its government guarantees and bond holdings. Adelino and Ferreira 
(2016) show that the rating score of banks with a profile equal to or higher than 
that of their sovereign state is affected more by sovereign downgrades compared 
to banks with a lower rating profile than their sovereign state. Mäkinen et al. 
(2019) link sovereign risk to bailouts in the banking sector and note that rising 
policy uncertainty weakens the ability of governments to provide bailouts. 
Gennaioli et al. (2014) focus on the dire consequences of sovereign default on 
aggregate financial activity in the defaulting country; the impact is stronger in 
countries where domestic banks hold more public debt. Altavilla et al. (2017) flag 
the amplification effect of sovereign stress on bank lending to domestic firms for 
a sample of euro-area banks. All these point to a strong feedback loop between 
sovereign and banking risk. 
It, therefore, comes as no surprise that banking risk has recently appeared on the 
radar of CRAs. For instance, S&P’s recent update of its assessment methodology 
(S&P’s Global Ratings, 2017) refers to contingent liabilities and their potential 
impact on sovereign ratings. Among these liabilities that have the potential to 
become government debt, or more broadly affect a government's fiscal profile, 
 
29 In January 2012, Mario Draghi told the European Parliament in Strasbourg that “we should learn 
to do without ratings, or at least we should learn to assess creditworthiness” adding that “certainly 
one needs to ask how important are these ratings for the marketplace overall, for investors”, 
whereas Mervyn King stressed (also in January 2012) in a parliamentary committee in London 
that one should “put less focus directly on what the ratings agencies say and more on what the 
market as a whole is saying in terms of sovereign debt” adding that “what we need to do is to move 
to a point, and I think markets have gone some way towards that, where they pay less attention to 
the verdicts of the ratings agencies”. See 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/18/business/global/european-central-bankers-criticize-
role-of-rating-agencies.html. 
30 These CRAs collectively control around 95% of the market. See 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-36629099. 
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bank NPLs31 have increased rapidly after 2008 not least in the Euro area adding 
to regulatory concerns. 32 In 2016, for instance, the European Banking Authority 
(EBA) flagged high NPLs as one of the main risks for EU banks, whereas in 2017, 
the ECB stressed that high NPLs harm bank lending to the economy as a result of 
profitability and capital constraints and also flagged the benefits of a reduction of 
NPLs to the economy from both a microprudential and a macroprudential 
perspective. 33 Thus, it is not surprising that CRAs consider changes in NPLs as an 
important driver of rating changes. For example, S&P’s latest report on Greece 
notes “Another potential trigger for an upgrade would be a marked reduction in 
nonperforming assets in Greece's impaired banking system”.34 
In recent work, Brůha and Kočenda (2018) examine the link between banking 
sector quality and sovereign risk to show that rising NPLs is the single most 
influential sector-specific variable that is associated with increased sovereign risk 
in the European Union. Besides, rising NPLs have often been considered the 
consequence of weak economic growth but, at the same time, negatively feedback 
themselves to the banking sector and the wider economy. Indeed, NPLs have been 
shown to be a significant predictor of bank failures (see Barr et al., 1994, Gonzalez-
Hermosillo et al., 1997, Lu and Whidbee, 2013). But even in the case where banks 
avoid failure, rising NPLs have a negative impact on the cost structure and 
efficiency of banks as well as their willingness to lend (see e.g. Balgova et al., 2016) 
and, as a result, undermine future economic growth.  
This very discussion indicates that NPLs are an appropriate measure of banking 
risk and opens up the possibility that developments in NPLs affect sovereign 
rating decisions over and above the impact of other control variables. On the other 
hand, sovereign ratings impact negatively on NPLs through banking ratings and 
lending supply. This is because sovereign rating downgrades lead to banking 
rating downgrades through the sovereign ceiling rule (Adelino and Ferreira, 
2016)  which in turn lead to a reduction in lending supply and, at the same time, 
increase the burden of refinancing existing loans, therefore, making it more likely 
than not that NPLs will increase.  This two-way feedback is examined within a 
panel VAR of 72 countries over the 1998-2016 period. 
First, we identify a significant negative effect of NPLs on sovereign credit ratings 
and vice versa. Second, economic policy uncertainty shocks trigger a negative 
effect on sovereign rating decisions following the financial turmoil and the 
 
31 These are loans where the full repayment of the principal and interest may no longer be 
expected. Typically, the principal or interest would be at least 90 days in arrears, although the 
precise definition of NPLs varies across jurisdictions. 
32 For instance, NPLs increased from 4.67% of total gross loans in 2008 to 36.29% in 2016 in 
Greece and from 3.59% in 2008 to 48.67% in 2016 in Cyprus. For the Euro area NPLs increased 
from 2.80% in 2008 to 4.05% in 2016. 
33 See  
https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1315397/EBA+Risk+Assessment+Report_Dec
ember+2016.pdf and 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/guidance_on_npl.en.pdf.  
34 See https://www.standardandpoors.com/en_US/web/guest/article/-/view/type/HTML/id/2075495. 
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subsequent Eurozone crisis. Indeed, economic policy uncertainty is firmly now on 
the radar of CRAs; Moody’s, for instance, notes (in May 2018) policy uncertainty 
in Italy as a reason for a credit rating review.35 From a theoretical point of view, 
uncertainty shocks could undermine the expected profitability of firms, which 
puts upward pressure on their perceived riskiness. In this context, investors 
demand higher interest rates be compensated for the higher risk and 
consequently that issuance of additional debt becomes more costly and adversely 
affects investments (see e.g. Gilchrist et al., 2014).  
Our results provide additional insight towards understanding how CRAs make 
sovereign credit rating decisions by flagging the importance of NPLs in driving 
these decisions. With this in mind, our results should be useful to regulators like 
the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) who monitor CRAs in 
order to understand their rating methodology and assess the quality of their 
ratings. Our results should also be informative for investors who can rely on our 
findings to get additional clarity on how CRAs reach their sovereign assessment 
decisions. This will go some way towards restoring part of the investor confidence 
towards CRAs which was undermined following the recent financial crisis and the 
heavy criticism CRAs received (and indeed continue to receive) by policymakers 
during the Eurozone crisis and beyond.  
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 discusses our dataset. 
Section 3.3 introduces the panel VAR model and Section 3.4 presents and 
discusses the empirical estimates. Finally, Section 3.5 offers some concluding 
remarks.  
 
3.2 Data description 
We use T = 19 annual observations over the 1998-2016 period for a panel of N = 
72 countries.36 Our main variable of interest is the sovereign credit rating 
published by the three main international rating agencies, Moody’s, S&P’s and 
Fitch Ratings (attributed on the 31st of December of each calendar year). In our 
main model, we implement a linear transformation of credit ratings to numerical 
scale, starting from 21 for the highest quality with a stable outlook (AAA for Fitch 
and S&P’s and Aaa for Moody’s) and ending to 1 for Default (D for Fitch and S&P’s 
 
35 Something that triggered the reaction of Five Star leader Di Maio who wrote that “governments 
are decided by the credit rating agencies”. See https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-
05-27/italy-s-president-vetoes-candidacy-of-euroskeptic-savona.  
36 The countries included are: United Arab Emirates, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Switzerland, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Gabon, The United Kingdom, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Hong Kong, Croatia, Hungary, Indonesia, 
India, Ireland, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea Republic, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Morocco, 
Moldova, Mexico, F.Y.R.O.M., Malta, Malaysia, The Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Pakistan,  
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Paraguay, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, The United States 
and South Africa. Due to missing observations, our dataset includes 1226 observations for 
Moody’s, 1253 observations for S&P’s and 1190 observations for Fitch. 
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and C for Moody’s). We consider both changes in credit ratings and changes in 
credit outlooks. For our sovereign rating variable, the difference between two 
continuous outlooks is always equal to 1/3, so the difference between two 
continuous ratings with the same outlook is always equal to one. Table 3.1 reports 
the linear transformation of credit ratings and provides details on the frequencies 
of the ratings per category. We also consider the logistic transformation of ratings 
in the robustness section of the chapter.  
Our PVAR framework (details of the theoretical model are given in the next section 
of the chapter) allows us to examine jointly sovereign ratings and a number of 
factors. In particular, we implement a PVAR model which includes Economic 
Policy Uncertainty, GDP growth rate, total investments (as % of GDP), gross 
government-debt (as % of GDP), fiscal balance (as % of GDP), NPLs (non-
performing loans as % of total gross loans) and sovereign credit ratings as 
endogenous variables and the shadow interest rate as predetermined variable.  
Endogenous variables selection is based on economic theory and prior empirical 
studies. Following the current literature, we incorporate variables that have been 
found to affect and be affected from sovereign credit ratings. On the one hand the 
literature on the determinants of sovereign credit ratings (see Cantor and Packer, 
1996, Afonso et al., 2011, Reusens and Croux, 2017, among others) shows that 
variables selected do affect credit ratings. On the other hand, sovereign credit 
ratings impact on those variables, as well. For instance, Chen et al. (2016) show 
that sovereign credit ratings affect gdp growth rate and Chen et al. (2013) show 
that sovereign ratings matter for investments. Moreover, Duygun et al. show that 
sovereign ratings do impact on government debt and fiscal balance. The 
theoretically expected impact of those variables is discussed below.  
Economic Policy Uncertainty is an index constructed based on newspaper articles 
regarding policy uncertainty from leading newspapers. It counts the number of 
newspaper articles containing the terms uncertain or uncertainty, economic or 
economy, and one or more policy-relevant terms.37 Increased uncertainty is 
expected to trigger sovereign rating downgrades as it makes consumers and 
investors more cautious and reduces consumption and investment. For example, 
S&P’s lists policy uncertainty as one of the main reasons driving its unprecedented 
decision to downgrade the US in 2011.38 On the other hand, a rating downgrade 
creates weaker economic conditions which, in turn, increases policy uncertainty. 
This is because governments are more likely to change their policy to deal with 
weak economic conditions and it, therefore, becomes increasingly uncertain 
which of the potential new policies will be adopted (Pástor and Veronesi, 2013). 
 
37 For more information see Baker et al. (2016) and 
http://www.policyuncertainty.com/index.html. Because of data unavailability, a country specific 
index is only employed for 22 countries. For European countries without a country specific index, 
the aggregate European index is employed. In the case of non-European countries without a 
country specific index, the Global policy uncertainty index is employed. 
38 See https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-sp-downgrade-text/sp-lowers-united-states-
credit-rating-to-aa-idUSTRE7750D320110806.  
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GDP growth impacts positively on sovereign ratings and vice versa (see e.g. Chen 
et al., 2016 and Reusens and Croux, 2017, and references therein). An increase in 
investments triggers sovereign rating upgrades as they enhance the country’s 
economic prospects. On the other hand, a rating downgrade reduces investments 
by affecting the cost of capital and changing the net present value of some projects 
from positive to negative (see Chen et al., 2016 and Chen et al., 2013). An increase 
in government debt triggers sovereign rating downgrades because a high stock of 
government debt implies higher interest rates to service it. Hence, additional 
financial resources are needed to repay debt obligations and therefore, higher 
government debt should increase the risk of default. On the other hand, the impact 
of sovereign ratings on government debt is uncertain. This is because rating 
upgrades decrease sovereign spreads and make debt repayment cheaper which 
might reduce the pile of debt. At the same time, however, political business cycle 
considerations suggest that governments might exploit the opportunity of the 
positive sentiment in financial markets following a rating upgrade and adopt 
expansionary fiscal policies to increase the probability of an electoral victory.39 A 
fiscal surplus or very low fiscal deficit indicates strong fiscal performance which, 
in turn, triggers sovereign rating upgrades. On the other hand, the impact of the 
sovereign rating on the fiscal balance is uncertain. This is because rating upgrades 
decrease sovereign spreads and reduce the amount needed to be paid on interest 
rates each year. At the same time, however, political business cycle considerations 
might trigger expansionary fiscal policies leading to a deterioration of the fiscal 
balance.  
We expand the information set by including NPLs in the specification. Rising NPLs 
lead to sovereign rating downgrades as they increase the possibility of a bailout to 
the banking sector that sets an additional fiscal burden and undermines the 
country’s economic prospects. On the other hand, sovereign downgrades lead to a 
rise in NPLs. This is because sovereign rating downgrades lead to banking rating 
downgrades which in turn lead to a reduction in lending supply and, at the same 
time, increase the burden of refinancing existing loans, therefore, making it more 
likely than not that NPLs will increase. Table 3.2 provides details of the data 
definitions and sources and Table 3.3 reports the data summary statistics.  
We also take into account monetary policy by including the shadow interest rate 
in our model. In response to the financial crisis, policymakers brought policy 
interest rates down to their zero lower bound (hereafter ZLB) and authorised 
Quantitative Easing policies. To assess the impact of the presence of these types of 
policies, we use the shadow interest rate proposed by Wu and Xia (2016). Noting 
that the prime focus of our chapter is on sovereign ratings and its determinants, 
the shadow rate enters our information set as a pre-determined variable that is, a 
variable which is potentially correlated with past errors (see e.g. the discussion in 
 
39 Duygun et al. (2016) find that a rating upgrade is likely to increase sovereign debt because of 
sovereign ratings’ procyclicality and path dependence. Nevertheless, they also find that the impact 
of sovereign rating decisions on debt varies with the degree of the country’s institutional quality; 
in particular, rating upgrades in countries with higher institutional quality are followed by debt 
reductions and an improvement in the fiscal balance.  
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Sigmund and Ferstl, 2019); this allows monetary policy to react to past shocks in 
the remaining variables of the model. Estimated from an affine term structure 
model, the shadow interest rate is the nominal interest rate that would prevail in 
the absence of its effective lower bound. Therefore, the shadow interest rate has 
the advantage that it is not constrained by the ZLB and thus allows us to combine 
the monetary policy rate data from the ZLB (or unconventional) period with the 
non-ZLB (or conventional) period. For the US, Eurozone and the UK, we use the 
corresponding shadow rates available at Wu’s website 
(https://sites.google.com/view/jingcynthiawu/shadow-rates). For the 
remaining countries in our sample, we construct and use a ‘global’ shadow interest 
rate as a weighted average of the shadow interest rates for the US, Eurozone, and 
the UK.40  Figure 3.1 plots the shadow rates for the US, UK and Eurozone 
economies together with the ‘global’ measure; these drop to negative territory 
post-2008 (and the US one reverts to positive territory after 2015 due to QE 
‘tapering’).  
 
3.3 Methodology 
We follow the estimation approach of Binder et al. (2005) and the implementation 
and extension by Sigmund and Ferstl (2019) and consider a PVAR model with 
fixed effects: 
 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + ∑ 𝛢𝑙
𝑝
𝑙=1 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐵𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                (3.1) 
 
where  𝑦𝑖,𝑡 ∈ ℝm is an (m x 1) vector of endogenous variables for the i-th cross-
sectional unit (i = 1,2,…,N) at time t (t = 1,2,…,T), ,i tx    ℝk  is a (k x1)   vector of 
predetermined variables that are potentially correlated with past errors, 
,i t ε  ℝ
m 
is an (m x 1) vector of disturbances, i  is an (m x 1) vector of individual-specific 
effects, and p is the lag length of the PVAR model. Stationarity requires all unit 
roots of the model to lie inside the unit circle. Parameter homogeneity for the (m 
x m) lA  matrix and the (m x k) B   matrix is assumed.   A PVAR model is hence a 
combination of a single equation dynamic panel model (DPM) and a vector 
autoregressive model (VAR). 
 
40 Based on the share of US, Eurozone and UK GDP output in the sum of their output using GDP 
(Purchasing Power Parity, constant 2011 international $), the US accounts for 52.47%, while the 
Eurozone and the UK account for 39.70% and 7.83% respectively.. Notice that the shadow rate for 
the Eurozone is available from 2004 onwards. From Wu’s website, this tracks well the ECB main 
refinancing rate prior to the financial crisis. With this in mind, we use the ECB main refinancing 
rate as a proxy for the Eurozone shadow rate over the 1999-2003 period and Bundesbank’s 
discount rate for 1998. 
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Applying the first difference transformation to (3.1) we get: 
 
𝛥𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝐴𝑙
𝑝
𝑙=1 𝛥𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝐵𝛥𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛥𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                                         (3.2) 
 
where Δ refers to the first difference operator. 41 
Following Binder et al. (2005), the moment conditions for the lagged endogenous 
and the predetermined variables are: 
 
𝛦[𝛥𝜀𝑖,𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑗
𝛵 ] = 0                               (3.3) 
𝛦[𝛥𝜀𝑖,𝑡𝑥𝑖,𝑗
𝛵 ] = 0 
 
with j ∊ {1,…,T − 2} and  t  𝕋Δ. By stacking over t, (3.2) is written as: 
 
𝛥𝑌𝑖 = ∑ 𝛥𝑌𝑖,𝑙𝐴𝑙
𝛵𝑝
𝑙=1
+ 𝛥𝑋𝑖𝐵𝑙
𝛵 + 𝛥𝐸𝑖,                                                                  (3.4) 
where ,iY  ,i lY  and iE  are ((𝑇 −  1 −  𝑝) x 𝑚) matrices and 𝛥𝑋𝑖  is  a ((T - 
1 - p) x k) matrix. Thus, the stacked moment conditions for each i  is as follows:  
 
𝐸[𝑄𝑖
𝛵(𝛥𝐸𝑖)] = 0,                   (3.5)  
 
where Qi is the stacked form of ,i tq  with 
, , 1 , 2 ,1 , 1 , 2 ,1: ( , ,..., , , ,...., ),
T T T
i t i t p i t p i i t i t iq y y y x x x
   
− − − − − −=   
for t  ∊ {p + 2,…,T} and  
 
𝑄𝑖 : =
(
 
 
𝑞𝑖,𝑝+2
𝛵 0 ⋯ 0
0 𝑞𝑖,𝑝+3
𝛵 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 0 ⋯ 𝑞𝑖,𝑇
𝛵
)
 
 
                 (3.6) 
 
41 The first difference transformation exists for t  ∊ {p + 2,…,T}. We denote the set of indexes t, for 
which the transformation exists by 𝕋Δ. Using the forward orthogonal transformation of Arellano 
and Bover (1995) produced qualitatively similar results to what we report below (these results 
are available on request). 
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Based on the moment conditions (3.5), the minimization problem is: 
 
min
𝛷
{∑ 𝑍𝑖
𝛵(𝛥𝑌𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
− [𝛥𝑌𝑖,−1𝛥𝑋𝑖]𝛷)
𝛵𝛬𝑧
−1∑ 𝑍𝑖
𝛵(𝛥𝑌𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
− [𝛥𝑌𝑖,−1𝛥𝑋𝑖]𝛷)},            (3.7) 
 
where   delivers the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimates of the 
model (3.2) and z  is the weighting matrix based on the one-step estimation 
procedure of Binder et al. (2005); see also the detailed technical discussion in 
Sigmund and Ferstl (2019).  
The choice of the optimal weighting matrix reduces the asymptotic bias in the 
estimation. Fixed effects are removed by implementing the first differences.  
There are m = 7 endogenous variables in our PVAR model such that the vector yi,t  
is given by yi,t = [Uncertainty, GDP growth, Investments, Debt, Fiscal Balance, 
NPLs, rating] using a lag length of p = 2 and employing 3 lags of all endogenous 
variables as instruments. 42 The choice of the lag length is based on the Andrews 
and Lu (2001) model and moment selection criteria (MMSC). 43 A choice of 2 lags 
appears justified also on economic grounds as there is evidence of persistence and 
stickiness in rating decisions (Dimitrakopoulos and Kolossiatis, 2016); 
considerable persistence also shows up in some of the impulse responses reported 
in the following section of the chapter.  
To examine the response of one (endogenous) variable to an impulse in another 
(endogenous) variable, we rely on Generalized Impulse Response Functions 
(GIRFs) of Pesaran and Shin (1998); contrary to Orthogonalized Impulse 
Response Functions (OIRFs; where the underlying shocks to the model are 
orthogonalized using the Cholesky decomposition before calculating impulse 
responses), GIRFs are not affected by the ordering of the variables in the PVAR 
model and fully take account of the historical patterns of correlations observed 
amongst the different shocks. The justification of GIRFs over OIRFs is twofold. 
First, the theoretical framework for this strand of the empirical literature is 
 
42 The literature on sovereign ratings (see e.g. Afonso et al., 2011) often models ratings as a 
function of GDP growth and the unemployment rate. To keep the dimensionality of the PVAR model 
as manageable as possible, we use GDP growth in our model. In any case, the impact of the 
unemployment rate on sovereign ratings is indirectly captured by the impact of GDP growth 
through an Okun’s-law type of approximation (in which case there is an inverse relationship 
between unemployment and GDP growth). 
43 For instance, using Moody’s model and implementing the first difference transformation, the 
MMSC-HQIC (Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion) is equal to 993110.5 using 2 lags and equal to 
1054326 using 1 lag. All MMSC-HQIC, MMSC-BIC (Bayesian Information Criterion) and MMSC-AIC 
(Akaike Information Criterion) selection criteria suggest 2 lags for all PVAR models employed in 
our chapter. 
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limited at best44 and, second, the large number of variables we employ makes an 
appropriate ordering almost impossible.45 In what follows, we report GIRFs with 
95% confidence intervals estimated using bootstrap cross-sectional resampling 
(Kapetanios, 2008).46  
 
3.4 Empirical results 
3.4.1 Main estimates 
We calculate and report GIRFs to one standard error shocks for all CRAs based on 
the first difference transformation (stability condition is satisfied in all cases). 
Figures 3.2 to 3.4 report GIRFs for the three CRAs using the first difference 
transformation.  
An economic policy uncertainty shock impacts negatively on the sovereign ratings 
assigned by all CRAs; the impact is statistically significant (slightly less so for 
S&P’s) but lasts only for 1-2 years for all CRAs (see Figures 3.2-3.4). A positive 
GDP growth rate shock impacts positively on CRA decisions; the effect lasts for 
almost 8 years for Moody’s and 5 years for S&P’s and Fitch. A positive investment 
shock leads to sovereign rating upgrades. The duration of the effect varies from 5 
years for Moody’s to 3 years for S&P’s and to 1 year for Fitch. The latter results 
suggest that Moody’s assigns a higher weight on investments than the remaining 
rating agencies.  
A positive shock to government debt has a negative and persistent effect on 
sovereign ratings. A positive shock to fiscal balance has a positive and persistent 
effect on sovereign ratings. The impact of a government debt shock is statistically 
important for up to 8 years while a shock on fiscal balance impacts on sovereign 
ratings for more than 10 years. Therefore, fiscal considerations in terms of fiscal 
balance trigger a longer impact on the rating decisions made by the three CRAs 
compared to government debt developments. The persistence of the effect is 
arguably not surprising given the stickiness of sovereign ratings and the 
importance of fiscal variables on default risk.  
Turning our attention to NPLs, our model confirms their importance for sovereign 
rating decisions. A positive shock to NPLs leads to sovereign rating downgrades 
with the impact being statistically stronger and economically more prolonged for 
Moody’s (up to 6 years).    
From Figures 3.2-3.4, we also note that positive shocks to sovereign ratings do 
have a very temporary impact on economic policy uncertainty and trigger a 
positive effect on GDP growth for all CRAs. The impact on GDP growth, which is 
similar for all CRAs, reaches its peak after 2 years and remains statistically 
 
44 See Holden at al. (2018) for an equilibrium theory that allows for the possibility that ratings 
affect the performance of the rated objects. 
45 Granger causality tests within our PVAR model (available on request) do not provide clear 
guidance on the ordering of the variables as they indicate bidirectional causality. 
46 We use 500 bootstrap replications in all calculations. 
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significant for up to 9 years. Investments also respond positively to positive 
sovereign rating shocks. The impact is maximized after 2 years for all agencies and 
lasts (from a statistical point of view) for almost 9 years after the shock in the case 
of Moody’s and slightly less so (7 to 8 years) for Fitch and S&P’s. Positive shocks 
to sovereign ratings do have a positive impact on fiscal balance and government 
debt. The impact on government debt is persistent and statistically significant for 
up to 8 years for Moody’s and slightly less so (up to 7 years) for S&P’s and Fitch, 
while, for all CRAs, a positive sovereign rating shock exerts a statistically 
significant and positive impact on the fiscal balance for up to 4 years. 
Consequently, or GIRFs show that governments do not exploit the opportunity of 
the positive sentiment in financial markets following a rating upgrade to adopt 
expansionary fiscal policies and increase the probability of an electoral victory 
(see Duygun et al. 2016).  
Last but not least, positive shocks to sovereign ratings reduce NPLs. The impact 
reaches its peak after 3 years and is long lasting (up to 9 years for Moody’s, up to 
10 years for S&P’s and up to 8 years for Fitch) and the magnitude of the impact of 
the shock at peak (after 3 years) is stronger for Moody’s (that is, a negative change 
of approximately 1.3 percentage points following a one standard error positive 
shock in the equation for sovereign ratings).   
To sum up, GIRFs provide evidence of significant effects from NPLs on sovereign 
rating decisions over and above the effects of the remaining economic/financial 
variables; at the same time, sovereign ratings impact on NPLs and all other 
variables. We also note that sovereign rating changes trigger a stronger response 
at peak (after 3 years) on NPLs in the case of Moody’s. Moody’s sovereign rating 
decisions exert a longer-lasting impact on investment decisions compared to 
decisions made by S&P’s and Fitch. Livingston et al. (2010) find that, in the case of 
corporate bond rating decisions, Moody’s has become more conservative (in the 
sense that it gives more inferior ratings) than S&P’s post-1998 and that investors 
value “more” decisions made by Moody’s than decisions made by S&P’s. If indeed, 
investors value “more” decisions made by Moody’s, one would expect Moody’s 
decisions to exert a longer-lasting impact on investment decisions compared to 
the remaining CRAs which is what the results of our GIRFs point to.  
Finally, fiscal considerations in terms of fiscal balance rather than government 
debt trigger a longer-lasting impact on the sovereign rating decisions made by the 
three CRAs. The next section examines how the impact of sovereign rating 
determinants on the assessment of CRAs has varied over time.  
 
3.4.2 Impulse response functions over time 
Using a multi-year probit analysis, Reusens and Croux (2017) documented that 
CRAs changed their sovereign credit rating assessment after the start of the 
European debt crisis in 2009. From a theoretical viewpoint, Holden at al. (2018) 
showed that it is possible that CRAs were too lenient before the 2007-8 period but 
not afterwards. We incorporate this into the context of PVAR models by examining 
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how GIRFs change over time. In particular, we consider GIRFs over the pre-crisis 
1998-2006 period. We then expand our sample to include the 1998-2009 period 
which allows us to account for the effect of the global financial crisis. We further 
expand our sample to include the 1998-2012 period so that the Eurozone crisis is 
also allowed. GIRFs over the expanding time windows discussed above are plotted 
together with the previously reported GIRFs over the full 1998-2016 sample 
period in Figures 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 for Moody’s, S&P’s and Fitch, respectively using 
the first difference transformation.47 
Expanding window sample analysis reveals some interesting findings. Policy 
uncertainty was not a major concern for Moody’s up until 2009; a controversial 
positive effect (but not always statistically significant) appears for S&P’s and Fitch 
up to 2009. On the other hand, as we expand our sample to include the Eurozone 
debt crisis and beyond, policy uncertainty exerts a negative and statistically 
significant impact for up to 2 years. This should not necessarily come as a surprise. 
Eurozone policymakers have arguably been fairly slow in responding to the 
Eurozone crisis because planning involves general parliamentary approval from 
all member states; at the same time, the so-called ‘Troika’ of the IMF, the European 
Commission, and the ECB have had their differences in dealing with the crisis48 , 
therefore, adding to policy uncertainty in the Euro area.49  
Prior to the financial crisis, the impact of GDP growth rate shocks on sovereign 
ratings was slightly smaller and less persistent for Moody’s whereas the opposite 
is true for S&P’s and Fitch. For all CRAs, the impact of investments shocks on 
sovereign ratings was less persistent before the crisis. In line with Reusens and 
Croux (2017), fiscal variables received greater attention from the three CRAs after 
2009; indeed, the effect of government debt and fiscal balance shocks became 
economically and statistically more important after the financial crisis and during 
the Eurozone crisis and beyond. As mentioned earlier on, the interaction between 
sovereign and bank credit risk was highlighted by the financial and the sovereign 
debt crisis. Taking that into account, it is not surprising that the sovereign rating 
assigned by Fitch was not affected by a shock to NPLs prior to 2007. The effect of 
a shock to NPLs on the rating of Fitch becomes economically stronger following 
from the financial crisis and up to the end of our sample period. On the other hand, 
Moody’s and S&P’s ratings were affected by shocks to NPLs even prior to the 
financial crisis.  
 
47 We pursue expanding rather than rolling window sample analysis due to the relatively short 
time dimension of our sample. Given the broad consensus of our earlier empirical results in terms 
of the first difference and the forward orthogonal deviation transformation, we focus only on 
expanding time windows using the former transformation. 
48 See e.g. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-33531743. 
49 In the context of sovereign credit spreads rather than sovereign credit ratings, Jeanneret (2015) 
shows that the global market uncertainty (proxied by the US option-implied volatility index; VIX) 
drives emerging markets sovereign spreads but also notes that the disagreements among 
European leaders on policies to prevent contagion in the default crisis, for example, are factors 
likely to affect European sovereign spreads beyond the level of volatility in financial markets. 
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Turning our attention to sovereign rating shocks we note that these affect policy 
uncertainty and more so (economically and statistically) through the period 
which includes the Eurozone crisis and beyond. Therefore, our model reveals a 
feedback from policy uncertainty to sovereign ratings and vice versa especially 
over the period which includes the Eurozone debt crisis; our results complement 
the results of Pástor and Veronesi (2013) who predict that uncertainty about the 
government's future policy choice is generally larger in weaker economic 
conditions because that is when the government is more likely to change its policy. 
The impact of sovereign rating shocks on GDP growth and investments became 
economically and statistically more significant following the Eurozone debt crisis; 
this highlights to some extent the adverse effect of massive sovereign downgrades 
on GDP growth rates recorded especially in Eurozone’s periphery since the debt 
crisis. 50 At first sight, these effects might appear counterintuitive especially if one 
bears in mind the increased criticism CRAs attracted in the aftermath of the 2007-
2008 financial crisis. This criticism was based on their inability to foresee 
corporate failures during the period leading to the financial crisis and questioning 
their decisions received from policymakers during the Eurozone crisis. That said, 
there are encouraging signs that CRAs have responded to the increasing criticism 
by subsequently improving their valuation assessment. Indeed, some encouraging 
evidence towards this end was provided, for instance, by the European Securities 
and Markets Authority (ESMA), the European authority competent for the 
supervision of CRAs. In fact, the 2016 ESMA Report noted that since the beginning 
of the supervision of CRAs in 2011, “ESMA’s supervisory work has triggered 
improvements in the empowerment and effectiveness of CRA’s internal control 
functions” and that “ESMA has driven significant changes in the credit rating 
process and the methodology and business development process thereby 
strengthening their integrity, independence, quality and transparency” (ESMA, 
2016, pages 16-17). The very fact that CRAs have adjusted their methodology to 
reflect ESMA guidelines might explain why we find an increasing influence of CRA 
decisions on GDP growth and investments over the most recent period. In recent 
work, Drobetz et al. (2018) find that rising policy uncertainty reduces the 
sensitivity of investments to the cost of capital. To the extent that policy 
uncertainty (which has been more elevated post rather than pre-2007) distorts 
the relationship between investments and market-based interest rates, it should 
not come as a surprise that investors have arguably turned to CRAs and, 
consequently, investment decisions have been more responsive to rating 
decisions over the most recent period.  
With reference to the fiscal variables, the response of government debt and fiscal 
balance to shocks on sovereign ratings became economically more important 
during the period covering the Eurozone debt crisis especially for S&P’s. The 
impact of shocks to sovereign rating decisions on debt was statistically 
 
50 Eurozone’s periphery (namely Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Cyprus) recorded an 
average GDP growth rate of 2.24% per annum over the 1998-2011 period. Eurozone’s periphery 
average GDP growth rate dropped to 0.74% per annum over the 2012-2016 period. 
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insignificant prior to 2007 for Moody’s and S&P’s (there is some weak evidence of 
statistical significance for Fitch). The impact of shocks on rating decisions on the 
fiscal balance was statistically insignificant prior to 2009 for S&P’s and prior to 
2007 for Fitch. Finally, NPLs decrease in response to positive shocks to rating 
decisions only after 2009. The impact is statistically and economically 
insignificant before that year. This is in line with our earlier discussion that the 
interaction between sovereign and bank credit risk was highlighted by the 
financial and the sovereign debt crisis. 
 
3.4.3 Robustness checks 
So far, our results have been based on the linear transformation of sovereign 
ratings from letters to numbers. This implies that the distance between two 
subsequent ratings is always the same. Among others, Afonso et al. (2011) have 
considered a logistic transformation of sovereign ratings instead of a linear one. 
The logistic transformation is given by ln[ / (1 )]l l lL R R= − , where (2 1) / (2 )l cR l n= − , 
the number of categories, cn , equals 21 and (from the last column of Table 3.1) 
the rating grades are =l 1,2,...,21. Figure 3.8 plots together with the linear and 
logistic transformation for Moody’s sovereign credit ratings. 
In the logistic transformation, the differences between categories are not constant 
but are still imposed a priori. Consequently, we perform again our analysis using 
the logistic transformation of sovereign ratings. We report in Figure 3.9 GIRFs for 
Moody’s over the 1998-2016 period using the first difference transformation; 
these are broadly in line with our main results reported earlier on. However, 
minor differences can be observed. For instance,  a comparison of Figure 3.9 with 
Figure 3.2 shows that the impact of sovereign rating shocks on NPLs based on the 
logistic transformation against the linear transformation is statistically most long-
lived (10 years for the former as opposed to 9 years for the latter case) and the 
impact of sovereign rating shocks on investments based on the linear 
transformation against the logistic transformation is statistically most long-lived 
(9 years for the former as opposed to 8 years for the latter case).  
Rather than using policy uncertainty in our PVAR model, we have tried country-
specific stock price volatility.51 Our GIRFs (see  Figure 3.10) throughout the entire 
sample period for Moody’s based on the first difference transformation are 
broadly in line with our main results reported earlier on. Notice, however (by 
comparing Figure 3.10 with Figure 3.2), that the impact of stock price volatility on 
sovereign ratings and vice versa is more profound (i.e. 6 years and 4 years 
respectively) than the impact of policy uncertainty on sovereign ratings and vice 
versa (i.e. 2 years).  
 
51 Volatility of stock price index is the 360-day standard deviation of the return on the national 
stock market index. (Bloomberg). This is available from the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis 
database. 
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As a further robustness check, rather than capturing banking risk considerations 
by NPLs, we have constructed for each country a ‘banking risk’ factor measure 
using principal component analysis (PCA). PCA is pooling information from a 4-
variable dataset, namely NPLs, bank credit to bank deposits, bank capital to risk-
weighted assets and bank Z-score which contribute 22.42%, 26.11%, 23.99%, and 
27.48% to the ‘banking risk’ factor, respectively, while the 'banking risk’ factor 
contributes 53.67% to the total variation of the 4-variable dataset (these are 
average numbers across countries).52  The bank capital to risk-weighted assets is 
a measure of bank solvency and resiliency which shows the extent to which banks 
are able to ‘weather the storm’ of unexpected losses. The bank credit to bank 
deposits is a measure of liquidity (see e.g. the discussion in Klomp and de Haan, 
2012). The bank Z-score captures the (inverse of the) probability of default of a 
country's banking system, calculated as a weighted average of the Z-scores of a 
country's individual banks where a bank-specific Z-score compares a bank's 
buffers (capitalization and returns) with the volatility of those returns.  From 
Figure 3.11, there is a statistically insignificant impact of shocks to the ‘banking 
risk’ factor on sovereign ratings and vice versa. Overall, these results suggest that 
NPLs dominate pooling-based information from measures of banking risk in 
driving credit rating decisions.53   
We have also explored the impact of regulatory quality; this pools information 
from a number of variables such as investment and financial freedom, business 
regulatory environment, competition policy, tax inconsistency, financial 
institution's transparency, public sector openness to foreign bidders and easiness 
to start a new business.54 To keep the dimensionality of the PVAR manageable, and 
noting that regulatory quality is a policy variable (more likely to affect than be 
affected by other economic or financial variables), we let it enter as an exogenous 
one. Doing so made no qualitative difference to the results reported earlier.55  
 
3.5 Conclusions  
This chapter examines the joint behavior of sovereign ratings and its 
macroeconomic/financial drivers within a multivariate Panel Vector 
AutoRegressive framework. Using a panel of 72 countries over the 1998-2016 
period, several findings stand out. First, our model finds an important role for 
NPLs in affecting sovereign rating assessment over and above the effects of 
economic policy uncertainty, GDP growth, government debt-to-GDP ratio, 
 
52 To ensure that an increase in the ‘banking risk’ factor indicates additional risk across countries, 
we have applied (at the country level) PCA to NPLs, bank credit to bank deposits, the inverse of 
bank capital to risk weighted assets and the inverse of bank Z-score. 
53 An alternative to PCA would involve running a country-specific dynamic factor model which 
relies, for instance, on the 4-variable dataset mentioned above to derive a latent banking risk 
factor. The country-specific time series information set is too short to pursue this option. 
54 For more details see  http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/rq.pdf.  
55 Jeanneret (2018) finds that government effectiveness as a measure of the ability of governments 
to collect and use fiscal revenues effectively leads to a reduction of sovereign credit spreads. 
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investment-to-GDP ratio, and the fiscal balance-to-GDP ratio. At the same time, 
sovereign rating decisions themselves affect NPLs. Intuitively, sovereign rating 
downgrades trigger bank rating downgrades which in turn lead to a reduction in 
lending supply and, at the same time, increase the burden of refinancing existing 
loans, therefore, triggering a rise in NPLs. Second, economic policy uncertainty 
shocks trigger sovereign rating downgrades following the financial turmoil and 
the subsequent Eurozone crisis.  
By flagging the importance of rising NPLs as a vital banking risk factor, our model 
provides additional insight towards understanding how CRAs make their 
sovereign rating assessments. Both rising NPLs and increased policy uncertainty 
trigger sovereign rating downgrades that ‘hit’ investments and economic growth. 
With this in mind, it is in the interest of policymakers to be tackling policy 
uncertainty and NPLs, especially since rising NPLs, have been found themselves to 
undermine future economic growth (Balgova et al., 2016). This could be achieved 
by improving, for instance, governance indicators; indeed, Balgova et al. (2016) 
note that improved governance (as a measure of the quality of institutions) helps 
reduce NPLs and strengthen economic growth.    
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4. DO CREDIT RATINGS AFFECT FIRM OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY? 
EVIDENCE FROM SOVEREIGN RATING DOWNGRADES 
4.1 Introduction 
A rating change, especially a downgrade, is always a concern for sovereigns, banks, 
and corporations. Despite the mass criticism related to their role in the global 
financial crisis and the Eurozone Debt crisis, investors still pay great attention to 
credit ratings in making their investment decisions. Anecdotal evidence shows 
that credit ratings affect corporate investment (Almeida et al., 2017) and 
innovation (Wang and Yang, 2019). What is not answered yet is whether credit 
ratings affect operational efficiency. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to analyse 
the effect of credit rating downgrades on operational efficiency.  
Firms always monitor credit rating agencies' decisions since the latter affect their 
access to financial markets and rating downgrades do not always remain 
unanswered from their chief staff. For example, Miguel Viana, CEO of   EDP 
Energias de Portugal in 2011 conference call said: “In terms of credit ratings, EDP 
recently suffered from downgrades by S&P and Moody’s, penalized by the 
maximum notch differential allowed between EDP and Portugal Sovereign, so 
right now EDP is one notch above Portugal by S&P and two notches above Portugal 
by Moody’s. Nevertheless, we consider that these by-the-book credit agencies 
methodologies are unable to reflect EDP’s distinct credit profile, namely the 
geographical diversification, the high quality of our generation fleet, our resilient 
EBITDA, and the fact that our operations in Portugal have low sensitivity to the 
economic cycle.” EDP Energias de Portugal was downgraded by S&P’s from A- to 
BBB on March 28, 2011, following Portugal’s sovereign rating downgrade from A- 
to BBB on the same day. EDP Energias de Portugal was unambiguously affected by 
the sovereign ceiling rule.  On January 27 of the same year, S&P’s downgraded 
Japan’s sovereign rating from AA to AA-. Toyota Motor Corporation, one of the 
largest firms in the country, was affected, facing a rating downgrade from AA to 
AA- on March 4 of the same year. Mike Michels, Toyota spokesman said in a 
statement: “The downgrade by S&P is regrettable and we do not take this rating 
change lightly. We aim to improve our rating by making the best management 
decisions we can while continuing to take care of our customers as our top 
priority. This will help us improve our profitability over the long-term” 
(MarketWatch, 2011).56   Both examples provide evidence that there is a link 
between sovereign and corporate rating downgrades and firms adjust their 
decisions and plans following credit rating downgrades. Moreover,  Almeida et al. 
(2017) show that there is a clear discontinuity at the sovereign bound, in the sense 
that the probability a corporate issuer will be downgraded within a month 
following a sovereign downgrade is much higher for corporations rated equal to 
or above the corresponding sovereign relative to those rated below. Firms affected 
by a sovereign rating downgrade through the sovereign ceiling rule reduce their 
 
56 https://www.marketwatch.com/story/toyotas-profit-path-trips-sp-downgrade-2011-03-04 
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investment and reliance on credit markets due to a rising cost of debt (Almeida et 
al., 2017). 
Performance measurement is at the heart of strategic management research. It is 
and should be one of the main priorities for every enterprise. It is also very 
important for every society that prioritizes the best use of available resources. 
Efficiency is typically defined as the maximization of outputs for a fixed level of 
inputs, or alternatively a minimization of inputs for a fixed level of outputs 
(Demerjian 2018).  It encompasses several strategies and techniques used to 
accomplish the fundamental goal of delivering quality goods to customers in the 
most cost-effective and timely manner. Resource utilization, production, 
distribution, and inventory management are all common aspects of operational 
efficiency.  
As mentioned above, the purpose of this chapter is to analyse the effect of credit 
rating downgrades on operational efficiency. We examine our main question by 
exploiting exogenous variation in credit ratings through the so-called sovereign 
ceiling rule. According to this policy, corporate credit ratings were bound by their 
corresponding sovereign rating, in the sense that sovereign rating acted as an 
upper bound for corporations and banks operating in that state. Although rating 
agencies moved officially away from this rule in the late ’90s, data and recent 
evidence (Almeida et al., 2017) show that corporate ratings are still bound to a 
large extent by sovereign ratings. Thus, sovereign rating downgrades lead to an 
asymmetric effect on corporate ratings through the sovereign ceiling rule. In that 
sense, the probability of being downgraded is much higher for firms bounded by 
the sovereign ceiling (treated firms) than those rated below their sovereign 
(control firms).  
We then trace our main effect by comparing changes between firms with a rating 
equal or above their sovereign (treated firms) and firms rated below their 
sovereign (control firms) around a sovereign downgrade. We find some weak 
evidence of an adverse effect from credit rating downgrades on sales growth and 
ROA. More specifically, our difference in difference estimation in the matched 
sample analysis shows that Sales growth of firms with a rating equal to or above 
the corresponding sovereign (treated firms) drops by 1.38% more than Sales 
growth of firms rated below their corresponding sovereign (control firms) 
following a sovereign rating downgrade. However, we do not find any evidence 
from credit rating downgrades on the ratio of Sales to the Book value of Assets, 
the ratio of Sales to the book value of assets in place and the ratio of Selling, 
General and Administrative Costs to Sales.  
Our results can be of interest for corporations since they show how and whether 
rating downgrades do matter for their efficiency, over and above the effect of 
macroeconomic fundamentals. They are also of interest to governments which 
should always consider the negative externalities of their sovereign downgrades 
on the corporate sector. 
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Rating agencies behaviour has not been stable over time.  Baghai et al. (2014) 
show that rating agencies have become more conservative in assigning corporate 
credit ratings over the period 1985 to 2009; holding firm characteristics constant, 
average ratings have dropped by three notches. Firms affected more by 
conservatism issue less debt, have lower leverage, hold more cash, are less likely 
to obtain a debt rating, and experience lower growth. Furthermore, Alp (2013) 
provides evidence of a divergent pattern between investment‐grade and 
speculative‐grade rating standards from 1985 to 2002 as investment‐grade 
standards tighten and speculative‐grade loosen. She also shows a structural shift 
occurs toward more stringent ratings in 2002.  
The chapter contributes to the very recent literature on the real effects of credit 
ratings on firm outcomes.  Almeida et al. (2017) show that firms reduce their 
investment and reliance on credit markets due to a rising cost of debt capital 
following a sovereign rating downgrade. They find that firms with a rating equal 
or above their sovereign (treated firms) reduce investment significantly more 
than firms rated below their sovereign (control firms) following a sovereign 
downgrade. More specifically, average investment drops from 26.6% to 17.7% of 
capital, a reduction of 8.9 percentage points for treated firms while investment 
decreases only slightly from 19.2% to 16.6% of capital, a reduction of 2.6 
percentage points. Investment is therefore reduced 6.4 percentage points more 
for treated firms than control firms, which is statistically and economically 
significant. They identify these effects by exploiting exogenous variation in 
corporate ratings due to rating agencies’ sovereign ceiling policies, which require 
that firms’ ratings remain at or below the sovereign rating of their country of 
domicile. Following the same identification strategy, Wang and Yang (2019) show 
that a sovereign downgrade leads to significant reductions in innovation among 
firms that have a rating at the sovereign bound ex-ante. The effect is more 
prolonged among firms with external finance dependence  
The sovereign ceiling channel has also been prolonged in the banking sector. 
Adelino and Ferreira (2016) study the causal effect of bank credit rating 
downgrades on the supply of bank lending. They exploit the asymmetric impact of 
sovereign downgrades through the sovereign ceiling rule on bank ratings at the 
sovereign bound and they show that this asymmetric effect leads to more 
significant reductions in ratings-sensitive funding and lending of banks at the 
bound relative to other banks.  
This chapter examines whether credit rating downgrades affect firm operational 
efficiency of firms rated at or above their corresponding country through the 
sovereign ceiling rule. A credit rating downgrade might affect operational 
efficiency through various channels. One the one hand, it might affect the weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC) a company faces and might turn new projects’ net 
present value (NPV) from positive to negative. Moreover, it can create a 
substitution effect between bigger and smaller projects since the former might 
require funds that would not be approachable in a period of financial stress. 
Furthermore, credit rating downgrades can affect operational efficiency through 
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capital structure. Almeida et. (2017) show that following rating downgrades 
companies issue less debt and more equity. Under the agency costs hypothesis, 
high leverage or a low equity/asset ratio reduces the agency costs of outside 
equity and increases firm value by constraining or encouraging managers to act 
more in the interests of shareholders (Berger and Di Patti, 2006). On the other 
hand, given the higher expected costs, firms would be more careful when deciding 
which project to invest in. Moreover, companies may also interpret a rating 
downgrade as a signal from rating agencies to change their main strategy. Bennett 
et al. (2019) show that management, directly or indirectly, learn from its own 
firm’s stock price. In the same sense, management can also learn from credit rating 
changes and adjust its strategy accordingly. Based on the proceeding discussion, 
the effect of credit rating downgrades on operational efficiency is theoretically 
uncertain.  
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2.1 discusses the primary content 
of the sovereign ceiling rule, while section 4.2.2 explains our identification 
strategy.  Section 4.2.3 provides details regarding the matching approach. Section 
4.3 provides information regarding the dataset, whereas in section 4.4, we discuss 
the results of the linear regressions (4.4.1) and the difference in difference 
estimation (4.4.2). Finally, 4.5 contains concluding remarks.  
 
4.2 Methodology 
4.2.1 Sovereign Ceiling Rule 
Credit ratings provide a measure of the probability that an entity will repay its 
debt obligations in full and on time. CRAs have been firstly criticized for not 
predicting Enron’s default in 2001. In fact, they rated Enron's bonds as 
investment-grade—safe for many pension funds, that is—until shortly before the 
firm collapsed. They also failed to flag problems at WorldCom and Parmalat before 
they went bankrupt. They have also faced mass criticism for not predicting 
corporate defaults during the 2008 financial crisis and for accelerating the 
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis by massively downgrading Eurozone periphery 
bonds. Although they have been heavily criticized they are still broadly considered 
as a credible measure of countries’, banks’ and companies’ financial performance 
and consequently set the tone for borrowing costs in international markets both 
for a sovereign state and the financial institutions operating in that sovereign 
state. Ratings are categorized into short and long term depending on the entity’s 
maturity and into foreign and local depending on currency denomination. 
Following the previous literature, we focus on foreign currency long-term issuer 
ratings, which are most likely to be bound by the sovereign rating. There are three 
leading credit rating agencies, namely Standard & Poor’s (S&P’s), Moody’s, and 
Fitch which control more than 90% of the market.  
Credit rating agencies implemented a strict strategy of not providing a private 
company a foreign currency credit rating above the corresponding sovereign 
rating. This so-called “sovereign ceiling rule” was officially abandoned firstly by 
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S&P’s in April of 1997 for a number of dollarized Latin American economies. Fitch 
and Moody’s incorporated the same policy in 1998 and 2001 respectively. 
However, corporate ratings exceeding their corresponding sovereign rating are 
not commonly observable even after rating agencies relaxed the sovereign ceiling 
rule.  
Credit rating agencies do not use only a firm’s ability and willingness to repay its 
debt in full and on time. Still, they also take into consideration other factors that 
can affect the issuer’s ability to fulfill its financial obligations in foreign currency.  
They consider the probability that capital and exchange controls might be 
imposed following a sovereign default. Two factors can lead to a corporate rating 
above the corresponding sovereign: strong adaptability to financial and economic 
disruptions typically following sovereign stress, as well as some degree of 
insulation and independence from the sovereign. For instance, firms with higher 
foreign sales, foreign assets, and foreign ownership are less likely to be bounded 
by the sovereign ceiling rule. 
Globalization, financial integration, and innovation have led to multinational 
corporate world.  A more significant percentage of corporations become more 
export-oriented, hold more foreign assets in other countries, are owned and 
sometimes managed by foreign investors. That explains why CRA has recently 
updated its methodologies to address some of the limitations of the previous 
approach. For instance, The Standard & Poor’s Rating Services (2013) 
methodology can be summarized as follows. An entity can be rated above the 
sovereign foreign currency rating if, in their view, there is a significant likelihood 
that it would not default if the sovereign were to default. They first determine the 
entity's potential rating, which they compare with the sovereign foreign currency 
rating on the country (or countries) where the entity has material exposure(s). 
Standard & Poor's clearly states that the sovereign rating does not act as a "ceiling" 
for ratings. However, when rating an entity above the sovereign foreign currency 
rating, Standard & Poor's (2013) is expressing its view that the entity has 
sufficient creditworthiness to withstand a sovereign default. Therefore, they apply 
a hypothetical sovereign foreign currency default stress scenario (stress test). 
This stress test is applied with respect to the country (or countries) where the 
entity has material concentration(s) of exposure and where the potential rating 
would exceed the foreign currency rating on the sovereign. Firms that pass the 
stress test can be rated up to two or four notches above the sovereign rating, 
depending on whether S&P’s views their sector’s sensitivity to country risk as high 
or moderate, respectively. As a result of the updated methodology, Standard & 
Poor's (2013) expects a few entities to be affected by corporate and project 
finance ratings. This suggests that S&P’s issued conservative ratings to some firms 
due to the sovereign ceiling before the recent revision of the methodology 
(Almeida et al. 2017).  
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4.2.2 Identification Strategy 
The main challenge in examining the effect of sovereign credit ratings on 
operational efficiency and more broadly on firm outcomes is the inherent 
endogeneity among the sovereign’s creditworthiness, a firm’s credit quality and 
firm outcomes. In other words, the credit rating may affect operational efficiency 
and other firm outcomes, but at the same time, it may be affected by them. 
Endogeneity is, arguably, one of the most critical and pervasive issues confronting 
studies in empirical corporate finance. Endogeneity leads to biased and 
inconsistent parameter estimates that make reliable inference virtually 
impossible. In many cases, endogeneity can be severe enough to reverse even 
qualitative inference (Roberts and Whited 2013).  Three primary sources can lead 
to endogeneity; omitted variable bias, simultaneity, and measurement error. 
Omitted variables bias refers to those variables that should be included in the 
vector of explanatory variables, but for various reasons are not. Simultaneity bias 
occurs when the dependent variable and one or more of the independents are 
determined in equilibrium so that it can plausibly be argued either that one of the 
independents causes the dependent or that dependent causes one of the 
independents. Finally, a measurement error occurs when one or more of the 
variables are measured imperfectly. It arises due to the fact that most empirical 
studies in corporate finance use proxies for unobservable or difficult to quantify 
variables. When variables are measured imperfectly, the measurement error 
becomes part of the regression error.  
Following Almeida et al. (2017) we tackle endogeneity in our empirical analysis 
by examining the differential effect of sovereign rating changes on firms that are 
limited by the sovereign ceiling (treated firms) and on other firms in the same 
country that are not limited by the sovereign ceiling (nontreated firms). In 
particular, we compare firms which have a rating equal to or above the 
corresponding sovereign (treated firms) with similar firms which have a lower 
rating than the corresponding sovereign (nontreated firms).  
Almeida et al. (2017) show that there is a clear discontinuity at the sovereign 
bound, in the sense that the probability a corporate issuer will be downgraded 
within a month following a sovereign downgrade is much higher for corporations 
rated equal to or above the corresponding sovereign relative to those rated below. 
Consequently, treated firms have a significantly higher probability of being 
downgraded than nontreated firms following a sovereign downgrade. For 
example, our dataset includes 230 treated and 1873 non treated firm-year 
observations from the same countries in a year of a sovereign downgrade. If the 
sovereign ceiling didn’t hold, following a sovereign downgrade, the probability of 
being downgraded would not have been different between treated and non 
treated firms. However, 141 of treated firms (62%) are downgraded within one 
year while only 238 of non treated firms (13%) are downgraded during the same 
period. Thus, our dataset confirms an apparent discontinuity because of the 
sovereign ceiling rule. To test even further the robustness of our identification 
strategy, we compare changes on corporate ratings between treated and non 
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treated firms around sovereign rating downgrade. Following Almeida et al., we 
transform credit ratings from letters to numbers using a linear transformation, 
starting from 22 for the highest rated companies (AAA) to 1 for default (SD/D).  
Table 4.1 presents the linear transformation of credit ratings from letters to 
numbers, while Table 4.2 displays the difference in difference estimation on 
corporate ratings around a sovereign rating downgrade. Following a sovereign 
downgrade, treated firms experience an average drop of 2.7 notches, while non 
treated firms face only a decline of 0.3 notches. The difference between them (2.4 
notches) is statistically an economically significant and enhances our hypothesis. 
A reasonable concern is that this discontinuity may be driven by factors other than 
the sovereign ceiling rule. For instance, it could be argued that the deterioration 
of economic conditions is responsible for that discontinuity. It can only happen if 
macroeconomic changes increase credit risk only for bound firms. In fact, if there 
were any differential macroeconomic effects, better-quality firms (treatment 
group) should be less affected than poorer-quality firms (control group) (Almeida 
et al. 2017).  
To sum up, data show that sovereign ceiling rule is still implemented, at least to 
some extent, following a sovereign downgrade. So, the effect on operational 
efficiency across treated and nontreated firms following a sovereign downgrade 
should derive from changes in ratings and not from differences in firm 
fundamentals.  
 
4.2.3 Matching Approach 
We examine whether sovereign rating downgrades affect the operational 
efficiency of bounded firms around a sovereign rating downgrade through the 
sovereign ceiling channel. We incorporate the Abadie and Imbens (2011) 
estimator, as introduced by Abadie et al. (2004). We follow this estimator in order 
to take into consideration the fact that treated and nontreated firms may have 
different observable characteristics. The main idea of the matching estimator can 
be summarized as follows. The set of counterfactuals is restricted to the matched 
controls, that is, in the absence of the treatment (in our context, sovereign 
downgrades), the treatment group would behave similarly to the control group 
(Almeida et al., 2017). 
The matching procedure works as follows. The first step is to isolate firms which 
prior to the sovereign downgrade had a rating equal or above the corresponding 
sovereign rating (treated firms). The second step is to look for identical firms from 
the same country which before the sovereign downgrade rated below the relevant 
sovereign rating (control firms). So, we then match each treated firm with an 
identical control firm along multiple categorical (year and country) and non-
categorical (firm size, investment, Tobin’s Q, cash flow, cash, leverage) variables. 
We require a perfect match on categorical and a less exact but very close match on 
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noncategorical variables57.  We then compare the differences in the outcome 
variables between the matched treated and control group around a sovereign 
rating downgrade.  
 
4.3 Data construction and summary statistics 
The sample consists of firms from 81 countries from 1990 to 2017. Financial firms 
(SIC Code 6000-6999) are excluded because they follow different financial 
policies. More specifically, we cannot compare leverage ratios between financial 
and non-financial firms. We obtain firm accounting data from WRDS Compustat, 
Compustat Global and Datastream and sovereign and corporate credit ratings 
(foreign currency long-term issuer ratings) from Bloomberg. We match firms 
between databases using International Securities Identification Number (ISIN),   
Stock Exchange Daily Official List (SEDOL), Committee on Uniform Securities 
Identification Procedures (CUSIP) and Company Name. In particular, we match US 
and Canadian firms using CUSIP and Company Name and International firms using 
ISIN, SEDOL, and Company name. The initial sample consists of 482,289 firm-year 
observations and 49,449 different firms. Only a small percentage of these 
companies has a rating (37,948 firm-year observations for 3,953 unique firms).  
Table 4.3 presents the total number of treated firm-year observations by country 
and year. There is initially a total of 230 treated firms from 25 individual countries. 
Treated firms appear both in developed markets (such as Italy and Japan) and 
emerging market countries (such as Argentina, Brazil, and Russia). Many 
countries have faced multiple sovereign rating downgrades from 2000 to 2017. 
For example, Italy has been downgraded 6 times, Portugal 3 times and Brazil 5 
times. Thus, some firms have been affected more than once from a sovereign 
rating downgrade through the sovereign ceiling rule. 
We measure operational efficiency with the following six proxies broadly 
incorporated in the literature (Mitton 2006).  Asset turnover defined as the ratio 
of total sales to total assets. We also incorporate the ratio of Sales to the value of 
assets in place (VAIP) as calculated in Loderer et al. (2017) and the ratio of Selling, 
general and administrative costs to total sales. Moreover, we employ Sales growth 
defined as the natural logarithmic difference of total sales, Return on Assets 
defined as the ratio of Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization to total assets and finally Operating return on Assets defined as the 
ratio of Earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. 
 
57We implement the matching estimator using the Stata command nnmatch. A detail we need to treat 
very carefully regarding exact matching in categorical variables is that the code does not automatically 
limit the match to be exact, but instead gives a weight of 1,000 (instead of one) for the categorical 
variables for which we request an exact match. For instance, the code may find an observation from 
the control group from Argentina in 2001 that minimizes the (Mahalanobis) distance for the vector of 
observed covariates for one treated observation from Brazil during the same year. In our application, 
we drop treated firms for which we are unable to find a perfect match in the same country and year.  
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We match treated and non treated firms in several covariates namely firm size, 
investment, Tobin’s Q, cash flow, cash, and leverage. Size is defined as the 
logarithm of total assets(Compustat item AT - Datastream item WC02999),  
Investment is defined as the ratio of annual capital expenditures (Compustat item 
CAPX - Datastream item WC04601) to lagged net property, plant, and equipment 
(Compustat item PPENT - Datastream item WC02501), Tobin’s Q is defined as the 
ratio of total assets plus market capitalization minus common equity (Compustat 
item CEQ - Datastream item WC03501) to total assets and Cash Flow is defined as 
the ratio of annual operating income (Compustat item OIBDP - Datastream item 
WC18155) plus depreciation and amortization (Compustat item DP - Datastream 
item WC01151) to lagged total assets. A detailed explanation of every variable is 
provided in table 4.4 
In addition, we require firms to match on year and country of domicile perfectly. 
In other words, we ensure that treated and control firms are exposed to the same 
sovereign rating downgrade and any other country-level shocks.  Finally, we only 
match treated firms with rated non-treated firms. This is essential because we 
cannot assume that non rated firms would have been in the control group if they 
had a rating.  
We drop observations with missing values and treated firms that do not match 
exactly with a firm from the control group of the same country during the same 
year. As a result, we end up with 64 treated firm-year observations. The list of 
perfectly matched treated firm-year observations is presented in table 4.5 
whereas summary statistics are provided in table 4.6. We compare mean and 
median between treated and control firms, but we also report summary statistics 
of all rated and non rated firms. In general, rated firms are bigger, more leveraged 
and have higher investment ratios. The goal of the matching estimator is to take 
into account those distributional differences, which could bias posttreatment 
outcomes. The Abadie–Imbens matching estimator identifies a match for each 
firm-year observation in the treatment group. We thus have 64 firm-year 
observations in both groups, but because matching is done with replacement, in 
the sense that one observation can be used more than once as a control in 
matching, we have 40 unique firm-year observations in the control group. The 
similarity of the mean and the median of the covariates between treated and 
control firms guarantees the appropriateness of the matched treated control 
sample. All the above things considered, we ensure that changes in the outcome 
variable are driven by sovereign rating downgrades.  
 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Linear Regression results 
We examine the effect of credit rating downgrades on the operational efficiency of 
treated firms using the following regression model.  
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Efficiencyi,t=α+β1*SovereignDowngradei,t +β2*Bound i,t-1 + 
β3*SovereignDowngradei,t *Bound i,t-1  +γXi,t-1 +  δi+ δt +εi,t                                              (4.1) 
 
Where i indexes firm and t indexes year. Efficiency is one of the six measures we 
incorporate in year t.58 Sovereign Downgrade is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 in the year of the sovereign downgrade and Bound is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 if the firm has a rating equal or above its country of 
domicile. Sovereign Downgrade*Bound is the product of the sovereign rating 
downgrade dummy and the lag of the bound firm dummy since we examine the 
effect on firms that had a rating equal or above their country of domicile prior to 
the sovereign rating downgrade. Finally, Xi,t-1  is the vector of firm-level control 
variables, δt  captures year fixed effects and  δi firm fixed effects. 
The coefficient of interest is the interaction term SovereignDowngrade*Bound, 
representing the difference in difference in operational efficiency between treated 
firms and nontreated firms following a sovereign downgrade relative to the 
difference before the downgrade.  We also include a set of control variables 
commonly used in the corporate finance literature to account for the time-varying 
differences across firms. We control for firm Size, Tobin’s Q, Investment, Cash, 
Cash Flow, and Leverage.  
Tables 4.7 – 4.12 report the estimates of equation 4.1 for each measure of 
operational efficiency. Each table incorporates 5 columns. Column1 presents the 
simple DiD effect without Firm/Year fixed effects. Column 2 shows the effects of 
using only Firm FE, whereas column 3 includes both Firm and Year fixed effects. 
Moreover, column 4 presents the results, including Firm fixed effects and control 
variables and column 5 includes Firm and Year fixed effects as well as control 
variables. 
Table 4.7 presents the effect of sovereign rating downgrades on Asset Turnover of 
treated firms. The coefficient of interest is always positive and statistically 
insignificant, showing that there is no effect of sovereign rating downgrades on 
Asset turnover of treated firms through the sovereign ceiling channel. Table 4.8 
examines the impact of credit rating downgrades on Sales growth. The 
SovereignDowngrade*Bound variable of interest is negative and statistically 
important in column 2. For instance, column 2 suggest that sales growth of treated 
firms drop by 24% relative to non treated firms following a sovereign rating 
downgrade. However, the effect disappears once we add Year fixed effects and/or 
control variables.  
In table 4.9, we display the result of the linear regression on Sales to Value of 
Assets in Place of firms that have a pre-downgrade rating at or above the sovereign 
bound (i.e., treated firms) relative to non treated firms. Not surprisingly, the 
 
58 We have also examined the effect in year t+1 , in the sense that rating downgrades might affect 
operational efficiency with a lag, but the results do not differ significantly.  
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coefficient of the variable of interest is insignificant, indicating no evidence of the 
sovereign ceiling rule effect on Sales to VAIP. 
Next, we examine the effect of sovereign downgrades on SGA to Sales ratio. This 
ratio usually employed as a proxy of agency cost in the literature (Florackis, 2008), 
serves as a proxy of the inverse of operational efficiency. In that sense, an increase 
in the SGA to sales ratio means that a firm becomes less efficient since its expenses 
increase more for every extra unit of sales. The coefficient of interest in column 1 
of Table 4.10 shows that Selling, General and Administrative Expenses to Sales 
increase more for treated firms relative to non-treated, following the sovereign 
rating downgrade. However, the impact does not exist when we add Firm/Year 
fixed effects and or control variables.  
Finally, tables 4.11 and 4.12 display the effect of the coefficient of interest on 
Return on Assets and Operating Return on Assets respectively. Column 1 in both 
tables shows that ROA/OROA of treated firms drops by around 7% more relative 
to nontreated firms. Unfortunately, the effect is opaque since it disappears once 
we add Firm/Year fixed effects and or control variables. 
4.4.2 Difference in difference results on the treated-control matched sample 
Our linear regressions reported some weak evidence of an effect of rating 
downgrades on operational efficiency. However, the linear regression results 
might be affected from the differences between treated and non treated firms. 
Consequently, we perform a matched sample analysis in order to take into 
consideration these concerns. We match each treated firm with an identical 
control firm along multiple categorical (year and country) and non-categorical 
(firm size, investment, Tobin’s Q, cash flow, cash, leverage) variables. We require 
a perfect match on categorical and a less exact but very close match on 
noncategorical variables, and we then compare the differences in the outcome 
variables between the matched treated and control group around a sovereign 
rating downgrade.  
Tables 4.13 – 4.18 report the difference in difference estimates in each proxy of 
operational efficiency around a sovereign rating downgrade between treated and 
control firms. In line with linear regression results, we do not find statistically 
significant differences in 5 out of 6 operational efficiency measures between 
treated and control firm-year observations around a sovereign downgrade. We 
only see a differential effect in Sales growth between treated and control firms 
around a sovereign downgrade. Table 4.14 presents a difference-in-differences 
matching estimator in Sales growth around a sovereign downgrade. For firms in 
the treatment group, average Sales growth drops from 8.6% to 7.85%, a reduction 
of 0.75 percentage points. For control firms, Sales growth increases slightly from 
7.07% to 7.70%, an upgrade of 0.63 percentage points. Sales growth is therefore 
reduced by 1.38% more for treated firms than control firms, which is statistically 
and economically significant.  
Tables 4.13 and 4.15-4.18 report very small differences between treated and 
control firms around the sovereign downgrade but these differences are not 
4. Do credit ratings affect firm operational efficiency? Evidence from sovereign 
rating downgrades 
63 
 
statistically and economically important. For example, table 4.17 shows that 
Return on Assets of treated firms drops by 2.6% from 15 to 12.4 percentage 
points. At the same time, Return on Assets of control firms drops by 2.3% from 
13.2 to 10.9 percentage points. As a result, Return on Assets drops by only 0.3% 
more for treated firms than control firms, which is neither economically nor 
statistically significant.  
 To conclude, linear regression results and differences in differences matching 
estimators present only opaque evidence of an effect of sovereign rating 
downgrades on operational efficiency.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
Our work examines a novel channel through which financing might affect 
operational efficiency.  We only find weak evidence that sovereign rating 
downgrades can affect operational efficiency through the sovereign ceiling 
channel. In particular, we show that Sales growth of firms with a rating equal to or 
above the corresponding sovereign drop by 1.38% more than Sales growth of 
firms rated below their corresponding sovereign following a sovereign rating 
downgrade. We exploit exogenous variation on corporate ratings from sovereign 
rating downgrades through the sovereign ceiling rule. This exogenous variation 
lets us identify a causal relationship between credit ratings and operational 
efficiency.  
The absence of robust evidence may arise from several reasons. First of all, as 
mentioned above, there are theoretically 3 different channels through which 
credit ratings affect operational efficiency. Thus, it possible that these channels 
neutralize each other and make the total effect insignificant. Secondly, the result 
may also be driven by the small number of treated firms. Finally, the results may 
be affected from the financial ratios used as proxies of operational efficiency 
Future work in this area could focus on more advanced operational efficiency 
measures to tackle the latter. For example, Stochastic Frontier Analysis and Data 
Envelopment Analysis which belong to the group of frontier methodologies can be 
incorporated to clarify the effect of credit rating downgrades on operational 
efficiency. Moreover, future work could also examine whether sovereign 
downgrades affect other corporate policies. Managers may use earnings 
management to dampen the adverse consequences of rating downgrades. It is also 
possible that firms affected by sovereign rating downgrades focus on their 
economic and financial performance setting aside environmental and corporate 
policies. 
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5. CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
5.1. Conclusion 
This thesis consists of three essay-style chapters in sovereign and corporate credit 
ratings. Chapter 2 studies the impact of economic policy uncertainty on sovereign 
credit rating decisions made by the three leading rating agencies namely Moody’s, 
Standard and Poor’s and Fitch for the Eurozone Economies from 2002 to 2015. In 
doing so, we implement a panel quantile regression that allows us to observe the 
relative importance of quantitative and qualitative factors across the conditional 
distribution of sovereign credit ratings. Our results can be summarized as follows. 
Economic policy uncertainty negatively affects credit ratings across the 
conditional distribution; however, the impact is more prolonged on the lower 
rated countries. Moreover, the unemployment rate, regulatory quality and 
competitiveness have a stronger impact on low rated countries whereas GDP per 
capita is a major driver of high rated countries.  We then quantify the negative 
effects of uncertainty on credit ratings by using estimates of our model under 
uncertainty to infer what credit ratings would have been had uncertainty 
remained at its 2002-2007 pre-financial and pre-European debt crisis average 
value. We find that economic policy uncertainty in the Euro area has reduced 
Greece’s credit rating by around 3 notches at the height of the Eurozone crisis in 
2011 and 2012; the impact of uncertainty has been substantial but somewhat less 
severe for the remaining GIIPS and Cyprus.  
Chapter 3 analyses the bidirectional relationship between sovereign credit ratings 
and non-performing loans over and above the impact of their remaining 
fundamentals namely economic policy uncertainty, GDP growth, Investments, 
Government Debt and Fiscal Balance in a Panel VAR for 72 countries from 1998 to 
2017. Our generalized impulse response functions identify a significant and 
persistent effect of NPLs on sovereign credit ratings and vice versa. Our results are 
robust to a logistic transformation of sovereign ratings to numbers and alternative 
measures of uncertainty and banking risk.   
Finally, in chapter 4, we examine the adverse consequences of sovereign rating 
downgrades on firms’ operational efficiency. We approach our main question by 
exploiting exogenous variation in sovereign credit ratings through the so-called 
sovereign ceiling rule. We then trace our main effect by comparing the differential 
effect of sovereign rating changes on firms that are limited by the sovereign ceiling 
(treated firms) and on other firms in the same country that are not limited by the 
sovereign ceiling (nontreated firms). In particular, we compare firms which have 
a rating equal to or above the corresponding sovereign (treated firms) with 
similar firms which have a lower rating than the corresponding sovereign 
(nontreated firms).  We match treated and non treated firms in several categorical 
and non categorical covariates namely firm size, investment, Tobin’s Q, cash flow, 
cash, leverage, Country of Domicile and Year. Our linear regressions identify a 
negative effect from credit rating downgrades on sales growth and ROA, while we 
do not find any evidence from credit rating downgrades on the ratio of Sales to the 
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Book value of Assets, the ratio of Sales to the book value of assets in place and the 
ratio of Selling, General and Administrative Costs to Sales. Moreover, our 
difference in difference estimation in the sample analysis shows that Sales growth 
of firms with a rating equal to or above the corresponding sovereign drop by 
1.38% more than Sales growth of firms rated below their corresponding sovereign 
following a sovereign rating downgrade. 
 
5.2 Directions for further research 
We now discuss some directions for further research that extend the work that 
has been done during this thesis.  
5.2.1 The possible impact of liquidity injections  
What we have not considered in chapter 2 is the possible impact (if any at all) of 
liquidity injections put forward by the ECB in terms of purchases and holdings of 
securities for monetary policy purposes from 2009 onwards (see the discussion 
in Lo Duca et al., 2016) and post-2014 Quantitative Easing support (see e.g. the 
discussion in Koijen et al., 2016) on Eurozone’s sovereign credit ratings. If, for 
instance, these types of policies provide a ‘signal’ that Eurozone’s economic 
recovery is, at best, shaky, CRAs might become more reluctant to proceed with a 
number of sovereign upgrades. The counter-argument, of course, is that ECB’s 
policies might have safeguarded against deteriorating economic conditions, 
therefore preventing additional sovereign downgrades over the recent years. We 
intend to explore these issues in future research.  
5.2.2 Using CDS instead of credit ratings 
The focus of chapter 3 has been on sovereign ratings. Credit Default Swaps provide 
a market-based measure of sovereign risk which is available at a higher frequency. 
Whether this links in the same manner as sovereign ratings to the lower frequency 
information set of fundamentals employed in our chapter is an interesting avenue 
of future research that could be addressed through e.g. mixed data sampling 
(MIDAS) models. 59 Future research could also focus on the potential role of state-
owned versus private banks. For instance, Gonzalez-Garcia and Grigoli (2013) find 
that a larger presence of state-owned banks in the banking system is associated 
with more credit to the public sector, larger fiscal deficits, higher public debt 
ratios, and higher NPLs because these tend to be more sensitive to political 
interests if governance in these banks is weak. In addition, state-owned banks 
appear to have a higher fraction of NPLs loans than privately-owned banks and 
tend to display a higher likelihood of default (see the discussion in Cull et al., 2017 
and references therein). These findings open up the possibility of exploring the 
interconnections among debt, NPLs and ultimately credit rating decisions in a 
panel VAR model which controls for governance indicators and a distinction 
 
59 Berndt et al. (2018) show that CDS in the US corporate sector comove with macroeconomic 
indicators (namely the 5-year Treasury rate and the University of Michigan consumer sentiment 
index). 
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between state-owned and private banks. Finally, it could be interesting to try to 
identify and investigate additional factors that credit rating agencies do not 
consider in their sovereign rating models but that could be used to further 
improve their models. For example, models used by sophisticated investors could 
highlight important factors neglected by rating agencies’ models; also, market 
prices of traded instruments linked to sovereign risk could reflect investors’ 
expectations about changes in the default likelihood of a sovereign. We intend to 
return to these issues in future research.  
 
5.2.3 Using stochastic frontier analysis and data envelopment analysis 
In chapter 4 we have incorporated 6 financial ratios as measures of operational 
efficiency. A potential extension on chapter 4 would be to integrate data 
envelopment analysis (DEA), which belongs to the group of frontier 
methodologies, in order to measure operational efficiency. In frontier 
methodologies, a firm’s performance is measured in terms of distance from the 
industry’s efficient frontier. In the DEA program, observations (termed decision-
making units or DMUs) are sorted into groups based on commonality in 
production technology or operations (termed the calculation group) (Demerjian 
2012). The efficient frontier is a function that indicates the maximum attainable 
level of output corresponding to a given quantity of input (Cheng et al., 2018). The 
frontier methodologies have proved particularly useful when firm performance is 
characterized by multiple dimensions with different units of analysis. A key 
strength of DEA lies in its capability to simultaneously incorporate multiple inputs 
and outputs, a requirement for analysis of many industries and for studies that 
seek to incorporate nonfinancial measures of performance (Cheng et al., 2018).  
DEA combines the ratio of outputs to inputs to create an efficient frontier of 
production based on an optimization program to maximize operational efficiency. 
The main drawback of the DEA approach is that it is not restricted to a definite 
functional form for the relationship between inputs and outputs. Additionally, it is 
non-parametric and optimal weightings are derived from the dataset used and are 
not assigned a priori. The DEA program calculates an efficiency score for each 
DMU in the calculation group, with scores ranging from zero to one. The 
operational efficiency of a company is relatively compared to those companies 
located on the efficient frontier which creates an ordinal ranking of firms.  For 
example, the most efficient firm is that one that produces the maximum level of 
output given the level of inputs or uses the minimum level of inputs given the level 
of outputs. After solving an optimization program for each firm within an 
estimation group, the DEA analysis standardizes efficiency scores so that the most 
(least) efficient firms are assigned a value of one (zero) (Cheng et al. 2018).  All in 
all DEA  could shed some extra light on the question examined in chapter 4.  
5.2.4 Sovereign rating downgrades and earnings management.  
In chapter 4, we have shown have how operational efficiency can be affected by 
sovereign rating downgrades through the sovereign ceiling channel. However, 
operational efficiency is not the only firm outcome or policy that can be affected 
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by credit rating downgrades. Examples provided above show that firms take 
rating downgrades very seriously into their strategies. Firms may look for options 
that could dampen the harmful effects of rating downgrades. Earnings 
management is one option that could abbreviate the adverse impact of rating 
downgrades of firm performance.  
Earnings management may be defined as “reasonable and legal management 
decision making and reporting intended to achieve stable and predictable 
financial results. Stein and Wang (2016) document that firms report more 
negative discretionary accruals when financial markets are less certain about 
their prospects. The period following a rating downgrade is usually a period with 
high uncertainty, so firms may opportunistically shift earnings following a rating 
downgrade. This project can highlight a new channel through credit rating 
decisions affect earnings management.  
 
5.2.5 Sovereign rating downgrades and corporate social responsibility.  
During recent decades our world has realized to a vast extent the necessity to 
protect the environment. Within this framework, a new aspect of Finance has 
erased. The so-called sustainable finance has exploded, with a strong appetite 
from investors and policymakers. Firms are now taking actions to protect the 
environment and benefit the society. Among these actions is the bond issuance for 
environmental projects, the so-called green bonds. Flammer (2018) documents 
that green bonds yield positive announcement returns, improvements in long-
term value and operating performance, gains in environmental performance, 
increases in green innovations, and an increase in ownership by long-term and 
green investors. As a result, firms are now assessed by independent organizations 
that report environmental and social scores for them. As mentioned above, the 
period following a rating downgrade is usually a period with high uncertainty. 
Firms usually put more emphasis on their financials. So we can hypothesize that 
rating downgrades would lead to a substitution effect between financials and 
corporate social responsibility in the sense that firms put less emphasis on their 
environmental and social actions following a credit rating downgrade. The effect 
might be more prolonged for firms with lower institutional ownership since 
recent research shows that across 41 countries, institutional ownership is 
positively associated with environmental and social performance (Dyck et al., 
2019).
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Table 2.1: Linear transformation of sovereign ratings 
 
Rating Agency Rating Grades
Fitch S&P's Moody's Outlook (1-21)
Highest quality AAA AAA Aaa Stable 21
Negative 20.67
Positive 20.33
AA+ AA+ Aa1 Stable 20
Negative 19.67
Positive 19.33
High quality AA AA Aa2 Stable 19
Negative 18.67
Positive 18.33
AA- AA- Aa3 Stable 18
Negative 17.67
Positive 17.33
A+ A+ A1 Stable 17
Negative 16.67
Positive 16.33
Strong payment A A A2 Stable 16
capacity Negative 15.67
Positive 15.33
A- A- A3 Stable 15
Negative 14.67
Positive 14.33
BBB+ BBB+ Baa1 Stable 14
Negative 13.67
Adequate payment Positive 13.33
capacity BBB BBB Baa2 Stable 13
Negative 12.67
Positive 12.33
BBB- BBB- Baa3 Stable 12
Negative 11.67
Positive 11.33
BB+ BB+ Ba1 Stable 11
Negative 10.67
Likely to fullfill Positive 10.33
obligations, ongoing BB BB Ba2 Stable 10
uncertainty Negative 9.67
Positive 9.33
BB- BB- Ba3 Stable 9
Negative 8.67
Positive 8.33
B+ B+ B1 Stable 8
Negative 7.67
Positive 7.33
High credit  risk B B B2 Stable 7
Negative 6.67
Positive 6.33
B- B- B3 Stable 6
Negative 5.67
Positive 5.33
CCC+ CCC+ Caa1 Stable 5
Negative 4.67
Positive 4.33
Very high credit CCC CCC Caa2 Stable 4
risk Negative 3.67
Positive 3.33
CCC- CCC- Caa3 Stable 3
Negative 2.66
Non default wih CC CC Ca 2.33
possibility of recovery C 2
Default DDD SD C
DD D 1
D
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Table 2.2: Data definitions and sources 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Definitions
Variable Name Definition Source
Fitch rating Sovereign rating attributed at 31st  December of each year Fitch
S&P's rating Sovereign rating attributed at 31st  December of each year S&P's
Moody's rating Sovereign rating attributed at 31st  December of each year Moody's
GDP per capita Log GDP per capita, US dollars, constant 2005 prices World Bank
Government debt General government gross debt as a percent of GDP IMF WEO
Current account balance Current account balance as a percent of GDP IMF WEO
Unemployment Rate Unemployment rate as a percent of total labor force IMF WEO
Inflation Rate Annual growth rate of consumer price index IMF WEO
Regulatory Quality Aggregate government indicator World Bank
Harmonised competitiveness indicator based on unit labour costs 
indices for the total economy
European Policy Uncertainty Eurozone's countries average www.policyuncertainty.com
Competitiveness Indicator ECB
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Table 2.3: Estimates for Moody’s 
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion. 
Dependent Variable: Moody's rating
Log GDP per capita Government Debt Current Account            Inflation Rate Unemployment Rate Regulatory Quality Competitiveness             Uncertainty AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
0.05 -1.1960 0.000 -0.0264 0.000 0.1159 0.000 0.2609 0.000 -0.3202 0.000 4.3321 0.000 -0.0467 0.000 -0.0325 0.000 9.207 0.585
0.10 -0.6623 0.000 -0.0384 0.000 0.0604 0.000 0.0332 0.000 -0.3341 0.000 4.3158 0.000 -0.0360 0.000 -0.0158 0.000 9.072 0.594
0.15 0.6975 0.000 -0.0370 0.000 0.0077 0.000 -0.0027 0.000 -0.2744 0.000 4.1139 0.000 -0.0349 0.000 -0.0119 0.000 8.804 0.608
0.20 3.1277 0.000 -0.0387 0.000 -0.0508 0.000 0.0034 0.864 -0.2400 0.000 4.1229 0.000 -0.0313 0.000 -0.0117 0.000 8.049 0.627
0.25 4.6216 0.000 -0.0449 0.000 -0.0196 0.014 -0.0680 0.000 -0.1907 0.000 3.3931 0.000 -0.0329 0.000 -0.0175 0.000 7.426 0.639
0.30 5.4820 0.000 -0.0372 0.000 -0.0377 0.000 0.0410 0.203 -0.1181 0.000 4.1231 0.000 -0.0341 0.000 -0.0109 0.000 7.528 0.625
0.35 4.8628 0.000 -0.0412 0.000 -0.1542 0.011 -0.1530 0.024 -0.1286 0.000 3.2106 0.000 -0.0251 0.000 -0.0307 0.000 7.345 0.575
0.40 3.3678 0.000 -0.0082 0.000 -0.0739 0.001 0.0221 0.576 -0.2136 0.000 4.4561 0.000 -0.0484 0.000 -0.0136 0.000 7.884 0.584
0.45 4.3645 0.000 0.0089 0.153 -0.0789 0.000 -0.0111 0.694 -0.2083 0.000 4.0718 0.000 -0.0294 0.000 -0.0191 0.000 7.092 0.533
0.50 3.7006 0.000 0.0032 0.337 -0.0226 0.000 -0.1233 0.000 -0.2119 0.000 2.4526 0.000 -0.0156 0.000 -0.0140 0.000 7.505 0.554
0.55 4.4081 0.000 -0.0097 0.000 0.0050 0.029 -0.0834 0.000 -0.2319 0.000 1.6651 0.000 -0.0325 0.000 -0.0158 0.000 7.621 0.589
0.60 6.7502 0.000 -0.0272 0.000 -0.0347 0.056 0.0363 0.213 -0.2010 0.000 1.9421 0.000 -0.0263 0.000 -0.0062 0.001 8.069 0.627
0.65 6.9493 0.000 -0.0168 0.000 -0.0641 0.000 -0.2221 0.000 -0.2727 0.000 0.6950 0.000 0.0036 0.656 0.0091 0.070 8.414 0.519
0.70 8.4967 0.000 -0.0246 0.000 -0.0411 0.000 -0.1600 0.000 -0.0403 0.163 0.9713 0.001 -0.0100 0.000 -0.0042 0.000 8.736 0.519
0.75 9.7634 0.000 -0.0308 0.000 -0.0263 0.025 -0.1112 0.011 0.0133 0.629 0.3437 0.180 -0.0201 0.000 -0.0076 0.002 8.889 0.495
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Table 2.4: Estimates for S&P’s 
 
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion. 
 
Dependent Variable: S&P's rating
Log GDP per capita Government Debt Current Account            Inflation Rate Unemployment Rate Regulatory Quality Competitiveness             Uncertainty AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
0.05 -0.1961 0.000 -0.0277 0.000 0.0565 0.000 0.0361 0.000 -0.3655 0.000 5.0575 0.000 -0.0687 0.000 -0.0219 0.000 9.101 0.620
0.10 2.7722 0.000 -0.0316 0.000 0.0156 0.000 -0.0336 0.000 -0.2247 0.000 3.3226 0.000 -0.0539 0.000 -0.0112 0.000 8.414 0.663
0.15 4.1889 0.000 -0.0398 0.000 0.0424 0.000 -0.1598 0.000 -0.2510 0.000 1.8446 0.000 -0.0417 0.000 -0.0118 0.000 8.019 0.681
0.20 4.8046 0.000 -0.0293 0.000 0.0194 0.049 -0.1416 0.000 -0.2487 0.000 2.7552 0.000 -0.0328 0.000 -0.0206 0.000 7.397 0.684
0.25 3.2558 0.000 -0.0237 0.000 0.0540 0.000 -0.1174 0.000 -0.2821 0.000 2.6147 0.000 -0.0420 0.000 -0.0159 0.000 8.292 0.675
0.30 4.5407 0.000 -0.0277 0.000 0.0555 0.000 -0.0873 0.000 -0.2470 0.000 2.4303 0.000 -0.0439 0.000 -0.0109 0.000 7.616 0.682
0.35 5.6193 0.000 -0.0402 0.000 -0.0202 0.035 -0.2705 0.000 -0.2713 0.000 2.3127 0.000 -0.0324 0.000 -0.0151 0.000 6.908 0.683
0.40 6.2628 0.000 -0.0270 0.000 0.0083 0.303 -0.1976 0.000 -0.2361 0.000 1.7445 0.000 -0.0275 0.000 -0.0129 0.000 7.490 0.687
0.45 6.5806 0.000 -0.0209 0.000 0.0130 0.003 -0.1212 0.000 -0.2405 0.000 1.3283 0.000 -0.0275 0.000 -0.0066 0.000 7.834 0.670
0.50 5.4772 0.000 -0.0069 0.046 -0.0419 0.308 -0.1020 0.000 -0.2703 0.000 1.0692 0.000 -0.0041 0.169 -0.0153 0.000 7.345 0.636
0.55 8.1589 0.000 -0.0373 0.000 -0.0568 0.029 -0.0810 0.000 -0.2010 0.000 1.6103 0.000 -0.0191 0.000 0.0007 0.810 8.576 0.671
0.60 8.3574 0.000 -0.0200 0.000 -0.0129 0.315 0.0264 0.686 -0.1562 0.000 0.4308 0.072 0.0118 0.000 -0.0109 0.000 8.727 0.645
0.65 8.8327 0.000 -0.0211 0.000 -0.0524 0.001 -0.3271 0.000 -0.2436 0.000 1.1058 0.000 0.0036 0.360 0.0137 0.000 8.896 0.567
0.70 11.1976 0.000 -0.0370 0.000 -0.0311 0.007 -0.0352 0.245 -0.0564 0.000 -0.2596 0.417 0.0009 0.460 -0.0085 0.000 9.133 0.619
0.75 12.6666 0.000 -0.0429 0.000 -0.0292 0.105 -0.0962 0.005 0.0169 0.359 0.1282 0.343 -0.0061 0.009 -0.0064 0.089 9.316 0.591
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Table 2.5: Estimates for Fitch 
 
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
Dependent Variable: Fitch rating
Log GDP per capita Government Debt Current Account            Inflation Rate Unemployment Rate Regulatory Quality Competitiveness             Uncertainty AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
0.05 0.8393 0.000 -0.0237 0.000 0.0960 0.000 -0.0463 0.000 -0.4446 0.000 1.2453 0.000 -0.0509 0.000 -0.0317 0.000 9.116 0.577
0.10 0.7370 0.000 -0.0179 0.000 0.0765 0.000 -0.1005 0.000 -0.4457 0.000 2.8360 0.000 -0.0389 0.000 -0.0115 0.000 8.911 0.633
0.15 2.3524 0.000 -0.0253 0.000 0.0583 0.000 -0.1070 0.000 -0.4223 0.000 2.7182 0.000 -0.0419 0.000 -0.0053 0.000 8.563 0.651
0.20 3.4014 0.000 -0.0203 0.000 0.0433 0.000 -0.1092 0.000 -0.3287 0.000 2.6176 0.000 -0.0421 0.000 -0.0107 0.000 8.214 0.663
0.25 6.5064 0.000 -0.0294 0.000 -0.0045 0.442 -0.1364 0.000 -0.3004 0.000 1.6866 0.000 -0.0488 0.000 -0.0093 0.000 7.198 0.669
0.30 4.7267 0.000 -0.0554 0.000 0.0523 0.019 -0.2287 0.000 -0.3111 0.000 1.3404 0.000 -0.0381 0.000 0.0040 0.441 7.729 0.634
0.35 5.6993 0.000 -0.0074 0.000 -0.0179 0.006 -0.0578 0.000 -0.2201 0.000 2.2305 0.000 -0.0370 0.000 -0.0118 0.000 7.267 0.635
0.40 6.5795 0.000 -0.0120 0.000 -0.0386 0.000 -0.1348 0.000 -0.1908 0.000 2.3079 0.000 -0.0388 0.000 -0.0152 0.000 7.794 0.633
0.45 6.1085 0.000 -0.0122 0.000 -0.0202 0.000 -0.0288 0.035 -0.2246 0.000 2.7174 0.000 -0.0402 0.000 -0.0098 0.000 7.632 0.647
0.50 5.4025 0.000 -0.0128 0.000 -0.0241 0.144 -0.1071 0.000 -0.2603 0.000 2.5984 0.000 -0.0315 0.000 0.0049 0.201 7.495 0.630
0.55 5.2451 0.000 -0.0092 0.001 0.0082 0.309 -0.0148 0.259 -0.2261 0.000 2.3528 0.000 -0.0221 0.000 -0.0077 0.000 7.297 0.660
0.60 9.3137 0.000 -0.0249 0.000 -0.0217 0.000 -0.0429 0.000 -0.1646 0.000 0.1749 0.006 -0.0177 0.000 -0.0010 0.097 8.789 0.632
0.65 10.1534 0.000 -0.0262 0.000 -0.0306 0.000 -0.0698 0.000 -0.1308 0.000 0.6065 0.000 -0.0091 0.000 0.0009 0.667 9.021 0.616
0.70 9.1753 0.000 -0.0292 0.000 -0.0575 0.000 -0.1863 0.000 -0.0706 0.000 0.8319 0.000 -0.0133 0.000 0.0006 0.832 8.843 0.595
0.75 11.8393 0.000 -0.0379 0.000 -0.0449 0.000 -0.1528 0.000 -0.0069 0.193 -0.7012 0.000 -0.0181 0.000 0.0025 0.132 9.182 0.498
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Table 2.6: Impact of European policy uncertainty on ratings for Moody’s  
Year Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain Cyprus 
2008 -0.535 -0.212 -0.442 -0.442 -0.212 -0.392 
2009 -0.314 -0.112 -0.283 -0.250 -0.135 -0.250 
2010 -1.037 -0.780 -1.037 -0.893 -0.410 -0.918 
2011 -3.025 -1.471 -1.632 -3.025 -2.860 -1.471 
2012 -3.521 -1.712 -1.712 -3.521 -1.712 -3.521 
2013 -2.707 -1.316 -1.316 -2.707 -1.316 -2.707 
2014 -1.453 -0.532 -0.532 -0.707 -0.532 -1.453 
2015 -2.010 -0.736 -0.736 -0.977 -0.736 -2.010 
 
Notes: Table 2.6 illustrates the effects of European policy uncertainty on credit ratings by using 
estimates of our credit rating model under uncertainty to infer what credit ratings would have 
been had uncertainty remained at its 2002-2007 average value. To do this, we construct the 
difference between the fitted values of the estimates of credit rating model (1) for Moody’s (as 
reported in Table 2.3) and the fitted values of the counterfactual model (1) which sets the post 
2007 values of the uncertainty variable equal to its 2002-2007 average. 
 
Table 2.7: Impact of European policy uncertainty on ratings for S&P’s 
Year Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain Cyprus 
2008 -0.4227 -0.1800 -0.1855 -0.4280 -0.1800 -0.1855 
2009 -0.2108 0.0128 -0.1187 -0.2317 -0.1954 -0.1187 
2010 -0.7379 -0.7151 -0.4352 -1.3492 0.0469 -0.7151 
2011 -2.0431 -1.9144 -1.0146 -1.0470 -1.4244 -1.0470 
2012 -2.3775 -1.2761 -1.2184 -2.3775 -1.2184 -2.3775 
2013 -1.8281 -1.7130 -0.9369 -1.8281 -0.9369 -1.8281 
2014 -0.9815 -0.6757 -0.5030 -0.9815 -0.5268 -0.9815 
2015 -1.3576 -0.4103 -0.6957 -0.6957 -0.7287 -1.3576 
 
Notes: Table 2.7 illustrates the effects of European policy uncertainty on credit ratings by using 
estimates of our credit rating model under uncertainty to infer what credit ratings would have 
been had uncertainty remained at its 2002-2007 average value. To do this, we construct the 
difference between the fitted values of the estimates of credit rating model (1) for S&P’s (as 
reported in Table 2.4) and the fitted values of the counterfactual model (1) which sets the post 
2007 values of the uncertainty variable equal to its 2002-2007 average. 
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Table 2.8: Impact of European policy uncertainty on ratings for Fitch 
Year Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain Cyprus 
2008 0.1132 0.0687 0.1382 -0.2166 0.0687 0.1382 
2009 -0.0945 0.0884 0.0884 0.0884 0.0439 0.0884 
2010 -0.7522 -0.7007 0.3240 -0.7734 0.0596 0.3240 
2011 -2.9516 -0.4918 -1.0974 -2.9516 -0.9145 -1.0673 
2012 -3.4349 -0.5723 -1.1569 -3.4349 -1.2420 -3.4349 
2013 -2.6411 -0.8896 -0.4401 -2.6411 -0.9550 -2.6411 
2014 -1.4179 -0.4160 -0.4776 -0.5127 -0.4776 -1.4179 
2015 -1.9613 -0.5754 -0.6606 -0.7092 -0.6606 -1.9613 
 
Notes: Table 2.8 illustrates the effects of European policy uncertainty on credit ratings by using 
estimates of our credit rating model under uncertainty to infer what credit ratings would have 
been had uncertainty remained at its 2002-2007 average value. To do this, we construct the 
difference between the fitted values of the estimates of credit rating model (1) for Fitch (as 
reported in Table 2.5) and the fitted values of the counterfactual model (1) which sets the post 
2007 values of the uncertainty variable equal to its 2002-2007 average. 
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Table 2.9: Estimates for Moody’s with first order lags as instrumental variables 
 
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
Dependent Variable: Moody's rating
Log GDP per capita Government Debt Current Account            Inflation Rate Unemployment Rate Regulatory Quality Competitiveness             Uncertainty AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
0.05 -0.7718 0.000 -0.0272 0.000 0.1196 0.000 0.2586 0.000 -0.3085 0.000 4.2377 0.000 -0.0476 0.000 -0.0307 0.000 9.150 0.593
0.10 -0.5901 0.000 -0.0390 0.000 0.0580 0.000 0.0355 0.000 -0.3339 0.000 4.2815 0.000 -0.0361 0.000 -0.0158 0.000 9.064 0.594
0.15 0.8942 0.000 -0.0396 0.000 0.0158 0.000 -0.0143 0.000 -0.2801 0.000 3.7907 0.000 -0.0376 0.000 -0.0108 0.000 8.801 0.609
0.20 2.7490 0.000 -0.0412 0.000 0.0030 0.000 -0.0328 0.000 -0.2265 0.000 3.7852 0.000 -0.0367 0.000 -0.0104 0.000 8.288 0.626
0.25 5.8908 0.000 -0.0456 0.000 -0.0179 0.008 -0.1727 0.000 -0.1720 0.000 2.6823 0.000 -0.0199 0.000 -0.0165 0.000 7.401 0.638
0.30 4.6627 0.000 -0.0304 0.000 -0.1361 0.000 -0.1292 0.000 -0.0936 0.000 6.3281 0.000 -0.0177 0.000 -0.0087 0.000 7.774 0.575
0.35 4.2664 0.000 -0.0223 0.000 -0.0379 0.000 -0.0257 0.283 -0.1272 0.000 4.0622 0.000 -0.0298 0.000 -0.0172 0.000 7.126 0.626
0.40 3.9472 0.000 -0.0056 0.015 -0.0209 0.024 0.0234 0.454 -0.2066 0.000 3.2522 0.000 -0.0379 0.000 -0.0146 0.000 7.578 0.585
0.45 3.0212 0.000 -0.0035 0.014 -0.0707 0.019 0.0439 0.018 -0.2055 0.000 4.9529 0.000 -0.0403 0.000 -0.0176 0.000 7.904 0.583
0.50 2.7157 0.001 0.0074 0.295 -0.0648 0.000 -0.0743 0.324 -0.2392 0.000 3.2915 0.000 -0.0093 0.038 -0.0106 0.000 7.792 0.554
0.55 8.1312 0.000 -0.0318 0.000 -0.0003 0.978 -0.1885 0.000 -0.0999 0.000 -0.0333 0.915 -0.0224 0.000 -0.0122 0.000 8.358 0.570
0.60 5.4859 0.000 -0.0111 0.030 -0.0309 0.159 -0.1036 0.025 -0.1875 0.000 1.5205 0.001 -0.0290 0.000 -0.0091 0.000 7.258 0.568
0.65 8.1615 0.000 -0.0217 0.000 -0.0377 0.000 -0.1567 0.012 -0.0658 0.000 0.6343 0.000 -0.0157 0.000 -0.0037 0.307 8.608 0.509
0.70 9.4343 0.000 -0.0264 0.000 -0.0342 0.000 -0.0781 0.021 -0.0191 0.015 0.2237 0.299 -0.0193 0.000 -0.0052 0.000 8.841 0.496
0.75 10.5101 0.000 -0.0357 0.000 -0.0379 0.003 -0.1316 0.000 0.0251 0.113 0.1774 0.398 -0.0222 0.000 -0.0087 0.001 8.983 0.502
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Table 2.10: Estimates for S&P’s with first order lags as instrumental variables 
 
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
Dependent Variable: S&P's rating
Log GDP per capita Government Debt Current Account            Inflation Rate Unemployment Rate Regulatory Quality Competitiveness             Uncertainty AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
0.05 0.2561 0.223 -0.0332 0.000 0.0996 0.000 0.1097 0.000 -0.3598 0.000 5.0597 0.000 -0.0704 0.000 -0.0224 0.000 9.049 0.629
0.10 3.1985 0.000 -0.0336 0.000 0.0123 0.000 -0.0188 0.000 -0.2321 0.000 3.1895 0.000 -0.0540 0.000 -0.0091 0.000 8.277 0.666
0.15 4.1839 0.000 -0.0403 0.000 0.0425 0.000 -0.1568 0.000 -0.2497 0.000 1.8321 0.000 -0.0425 0.000 -0.0128 0.000 8.048 0.680
0.20 3.8653 0.000 -0.0317 0.000 0.0616 0.000 -0.0849 0.006 -0.2305 0.000 2.4660 0.000 -0.0412 0.000 -0.0145 0.000 8.034 0.684
0.25 5.2135 0.000 -0.0386 0.000 0.0713 0.002 -0.1237 0.000 -0.2467 0.000 1.7475 0.000 -0.0456 0.000 -0.0167 0.000 7.554 0.685
0.30 4.5990 0.000 -0.0285 0.000 0.0421 0.001 -0.0986 0.000 -0.2503 0.000 2.4420 0.000 -0.0466 0.000 -0.0124 0.000 7.663 0.682
0.35 5.0184 0.000 -0.0234 0.000 0.0311 0.000 -0.1279 0.000 -0.1890 0.000 2.5447 0.000 -0.0393 0.000 -0.0154 0.000 7.068 0.679
0.40 7.0828 0.000 -0.0235 0.000 -0.0323 0.452 -0.2229 0.000 -0.2458 0.000 1.5197 0.000 -0.0227 0.009 -0.0113 0.000 8.059 0.674
0.45 5.8402 0.000 -0.0189 0.000 -0.0128 0.593 -0.1645 0.016 -0.2379 0.000 2.0647 0.000 -0.0289 0.000 -0.0088 0.000 7.406 0.672
0.50 6.6124 0.000 -0.0222 0.000 -0.0113 0.212 -0.2705 0.000 -0.2465 0.000 1.5298 0.000 -0.0210 0.000 -0.0053 0.025 7.938 0.666
0.55 5.1502 0.000 -0.0213 0.000 -0.0181 0.029 0.0020 0.927 -0.2167 0.000 3.6500 0.000 -0.0184 0.000 -0.0004 0.863 7.684 0.664
0.60 7.9678 0.000 -0.0281 0.000 0.0271 0.007 -0.0017 0.957 -0.1486 0.000 -0.0360 0.907 -0.0041 0.081 -0.0056 0.000 8.517 0.661
0.65 8.2714 0.000 -0.0321 0.000 0.0111 0.416 -0.2254 0.007 -0.1171 0.000 0.8732 0.001 -0.0254 0.000 -0.0067 0.289 8.490 0.654
0.70 10.5796 0.000 -0.0422 0.000 -0.0138 0.002 -0.1360 0.000 -0.0601 0.000 0.2215 0.092 -0.0039 0.009 -0.0071 0.007 9.033 0.640
0.75 11.5694 0.000 -0.0378 0.000 -0.0127 0.122 -0.1121 0.000 -0.0254 0.000 0.3859 0.054 -0.0028 0.161 -0.0048 0.383 9.209 0.605
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Table 2.11: Estimates for Fitch with first order lags as instrumental variables 
 
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
Dependent Variable: Fitch rating
Log GDP per capita Government Debt Current Account            Inflation Rate Unemployment Rate Regulatory Quality Competitiveness             Uncertainty AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
0.05 0.5366 0.000 -0.0204 0.000 0.1048 0.000 -0.0159 0.000 -0.4264 0.000 1.6633 0.000 -0.0492 0.000 -0.0297 0.000 9.113 0.587
0.10 -0.4317 0.000 -0.0093 0.000 0.0646 0.000 -0.1265 0.000 -0.4788 0.000 3.5251 0.000 -0.0380 0.000 -0.0052 0.000 9.028 0.611
0.15 1.9404 0.000 -0.0240 0.000 0.0662 0.000 -0.1173 0.000 -0.4323 0.000 2.6932 0.000 -0.0421 0.000 -0.0042 0.000 8.662 0.645
0.20 3.7112 0.000 -0.0213 0.000 0.0246 0.000 -0.1000 0.000 -0.3350 0.000 2.6471 0.000 -0.0437 0.000 -0.0091 0.000 8.086 0.663
0.25 4.4816 0.000 -0.0185 0.000 -0.0020 0.756 -0.1843 0.000 -0.3376 0.000 2.3379 0.000 -0.0379 0.000 -0.0095 0.000 7.643 0.664
0.30 4.4702 0.000 -0.0026 0.245 -0.0674 0.000 -0.1153 0.001 -0.2963 0.000 3.8467 0.000 -0.0235 0.000 -0.0046 0.000 6.999 0.633
0.35 6.3135 0.000 -0.0052 0.112 -0.0613 0.287 -0.0742 0.047 -0.2090 0.000 2.7420 0.000 -0.0297 0.005 -0.0107 0.000 7.962 0.625
0.40 6.5421 0.000 -0.0082 0.001 -0.0443 0.164 -0.1001 0.131 -0.2181 0.000 2.3106 0.000 -0.0397 0.000 -0.0154 0.000 7.765 0.626
0.45 5.9594 0.000 -0.0117 0.000 -0.0195 0.146 -0.1031 0.063 -0.2269 0.000 2.6819 0.000 -0.0372 0.000 -0.0039 0.284 7.676 0.637
0.50 5.9069 0.000 -0.0177 0.000 -0.0405 0.000 -0.2021 0.000 -0.2611 0.000 2.1313 0.000 -0.0374 0.000 0.0053 0.000 7.589 0.627
0.55 7.3734 0.000 -0.0133 0.000 -0.0199 0.000 -0.0637 0.000 -0.2130 0.000 1.8956 0.000 -0.0221 0.000 -0.0048 0.000 8.382 0.647
0.60 6.1613 0.000 -0.0178 0.000 0.0217 0.000 -0.1767 0.000 -0.2968 0.000 0.3757 0.000 0.0073 0.012 -0.0087 0.000 7.809 0.665
0.65 7.9307 0.000 -0.0205 0.000 -0.0029 0.756 -0.0691 0.002 -0.2220 0.000 0.9636 0.000 -0.0079 0.013 0.0073 0.010 8.627 0.623
0.70 9.5834 0.000 -0.0344 0.000 -0.0781 0.000 -0.1846 0.000 -0.0804 0.000 0.1674 0.263 -0.0190 0.000 -0.0055 0.013 8.806 0.625
0.75 11.6596 0.000 -0.0355 0.000 -0.0642 0.000 -0.1174 0.008 -0.0070 0.426 -0.1257 0.591 -0.0129 0.000 -0.0025 0.476 9.184 0.566
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Table 2.12: Estimates for Moody’s using the US policy uncertainty index 
 
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
Dependent Variable: Moody's rating
Log GDP per capita Government Debt Current Account            Inflation Rate Unemployment Rate Regulatory Quality Competitiveness        US  Uncertainty AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
0.05 -1.0811 0.000 -0.0463 0.000 0.0798 0.000 0.1869 0.000 -0.3495 0.000 4.2204 0.000 -0.0390 0.000 -0.0105 0.000 9.125 0.553
0.10 -0.0365 0.000 -0.0510 0.000 0.0451 0.000 0.0346 0.000 -0.3460 0.000 3.5093 0.000 -0.0454 0.000 -0.0090 0.000 9.039 0.570
0.15 2.4221 0.000 -0.0460 0.000 -0.0298 0.000 -0.0239 0.000 -0.2643 0.000 3.6139 0.000 -0.0364 0.000 -0.0011 0.000 8.360 0.602
0.20 2.1861 0.000 -0.0416 0.000 -0.0049 0.000 0.0104 0.000 -0.2914 0.000 4.0044 0.000 -0.0434 0.000 -0.0050 0.000 8.476 0.608
0.25 2.8051 0.000 -0.0318 0.000 -0.0276 0.000 -0.0144 0.324 -0.2250 0.000 4.3131 0.000 -0.0399 0.000 -0.0102 0.000 8.166 0.610
0.30 4.2157 0.000 -0.0295 0.000 -0.0348 0.003 0.0851 0.001 -0.1798 0.000 5.0614 0.000 -0.0479 0.000 0.0032 0.335 7.060 0.588
0.35 3.8584 0.000 -0.0245 0.000 -0.0717 0.000 0.0248 0.116 -0.1511 0.000 4.7225 0.000 -0.0504 0.000 -0.0128 0.000 7.579 0.586
0.40 4.2968 0.000 -0.0250 0.000 -0.0368 0.000 -0.0411 0.006 -0.1663 0.000 3.7575 0.000 -0.0468 0.000 -0.0013 0.569 7.228 0.586
0.45 4.5009 0.000 -0.0082 0.001 -0.0256 0.001 -0.0305 0.220 -0.2563 0.000 3.5760 0.000 -0.0272 0.000 -0.0097 0.001 7.050 0.577
0.50 6.4926 0.000 -0.0153 0.000 -0.0811 0.000 -0.0845 0.000 -0.1773 0.000 1.9668 0.000 -0.0326 0.000 0.0087 0.009 8.152 0.533
0.55 6.7314 0.000 -0.0196 0.000 -0.0078 0.120 -0.0476 0.000 -0.1232 0.000 1.0435 0.000 -0.0358 0.000 -0.0034 0.189 7.994 0.527
0.60 5.9102 0.000 -0.0152 0.000 0.0328 0.000 0.0019 0.842 -0.2000 0.000 0.9797 0.000 -0.0174 0.000 -0.0127 0.000 7.585 0.569
0.65 7.5368 0.000 -0.0163 0.001 -0.0560 0.363 -0.0246 0.267 -0.0631 0.000 0.8085 0.148 -0.0128 0.050 -0.0054 0.407 8.510 0.516
0.70 8.2166 0.000 -0.0201 0.000 -0.0393 0.000 -0.1358 0.000 -0.0800 0.000 0.4679 0.005 -0.0192 0.000 -0.0009 0.569 8.612 0.486
0.75 9.5034 0.000 -0.0257 0.000 -0.0445 0.000 -0.1482 0.000 -0.0332 0.463 0.1742 0.012 -0.0156 0.000 0.0140 0.174 8.951 0.420
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Table 2.13: Estimates for S&P’s using the US policy uncertainty index 
 
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion. 
Dependent Variable: S&P's rating
Log GDP per capita Government Debt Current Account            Inflation Rate Unemployment Rate Regulatory Quality Competitiveness        US  Uncertainty AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
0.05 1.0733 0.000 -0.0455 0.000 0.0714 0.000 0.0970 0.000 -0.3025 0.000 4.1584 0.000 -0.0764 0.000 -0.0198 0.000 8.965 0.615
0.10 4.1456 0.000 -0.0398 0.000 -0.0020 0.453 -0.1039 0.000 -0.2420 0.000 2.2753 0.000 -0.0398 0.000 0.0008 0.849 7.707 0.668
0.15 7.3733 0.000 -0.0542 0.000 -0.0238 0.034 -0.1443 0.000 -0.1919 0.000 0.9407 0.000 -0.0364 0.000 -0.0019 0.375 7.971 0.672
0.20 4.3276 0.000 -0.0414 0.000 0.0767 0.000 -0.1416 0.000 -0.3205 0.000 2.6185 0.000 -0.0213 0.000 -0.0251 0.000 7.819 0.658
0.25 3.7672 0.000 -0.0248 0.000 0.0519 0.000 -0.0537 0.000 -0.2790 0.000 3.0710 0.000 -0.0452 0.000 -0.0125 0.000 7.985 0.665
0.30 5.3187 0.000 -0.0250 0.000 0.0143 0.022 -0.0288 0.118 -0.1949 0.000 3.5621 0.000 -0.0434 0.000 -0.0016 0.595 7.281 0.660
0.35 4.4419 0.000 -0.0306 0.000 -0.0248 0.013 -0.2510 0.000 -0.2719 0.000 2.8031 0.000 -0.0437 0.000 -0.0065 0.000 7.605 0.666
0.40 5.3021 0.000 -0.0213 0.000 0.0171 0.006 -0.1674 0.000 -0.2376 0.000 2.1254 0.000 -0.0342 0.000 -0.0049 0.159 6.948 0.661
0.45 7.2741 0.000 -0.0229 0.000 -0.0190 0.079 -0.1977 0.000 -0.2624 0.000 1.9839 0.000 -0.0313 0.000 -0.0075 0.001 8.166 0.658
0.50 5.8615 0.000 -0.0177 0.000 0.0046 0.840 -0.0878 0.000 -0.2357 0.000 2.3395 0.000 -0.0001 0.991 -0.0002 0.918 8.089 0.666
0.55 7.4878 0.000 -0.0125 0.006 -0.0181 0.487 -0.1858 0.000 -0.2607 0.000 1.8494 0.000 -0.0280 0.000 -0.0128 0.024 8.271 0.624
0.60 10.7138 0.000 -0.0381 0.000 -0.0661 0.046 -0.0819 0.011 -0.1080 0.000 0.6225 0.000 0.0086 0.001 -0.0283 0.003 9.038 0.610
0.65 9.8143 0.000 -0.0343 0.000 -0.0123 0.000 -0.1153 0.013 -0.0898 0.000 0.9291 0.000 -0.0075 0.002 -0.0048 0.160 8.953 0.639
0.70 10.7290 0.000 -0.0310 0.000 -0.0453 0.000 -0.2093 0.000 -0.0967 0.000 0.4517 0.229 0.0012 0.819 -0.0046 0.082 9.105 0.610
0.75 11.3388 0.000 -0.0399 0.000 -0.0016 0.873 -0.0665 0.000 -0.0346 0.212 0.3835 0.026 -0.0056 0.009 -0.0114 0.331 9.147 0.614
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Table 2.14: Estimates for Fitch using the US policy uncertainty index 
 
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion. 
Dependent Variable: Fitch rating
Log GDP per capita Government Debt Current Account            Inflation Rate Unemployment Rate Regulatory Quality Competitiveness        US  Uncertainty AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
0.05 1.6295 0.000 -0.0408 0.000 0.0589 0.000 -0.2168 0.000 -0.4458 0.000 1.1758 0.000 -0.0329 0.000 -0.0126 0.000 8.871 0.603
0.10 1.6581 0.000 -0.0250 0.000 0.0282 0.000 -0.2082 0.000 -0.4687 0.000 2.6636 0.000 -0.0468 0.000 -0.0029 0.000 8.766 0.631
0.15 1.9947 0.000 -0.0266 0.000 0.0478 0.000 -0.1543 0.000 -0.4698 0.000 2.7098 0.000 -0.0367 0.000 0.0032 0.000 8.595 0.638
0.20 2.9458 0.000 -0.0229 0.000 0.0318 0.000 -0.1051 0.000 -0.3810 0.000 3.0963 0.000 -0.0410 0.000 -0.0056 0.000 8.305 0.653
0.25 4.4844 0.000 -0.0155 0.000 -0.0428 0.007 -0.1952 0.000 -0.3602 0.000 2.8791 0.000 -0.0391 0.000 -0.0129 0.009 7.594 0.644
0.30 3.0192 0.000 -0.0124 0.000 0.0251 0.000 -0.0799 0.000 -0.3332 0.000 3.3293 0.000 -0.0371 0.000 -0.0040 0.000 8.100 0.647
0.35 4.5063 0.000 -0.0224 0.000 -0.0132 0.727 -0.0882 0.000 -0.1951 0.000 3.5161 0.000 -0.0263 0.003 -0.0115 0.000 6.913 0.655
0.40 6.3075 0.000 -0.0125 0.000 -0.0371 0.000 -0.1339 0.000 -0.1951 0.000 2.4441 0.000 -0.0405 0.000 -0.0037 0.385 7.840 0.617
0.45 6.6617 0.000 -0.0101 0.000 -0.0317 0.000 -0.0819 0.000 -0.2160 0.000 2.9831 0.000 -0.0413 0.000 -0.0104 0.000 8.010 0.619
0.50 5.8961 0.000 -0.0154 0.000 -0.0149 0.280 -0.1328 0.000 -0.2610 0.000 2.2834 0.000 -0.0234 0.000 -0.0002 0.951 7.761 0.655
0.55 8.9905 0.000 -0.0320 0.000 -0.0097 0.399 -0.1322 0.000 -0.2261 0.000 0.2419 0.682 -0.0257 0.000 -0.0029 0.068 8.670 0.660
0.60 9.4244 0.000 -0.0222 0.000 -0.0320 0.000 -0.0241 0.223 -0.2069 0.000 0.1083 0.063 -0.0037 0.068 0.0002 0.484 8.873 0.633
0.65 9.9326 0.000 -0.0195 0.000 -0.0603 0.000 -0.1353 0.000 -0.1377 0.000 0.8549 0.000 -0.0086 0.001 -0.0015 0.090 8.989 0.604
0.70 10.7658 0.000 -0.0315 0.000 -0.0450 0.000 -0.1552 0.000 -0.0706 0.000 0.8198 0.000 -0.0064 0.000 0.0006 0.513 9.121 0.598
0.75 12.0175 0.000 -0.0344 0.000 -0.0866 0.000 -0.1331 0.000 0.0101 0.514 0.2083 0.143 -0.0120 0.000 -0.0014 0.787 9.253 0.545
 87 
 
 
Table 2.15: Estimates for Moody’s adding the 1st order lag of fiscal balance 
 
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion. 
Dependent Variable: Moody's rating
Log GDP per capita Government Debt Lag Fiscal Balance Current Account     Inflation Rate Unemployment Rate Regulatory Quality Competitiveness         Uncertainty AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
0.05 -1.5290 0.000 -0.0316 0.000 0.0381 0.000 0.0577 0.000 0.1778 0.000 -0.3651 0.000 3.4120 0.000 -0.0566 0.000 -0.0251 0.000 9.448 0.568
0.10 -1.3230 0.000 -0.0318 0.000 0.0593 0.000 0.0778 0.000 0.0315 0.000 -0.3322 0.000 4.8095 0.000 -0.0431 0.000 -0.0170 0.000 9.309 0.596
0.15 0.9305 0.000 -0.0333 0.000 0.1155 0.000 0.0243 0.000 0.0452 0.000 -0.2549 0.000 4.3205 0.000 -0.0432 0.000 -0.0100 0.000 8.913 0.616
0.20 2.7095 0.000 -0.0373 0.000 0.1240 0.000 0.0220 0.000 -0.0012 0.646 -0.2279 0.000 3.1784 0.000 -0.0426 0.000 -0.0075 0.000 8.530 0.630
0.25 3.7513 0.000 -0.0428 0.000 0.0226 0.570 -0.0073 0.380 -0.0077 0.743 -0.2357 0.000 3.8349 0.000 -0.0362 0.000 -0.0157 0.000 8.092 0.638
0.30 5.2677 0.000 -0.0239 0.000 0.1015 0.000 -0.0313 0.001 0.0144 0.492 -0.1063 0.000 3.3843 0.000 -0.0321 0.000 -0.0150 0.000 7.369 0.635
0.35 4.6305 0.000 -0.0184 0.000 0.0660 0.000 -0.0216 0.021 0.0058 0.773 -0.1398 0.000 3.6970 0.000 -0.0299 0.000 -0.0143 0.000 7.133 0.631
0.40 5.7900 0.001 -0.0042 0.633 0.0005 0.995 -0.0718 0.092 -0.0176 0.751 -0.1869 0.000 3.0631 0.000 -0.0319 0.011 -0.0061 0.445 8.000 0.544
0.45 5.1887 0.000 -0.0149 0.011 0.0680 0.002 -0.1557 0.000 -0.1527 0.000 -0.1330 0.000 3.3001 0.000 -0.0176 0.001 -0.0066 0.002 7.799 0.595
0.50 5.8321 0.000 -0.0134 0.000 0.0832 0.000 -0.0706 0.000 0.0056 0.631 -0.0980 0.000 1.7713 0.000 -0.0517 0.000 -0.0184 0.000 7.239 0.567
0.55 4.2450 0.000 -0.0152 0.000 -0.0147 0.555 0.0201 0.064 -0.0104 0.646 -0.1958 0.000 1.6746 0.000 -0.0273 0.000 -0.0192 0.003 7.823 0.620
0.60 7.8933 0.000 -0.0217 0.000 0.0747 0.004 -0.0212 0.201 -0.0144 0.337 -0.1929 0.001 0.4218 0.043 -0.0157 0.009 0.0003 0.950 8.628 0.587
0.65 9.1220 0.000 -0.0219 0.000 0.0925 0.000 -0.0277 0.011 -0.0447 0.040 -0.0205 0.111 0.3451 0.013 -0.0137 0.001 -0.0021 0.352 8.976 0.516
0.70 9.0676 0.000 -0.0237 0.000 0.0135 0.513 -0.0205 0.000 -0.0920 0.000 -0.0189 0.000 0.2455 0.007 -0.0189 0.000 -0.0050 0.000 8.919 0.487
0.75 10.1590 0.000 -0.0299 0.000 -0.0120 0.415 -0.0210 0.032 -0.0643 0.000 0.0541 0.000 0.4887 0.000 -0.0159 0.000 -0.0093 0.000 9.133 0.471
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Table 2.16: Estimates for S&P’s adding the 1st order lag of fiscal balance 
 
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion. 
Dependent Variable: S&P's rating
Log GDP per capita Government Debt Lag Fiscal Balance Current Account     Inflation Rate Unemployment Rate Regulatory Quality Competitiveness        Uncertainty AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
0.05 -0.2452 0.003 -0.0228 0.000 -0.0876 0.000 0.0641 0.000 0.0526 0.000 -0.3479 0.000 5.8159 0.000 -0.0553 0.000 -0.0283 0.000 9.175 0.617
0.10 2.5703 0.000 -0.0293 0.000 -0.0218 0.000 0.0258 0.000 -0.0359 0.000 -0.2185 0.000 3.4540 0.000 -0.0420 0.000 -0.0143 0.000 8.529 0.667
0.15 3.5529 0.000 -0.0259 0.000 0.0156 0.519 0.0616 0.000 -0.0894 0.000 -0.2615 0.000 2.2664 0.000 -0.0380 0.000 -0.0164 0.000 8.325 0.681
0.20 4.4567 0.000 -0.0334 0.000 0.0157 0.000 0.0572 0.000 -0.0854 0.000 -0.2215 0.000 2.1014 0.000 -0.0456 0.000 -0.0135 0.000 7.971 0.684
0.25 3.8314 0.000 -0.0282 0.000 0.0225 0.000 0.0716 0.000 -0.1017 0.000 -0.2788 0.000 2.0795 0.000 -0.0461 0.000 -0.0141 0.000 8.318 0.678
0.30 6.7341 0.000 -0.0455 0.000 -0.1266 0.006 -0.0109 0.800 -0.1076 0.000 -0.1922 0.000 3.8860 0.000 -0.0579 0.000 -0.0063 0.214 7.985 0.657
0.35 5.0360 0.000 -0.0183 0.000 0.0736 0.000 0.0457 0.000 -0.1318 0.000 -0.2389 0.000 1.8713 0.000 -0.0331 0.000 -0.0119 0.000 7.211 0.680
0.40 5.8972 0.000 -0.0102 0.004 0.0994 0.000 0.0257 0.021 -0.1852 0.000 -0.2468 0.000 1.1568 0.000 -0.0299 0.000 -0.0077 0.000 7.411 0.647
0.45 5.7537 0.000 -0.0132 0.000 0.1150 0.000 -0.0032 0.902 -0.1526 0.000 -0.2221 0.000 1.6885 0.000 -0.0169 0.043 -0.0173 0.003 7.441 0.674
0.50 5.6370 0.000 -0.0149 0.000 0.0824 0.000 -0.0080 0.109 -0.0659 0.004 -0.2176 0.000 1.4285 0.000 -0.0261 0.000 -0.0067 0.072 7.410 0.675
0.55 5.3905 0.000 -0.0143 0.000 0.0511 0.000 0.0133 0.166 -0.1355 0.004 -0.2226 0.000 1.8670 0.000 -0.0214 0.000 -0.0117 0.000 7.237 0.680
0.60 5.5769 0.000 -0.0017 0.839 0.1248 0.000 -0.0125 0.425 -0.0007 0.957 -0.2420 0.002 1.5841 0.000 0.0014 0.840 -0.0042 0.071 8.035 0.648
0.65 11.2861 0.000 -0.0292 0.000 0.1027 0.001 -0.0411 0.102 -0.0720 0.001 -0.0753 0.000 0.6712 0.000 0.0008 0.748 -0.0156 0.000 9.291 0.644
0.70 9.8056 0.000 -0.0235 0.000 0.0900 0.000 -0.0173 0.529 -0.2087 0.008 -0.0624 0.020 0.4422 0.219 -0.0088 0.247 -0.0077 0.001 9.064 0.622
0.75 11.9267 0.000 -0.0376 0.000 0.0420 0.001 0.0004 0.985 -0.0327 0.306 -0.0212 0.026 -0.0431 0.815 -0.0071 0.210 -0.0089 0.004 9.354 0.618
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Table 2.17: Estimates for Fitch adding the 1st order lag of fiscal balance 
 
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
Dependent Variable: Fitch rating
Log GDP per capita Government Debt Lag Fiscal Balance Current Account     Inflation Rate Unemployment Rate Regulatory Quality Competitiveness         Uncertainty AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
0.05 -0.3671 0.002 -0.0163 0.000 -0.0605 0.000 0.1055 0.000 -0.0178 0.000 -0.4518 0.000 3.2446 0.000 -0.0415 0.000 -0.0263 0.000 9.273 0.599
0.10 0.5267 0.000 -0.0178 0.000 -0.0205 0.000 0.0803 0.000 -0.0752 0.000 -0.4514 0.000 2.9392 0.000 -0.0408 0.000 -0.0128 0.000 9.097 0.627
0.15 2.4328 0.000 -0.0185 0.000 0.0290 0.000 0.0561 0.000 -0.0900 0.000 -0.3776 0.000 2.7393 0.000 -0.0450 0.000 -0.0069 0.000 8.669 0.653
0.20 2.8415 0.000 -0.0168 0.000 0.0350 0.000 0.0606 0.000 -0.0887 0.000 -0.3379 0.000 2.7900 0.000 -0.0442 0.000 -0.0118 0.000 8.557 0.658
0.25 3.8107 0.000 -0.0156 0.000 -0.0191 0.232 0.0234 0.001 -0.1209 0.000 -0.3329 0.000 2.7569 0.000 -0.0392 0.000 -0.0108 0.000 8.101 0.659
0.30 4.4626 0.000 -0.0204 0.000 0.0634 0.001 0.0042 0.843 -0.1101 0.000 -0.2535 0.000 2.5880 0.000 -0.0478 0.000 -0.0050 0.090 7.724 0.662
0.35 5.3301 0.000 -0.0167 0.000 0.0465 0.029 0.0011 0.933 0.0036 0.864 -0.2313 0.000 3.0073 0.000 -0.0471 0.000 -0.0018 0.531 7.194 0.651
0.40 4.9300 0.000 0.0006 0.641 0.1033 0.000 -0.0204 0.103 -0.0093 0.524 -0.1889 0.000 2.8000 0.000 -0.0307 0.000 -0.0024 0.278 7.383 0.626
0.45 4.4089 0.000 -0.0009 0.873 -0.0134 0.802 -0.0330 0.183 -0.1134 0.000 -0.2435 0.000 3.3225 0.000 0.0096 0.584 -0.0120 0.006 7.559 0.644
0.50 5.8097 0.000 -0.0124 0.011 0.0243 0.496 -0.0113 0.406 -0.0990 0.000 -0.2623 0.000 2.2384 0.000 -0.0262 0.006 -0.0021 0.818 7.780 0.657
0.55 6.2886 0.000 -0.0250 0.076 -0.0800 0.027 -0.0873 0.017 -0.2708 0.020 -0.3180 0.000 2.0090 0.056 -0.0311 0.000 -0.0022 0.535 7.788 0.645
0.60 9.2795 0.000 -0.0189 0.000 0.0871 0.000 -0.0245 0.000 0.0028 0.801 -0.1776 0.000 0.3689 0.030 -0.0097 0.003 0.0009 0.365 8.990 0.637
0.65 10.5963 0.000 -0.0279 0.000 0.0457 0.000 -0.0116 0.234 -0.0937 0.001 -0.0974 0.000 0.1014 0.342 -0.0092 0.000 -0.0078 0.001 9.160 0.628
0.70 9.4169 0.000 -0.0239 0.000 -0.0045 0.779 -0.0363 0.000 -0.1783 0.000 -0.0703 0.000 0.6184 0.000 -0.0076 0.001 -0.0044 0.000 9.031 0.598
0.75 11.5613 0.000 -0.0321 0.000 0.0173 0.269 -0.0534 0.000 -0.1193 0.000 -0.0430 0.065 -0.3545 0.075 -0.0060 0.000 0.0026 0.607 9.342 0.559
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Table 2.18: Estimates of mean regressions for Moody’s, S&P’s and Fitch ratings 
 
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. 
 
              Moody's                 S&P's                Fitch
coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
Log GDP per capita 14.7949 0.000 16.0823 0.000 16.3700 0.000
Government Debt -0.1094 0.000 -0.0727 0.000 -0.0840 0.000
Current Account -0.0628 0.007 -0.0328 0.114 -0.0356 0.075
Unemployment Rate -0.1386 0.006 -0.2852 0.000 -0.2458 0.000
Inflation Rate -0.1714 0.000 -0.1946 0.000 -0.2111 0.000
Regulatory Quality 2.9120 0.000 2.6319 0.000 2.1821 0.001
Competitiveness -0.0416 0.000 -0.0235 0.014 -0.0286 0.002
Uncertainty -0.0083 0.131 -0.0099 0.046 0.0022 0.645
Constant -38.2044 0.008 -46.7757 0.000 -48.0082 0.000
Time effects coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
2003 0.1657 0.621 0.1675 0.577 0.2415 0.406
2004 -0.2732 0.544 -0.1930 0.633 0.4167 0.286
2005 -0.5254 0.315 -0.4935 0.293 0.1750 0.699
2006 -0.9529 0.113 -1.1522 0.033 -0.2590 0.619
2007 -1.3860 0.023 -1.7272 0.002 -0.8070 0.127
2008 -0.1771 0.681 -0.4662 0.228 -0.3021 0.419
2009 1.0514 0.025 -0.4168 0.319 0.3485 0.389
2010 1.5486 0.000 0.4149 0.166 0.7237 0.013
2011 0.5975 0.066 0.4120 0.157 0.2816 0.317
2012 0.4528 0.137 0.3420 0.186 0.6235 0.463
2013 0.2504 0.452 -0.1271 0.671 0.0961 0.739
2014 0.6234 0.139 -0.4244 0.262 0.2200 0.547
2015 0.2562 0.503 -0.5742 0.096 -0.5315 0.111
R^2 within 0.877 0.849 0.864
between 0.582 0.684 0.653
overall 0.602 0.667 0.642
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Figure 2.1: Uncertainty measures 
 
Note: The survey-based uncertainty is from Girardi and Reuter (2017) and the other two from 
Baker et al (2016). 
Figure 2.2: Impact of regulatory quality on ratings for Moody’s: Quantile panel 
model versus standard panel model with fixed individual and time effects 
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Figure 2.3: Impact of competitiveness on ratings for Fitch: Quantile panel model 
versus standard panel model with fixed individual and time effects 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Mapping of sovereign credit ratings to quantile distribution for 
Moody’s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0,06
-0,05
-0,04
-0,03
-0,02
-0,01
0,00
0,05 0,10 0,15 0,20 0,25 0,30 0,35 0,40 0,45 0,50 0,55 0,60 0,65 0,70 0,75
Quantile of sovereign credit ratings
Competitiveness impact (Quantile panel model)
Competitiveness impact (Panel model with fixed individual and time effects)
 93 
 
Figure 2.5: Mapping of sovereign credit ratings to quantile distribution for S&P’s 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Mapping of sovereign credit ratings to quantile distribution for Fitch 
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Table 3.1: Linear transformation of sovereign ratings 
  Rating Agency   Frequency Rating Scale 
  Fitch S&P's Moody's Outlook Fitch S&P's Moody's (1-21) 
Highest quality AAA AAA Aaa Stable 249 249 291 21 
        Negative 8 15 12 20.67 
    Positive - 11 3 20.33 
 AA+ AA+ Aa1 Stable 56 52 35 20 
    Negative 3 11 9 19.67 
    Positive 3 4 7 19.33 
High quality AA AA Aa2 Stable 61 40 50 19 
    Negative 15 14 2 18.67 
    Positive 4 2 10 18.33 
 AA- AA- Aa3 Stable 34 41 35 18 
        Negative 10 9 4 17.67 
    Positive 8 9 12 17.33 
 A+ A+ A1 Stable 57 38 65 17 
    Negative 8 7 4 16.67 
    Positive 13 11 9 16.33 
Strong payment  A A A2 Stable 45 66 54 16 
capacity    Negative 2 10 7 15.67 
    Positive 10 11 14 15.33 
 A- A- A3 Stable 58 64 45 15 
        Negative 9 6 10 14.67 
    Positive 6 9 5 14.33 
 BBB+ BBB+ Baa1 Stable 49 42 57 14 
    Negative 17 12 10 13.67 
Adequate payment    Positive 10 15 11 13.33 
capacity BBB BBB Baa2 Stable 58 57 43 13 
    Negative 7 15 10 12.67 
    Positive 10 7 28 12.33 
 BBB- BBB- Baa3 Stable 83 59 64 12 
        Negative 18 23 21 11.67 
    Positive 12 14 15 11.33 
 BB+ BB+ Ba1 Stable 46 35 52 11 
    Negative 16 16 20 10.67 
Likely to fulfill    Positive 4 19 7 10.33 
obligations, ongoing BB BB Ba2 Stable 37 52 23 10 
uncertainty    Negative 12 23 8 9.67 
    Positive 16 3 3 9.33 
 BB- BB- Ba3 Stable 34 45 28 9 
        Negative 6 9 6 8.67 
    Positive 9 12 11 8.33 
 B+ B+ B1 Stable 24 32 39 8 
    Negative 4 5 7 7.67 
    Positive 7 11 2 7.33 
High credit  risk B B B2 Stable 27 26 24 7 
    Negative 8 8 4 6.67 
    Positive 3 3 6 6.33 
 B- B- B3 Stable 24 42 36 6 
        Negative 8 9 9 5.67 
    Positive - - 4 5.33 
 CCC+ CCC+ Caa1 Stable 2 18 13 5 
    Negative 1 4 9 4.67 
    Positive - - - 4.33 
Very high credit CCC CCC Caa2 Stable 10 - 4 4 
risk    Negative - 2 - 3.67 
    Positive - - - 3.33 
 CCC- CCC- Caa3 Stable - - 7 3 
        Negative - 3 2 2.66 
Non default with CC CC Ca   - - - 2.33 
possibility of 
recovery  C       3 3 4 
2 
Default DDD SD C     
 
 DD D   8 10 1 1 
  D               
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Table 3.2: Data definitions and sources 
Variable Name Definition Source 
Fitch rating 
Sovereign rating attributed at 31st  December of 
each year 
Fitch 
S&P's rating 
Sovereign rating attributed at 31st  December of 
each year 
S&P's 
Moody's rating 
Sovereign rating attributed at 31st  December of 
each year 
Moody's 
Uncertainty News Index Economic Policy Uncertainty www.policyuncertainty.com  
GDP growth rate 
Gross domestic product, constant prices Percent 
change 
IMF WEO April 2017 
Investments Total investments as a percent of GDP IMF WEO April 2017 
Government debt General government gross debt as a percent of GDP IMF WEO April 2017 
Fiscal Balance 
General government net lending/borrowing as a 
percent of GDP IMF WEO April 2017 
Non-performing 
loans 
Non-performing loans as a percent of total gross 
loans 
World Bank; FRED; IMF IFS 
 
Table 3.3: Summary statistics of the data variables 
Variable   Min.   
1st 
Quartile  Median  Mean 
 3rd 
Quartile Max. 
St. 
Dev. 
Moody's ratings 1 11 15 14.84 20 21 5.10 
S&P's ratings 1 10.33 15 14.46 19.67 21 5.12 
Fitch 
ratings  1 11 15 14.87 20 21 4.90 
Economic Policy Uncertainty 26.62 81.22 108.41 117.96 135.11 542.77 47.26 
GDP growth rate -15.14 1.51 3.31 3.22 5.14 26.26 3.69 
Investments 4.31 20.06 22.81 23.51 26.08 48.01 5.37 
Government debt 0.06 29.48 44.13 51.48 66.89 242.11 33.51 
Fiscal Balance -32.13 -4.09 -2.21 -1.81 0.04 29.80 4.53 
Non-performing loans 0.08 1.79 3.61 6.61 8.60 71.70 7.81 
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Figure 3.1: Shadow interest rates (%), 1998-2016 
 
 
Notes: Shadow interest rates for the US, UK, the Eurozone area and ‘global’ shadow interest rate. 
The ‘global’ shadow interest rate is a weighted average of the shadow interest rates for the US, 
Eurozone and the UK as discussed in Section 2 of the chapter.  
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Figure 3.2: Generalized impulse response functions for Moody’s using first 
difference transformation 
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Figure 3.2 (continued): Generalized impulse response functions for Moody’s 
using first difference transformation 
 
Notes: Shaded areas refer to the 95% confidence intervals based on 500 bootstrap replications. 
Generalized impulse response functions are based on estimates of the Panel Vector 
AutoRegressive (PVAR) model (3.2) in Section 3 of the chapter where the endogenous variables in 
our PVAR model are  
yi,t = [Uncertainty, GDP growth, Investments, Debt, Fiscal Balance, NPLs, rating] using the rating of 
Moody’s and the first difference transformation. 
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Figure 3.3: Generalized impulse response functions for S&P’s using the first 
difference transformation 
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Figure 3.3 (continued): Generalized impulse response functions for S&P’s using 
the first difference transformation 
 
Notes: Shaded areas refer to the 95% confidence intervals based on 500 bootstrap replications. 
Generalized impulse response functions are based on estimates of the Panel Vector 
AutoRegressive (PVAR) model (3.2) in Section 3 of the chapter where the endogenous variables in 
our PVAR model are  
yi,t = [Uncertainty, GDP growth, Investments, Debt, Fiscal Balance, NPLs, rating] using the rating of 
S&P’s and the first difference transformation. 
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Figure 3.4: Generalized impulse response functions for Fitch using first difference 
transformation 
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Figure 3.4 (continued): Generalized impulse response functions for Fitch using 
the first difference transformation 
 
Notes: Shaded areas refer to the 95% confidence intervals based on 500 bootstrap replications. 
Generalized impulse response functions are based on estimates of the Panel Vector 
AutoRegressive (PVAR) model (3.2) in Section 3 of the chapter where the endogenous variables in 
our PVAR model are  
yi,t = [Uncertainty, GDP growth, Investments, Debt, Fiscal Balance, NPLs, rating] using the rating of 
Fitch and the first difference transformation. 
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Figure 3.5: Generalized impulse response functions for Moody’s using expanding 
time windows  
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Figure 3.5 (continued): Generalized impulse response functions for Moody’s 
using expanding time windows 
 
Notes: The green line covers the 1998-2006 period. The blue line covers the 1998-2009 period. 
The red line covers the 1998-2012 period. The black line covers the whole 1998-2016 sample 
period. Dashed lines and shaded areas refer to 95% confidence intervals based on 500 bootstrap 
replications. Generalized impulse response functions are based on estimates of the Panel Vector 
AutoRegressive (PVAR) model (3.2) in Section 3 of the chapter where the endogenous variables in 
our PVAR model are  
yi,t = [Uncertainty, GDP growth, Investments, Debt, Fiscal Balance, NPLs, rating] using the rating of 
Moody’s and the first difference transformation. 
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Figure 3.6: Generalized impulse response functions for S&P’s using expanding 
time windows 
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Figure 3.6 (continued): Generalized impulse response functions for S&P’s using 
expanding time windows 
 
Notes: The green line covers the 1998-2006 period. The blue line covers the 1998-2009 period. 
The red line covers the 1998-2012 period. The black line covers the whole 1998-2016 sample 
period. Dashed lines and shaded areas refer to 95% confidence intervals based on 500 bootstrap 
replications. Generalized impulse response functions are based on estimates of the Panel Vector 
AutoRegressive (PVAR) model (3.2) in Section 3 of the chapter where the endogenous variables in 
our PVAR model are  
yi,t = [Uncertainty, GDP growth, Investments, Debt, Fiscal Balance, NPLs, rating] using the rating of 
S&P’s and the first difference transformation. 
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Figure 3.7: Generalized impulse response functions for Fitch using expanding 
time windows 
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Figure 3.7 (continued): Generalized impulse response functions for Fitch using 
expanding time windows 
 
Notes: The green line covers the 1998-2006 period. The blue line covers the 1998-2009 period. 
The red line covers the 1998-2012 period. The black line covers the whole 1998-2016 sample 
period. Dashed lines and shaded area refer to 95% confidence intervals based on 500 bootstrap 
replications. Generalized impulse response functions are based on estimates of the Panel Vector 
AutoRegressive (PVAR) model (3.2) in Section 3 of the chapter where the endogenous variables in 
our PVAR model are  
yi,t = [Uncertainty, GDP growth, Investments, Debt, Fiscal Balance, NPLs, rating] using the rating of 
Fitch and the first difference transformation. 
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Figure 3.8: Linear and logistic transformation of sovereign credit ratings for 
Moody’s 
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Figure 3.9: Generalized impulse response functions for Moody’s using logistic 
transformation of sovereign ratings 
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Figure 3.9 (continued): Generalized impulse response functions for Moody’s 
using a logistic transformation of sovereign ratings 
 
Notes: Shaded areas refer to the 95% confidence intervals based on 500 bootstrap replications. 
Generalized impulse response functions are based on estimates of the Panel Vector 
AutoRegressive (PVAR) model (3.2) in Section 3 of the chapter (using the first difference 
transformation) where the endogenous variables in our PVAR model are  
yi,t = [Uncertainty, GDP growth, Investments, Debt, Fiscal Balance, NPLs, rating] using the logistic 
transformation of the rating of Moody’s. 
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Figure 3.10: Generalized impulse response functions for Moody’s using stock 
price volatility 
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Figure 3.10 (continued): Generalized impulse response functions for Moody’s 
using stock price volatility 
 
Notes: Shaded areas refer to the 95% confidence intervals based on 500 bootstrap replications. 
Generalized impulse response functions are based on estimates of the Panel Vector 
AutoRegressive (PVAR) model (3.2) in Section 3 of the chapter where the endogenous variables in 
our PVAR model are  
yi,t = [Stock price volatility, GDP growth, Investments, Debt, Fiscal Balance, NPLs, rating] using the 
rating of Moody’s and the first difference transformation. 
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Figure 3.11: Generalized impulse response functions for Moody’s using the 
banking risk factor 
 
Notes: Shaded areas refer to the 95% confidence intervals based on 500 bootstrap replications. 
Generalized impulse response functions are based on estimates of the Panel Vector 
AutoRegressive (PVAR) model (3.2) in Section 3 of the chapter where the endogenous variables in 
our PVAR model are  
yi,t = [Uncertainty, GDP growth, Investments, Debt, Fiscal Balance, banking risk factor, rating] using 
the rating of Moody’s and the first difference transformation. 
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Table 4.1 Transformation of sovereign and corporate credit ratings 
This table presents the conversion of S&P’s credit rating notation to a numerical 
scale. 
Numerical Rating S&P's Rating 
22 AAA 
21 AA+ 
20 AA 
19 AA- 
18 A+ 
17 A 
16 A- 
15 BBB+ 
14 BBB 
13 BBB- 
12 BB+ 
11 BB 
10 BB- 
9 B+ 
8 B 
7 B- 
6 CCC+ 
5 CCC 
4 CCC- 
3 CC 
2 C 
1 SD/D 
 
Table 4.2 Changes in corporate ratings around sovereign downgrades 
  Corporate Credit Rating 
  Year before Downgrade Year of Downgrade Difference 
Treated Firms 15.837 13.103 -2.734 
    
Control Firms 12.766 12.497 -0.299 
    
Difference -3.071*** -0.606** -2.465*** 
  (0.089) (0.254) (0.269) 
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Table 4.3 Sovereign Credit Rating Downgrades by Country and Year 
This table provides the initial sample of sovereign credit rating downgrades used 
in the study and the number of treated firm-year observations by country and year 
throughout 1990-2017.  
Country of Domicile Year of a sovereign downgrade Number of treated firms  
Argentina 2000 5 
 2001 5 
 2008 4 
 2012 2 
 2013 3 
 2014 3 
Brazil 1999 4 
 2002 8 
 2014 6 
 2015 18 
 2016 24 
Canada 1992 1 
China 2017 1 
Colombia 2017 2 
Czech Republic 1998 1 
Greece 2011 3 
 2015 8 
Hong Kong 1998 2 
 2017 1 
Hungary 2006 1 
 2012 1 
Indonesia 1997 1 
 1998 4 
Ireland 2011 2 
Italy 2004 1 
 2006 2 
 2011 2 
 2012 2 
 2013 7 
 2014 9 
Japan 2001 1 
 2002 4 
 2011 13 
 2015 13 
Jordan 2017 1 
Mexico 1995 2 
 2009 4 
Philippines 2005 4 
Portugal 2010 1 
 2011 2 
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 2012 4 
Russia 2014 5 
 2015 13 
Saudi Arabia 2015 1 
 2016 3 
South Korea 1997 1 
Spain 2012 2 
Taiwan 2002 1 
Thailand 1997 1 
 1998 2 
Turkey 2001 2 
 2016 6 
United States 2011 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 118 
 
Table 4.4 Variable Definition 
This table defines each variable used throughout this chapter 
Variable  Definition  Data Source 
Sovereign Long-term foreign currency rating assigned  
Bloomberg 
 Credit Rating to the sovereign by S&P's  
Corporate Credit 
Rating 
Long-term foreign currency rating assigned  
Bloomberg 
to the corporation by S&P's  
Size Natural logarithm of total assets (AT) 
Compustat 
Global 
Datastream 
Investment Annual capital expenditures  to lagged 
Compustat 
Global 
net property, plant, and equipment Datastream 
Tobin's Q Total assets plus market capitalization minus 
Compustat 
Global 
common equity  to total assets Datastream 
Cash Cash and short-term investment  
Compustat 
Global 
to total assets Datastream 
Cash Flow Annual operating income  plus depreciation 
Compustat 
Global 
and amortization to lagged total assets Datastream 
Leverage Total debt to total assets 
Compustat 
Global 
Datastream 
Sales /Assets Total sales to total assets 
Compustat 
Global 
  Datastream 
Sales/VAIP Sales to the value of assets in place (VAIP)  
Compustat 
Global 
  as calculated in Loderer et al. (2017) Datastream 
SGA/Sales Selling, general and administrative costs to  
Compustat 
Global 
  total sales Datastream 
Sales growth Natural logarithmic difference in total sales 
Compustat 
Global 
Datastream 
ROA Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
Compustat 
Global 
  amortization to total assets Datastream 
OROA Earnings before interest and taxes 
Compustat 
Global 
  to total assets Datastream 
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Table 4.5 List of treated  firms 
      Corporate Rating 
Country  
Year of sovereign  Before After 
 downgrade Company Downgrade Downgrade 
Brazil 2014 Ambev Sa A A 
  Eletrobras-Centr Eletr Bras BBB BBB- 
  Embraer Sa BBB BBB 
  Petroleo Brasileiro Sa- Petr BBB BBB- 
 2015 Ambev Sa A A- 
  Braskem Sa BBB- BBB- 
  Brf Sa BBB- BBB 
  Eletrobras-Centr Eletr Bras BBB- BB+ 
  Embraer Sa BBB BBB 
  Gerdau Sa BBB- BBB- 
  Klabin Sa BBB- BBB- 
  Localiza Rent A Car Sa BBB- BBB- 
  Transmissora Alianca De Ener BBB- BB+ 
  Ultrapar Participacoes Sa BBB BBB- 
 2016 Braskem Sa BBB- BBB- 
  Brf Sa BBB BBB 
  Eletrobras-Centr Eletr Bras BB+ BB 
  Embraer Sa BBB BBB 
  Hypera Sa BB+ BB+ 
  Jbs Sa BB+ BB 
  Klabin Sa BBB- BB+ 
  Localiza Rent A Car Sa BBB- BB+ 
  Rio Paranapanema Com BBB- BB 
  Sao Martinho Sa BB+ BB+ 
  Ultrapar Participacoes Sa BBB- BB+ 
  Vale Sa BBB BBB- 
China 2017 China Shenhua Energy Co Ltd AA- A+ 
Greece 2015 Titan Cement Co Sa BB BB 
Hong Kong 2017 Mtr Corp Ltd AAA AA+ 
Ireland 2011 Medtronic Plc AA- AA- 
Italy 2011 Terna Spa A+ A 
 2012 Terna Spa A A- 
 2014 Atlantia Spa BBB+ BBB+ 
  Terna Spa BBB+ BBB 
Japan 2011 Elec Power Development Co AA A+ 
  Okinawa Electric Power Co AA AA- 
  Osaka Gas Co Ltd AA AA- 
  Takeda Pharmaceutical Co AA AA- 
  Tokyo Gas Co Ltd AA AA- 
 2015 Canon Inc AA AA 
Mexico 2009 America Movil Sa De Cv BBB+ BBB+ 
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  Grupo Bimbo Sa De Cv BBB+ BBB 
  Grupo Televisa Sab BBB+ BBB+ 
Russia 2014 Federal Grid Co Of The Unif BBB BBB- 
  Transneft Pjsc BBB BBB- 
 2015 Federal Grid Co Of The Unif BBB- BB+ 
  Gazprom Neft Pjsc BBB- BB+ 
  Mmc Norilsk Nickel Psjc BBB- BBB- 
  Novatek Jsc BBB- BB+ 
  Rosseti Pjsc BBB- BB+ 
  Transneft Pjsc BBB- BB+ 
  Uralkali Pjsc BBB- BB- 
Spain 2012 Enagas Sa AA- BBB 
  Red Electrica Corp Sa AA- BBB 
Turkey 2016 Koc Holding As BBB- BBB- 
  Turk Sise Cam BB+ BB 
  Turk Telekomunikasyon As BBB- BBB- 
  Turkcell Iletisim Hizmet BBB- BBB- 
United 
States 2011 Automatic Data Processing AAA AAA 
  Exxon Mobil Corp AAA AAA 
  Johnson & Johnson AAA AAA 
    Microsoft Corp AAA AAA 
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Table 4. 6 Summary Statistics  
This table presents the median and means of nonrated, rated, treated and control 
groups. Treated firms have a credit rating equal to or above the sovereign rating 
in the year before a sovereign downgrade. Control firms are matched firms using 
the Abadie and Imbens matching estimator. The covariates are country, year, size, 
investment, Tobin’s Q, cash flow, cash, and leverage. 
  Median   Mean 
  Non rated Rated Treated Control   Non rated Rated Treated Control 
Tobin's Q 1.23 1.58 1.17 1.08  1.65 1.34 1.30 1.21 
Size 6.84 8.68 11.13 10.88  7.02 8.37 11.47 11.28 
Cash Flow 0.13 0.19 0.17 0.18  0.12 0.18 0.18 0.18 
Investment 0.17 0.22 0.15 0.15  0.15 0.17 0.17 0.18 
Cash 0.10 0.09 0.14 0.12  0.16 0.06 0.14 0.13 
Leverage 0.19 0.34 0.35 0.36   0.22 0.32 0.38 0.36 
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Table 4.7 Linear regression  on Asset turnover 
This table presents regression estimates of the effect of a sovereign downgrade on 
Asset turnover of firms that have a pre-downgrade rating at or above the 
sovereign bound (i.e., treated firms) relative to non treated firms. The dependent 
variable is the ratio of Sales to the book value of total assets. Bound is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if a firm has a credit rating equal to or above 
the sovereign rating in year t − 1, and Sovereign Downgrade is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of one if a firm’s country rating is downgraded in year t. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sovereign Downgrade -0.127*** 0.038*** 0.030*** -0.001 -0.015** 
 (0.016) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Bound -0.273*** -0.004 0.004 0.002 0.007 
 (0.016) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) 
Sovereign Downgrade*Bound 0.038 0.014 0.034 0.005 0.023 
 (0.050) (0.02) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) 
Tobin’s Q    0.0027*** 0.002*** 
    (0.0006) (0.001) 
Size    -0.070*** -0.066*** 
    (0.001) (0.001) 
Cash Flow    0.362*** 0.349*** 
    (0.005) (0.005) 
Investment    -0.024*** -0.026*** 
    (0.001) (0.001) 
Cash    -0.374*** -0.374*** 
    (0.005) (0.005) 
Leverage    -0.089*** -0.075*** 
    (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant 0.932*** 0.928*** 0.973*** 1.518*** 1.496*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
      
Firm FE  NO YES YES YES YES 
Year FE NO NO YES NO YES 
Observations 455,643 471,111 471,111 322,025 322,025 
R-squared 0.001 0.000 0.011 0.055 0.063 
Number of Firms   46,654 46,654 38,167 38,167 
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Table 4.8 Linear regression  on Sales growth 
This table presents regression estimates of the effect of a sovereign downgrade on 
Sales Growth of firms that have a pre-downgrade rating at or above the sovereign 
bound (i.e., treated firms) relative to non treated firms. Sales Growth is defined as 
the logarithmic difference between Sales and Lag Sales. Bound is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if a firm has a credit rating equal to or above 
the sovereign rating in year t − 1, and Sovereign Downgrade is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of one if a firm’s country rating is downgraded in year t. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sovereign Downgrade 0.252*** 0.042 0.046 0.026 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) 
Bound 0.0447 -0.0447 -0.212*** -0.210*** 
 (0.052) (0.051) (0.057) (0.056) 
Sovereign Downgrade*Bound -0.248** -0.068 -0.080 0.015 
 (0.116) (0.114) (0.118) (0.117) 
Tobin’s Q   0.150*** 0.150*** 
   (0.003) (0.003) 
Size   0.638*** 0.705*** 
   (0.004) (0.005) 
Cash Flow   0.643*** 0.498*** 
   (0.031) (0.030) 
Investment   0.115*** 0.107*** 
   (0.007) (0.007) 
Cash   -0.296*** -0.290*** 
   (0.031) (0.031) 
Leverage   -0.206*** -0.240*** 
   (0.026) (0.026) 
Constant 4.845*** 4.164*** -0.0234 -0.577*** 
 (0.002) (0.024) (0.032) (0.040) 
     
Firm FE  YES YES YES YES 
Year FE NO YES NO YES 
Observations 265,459 265,459 207,827 207,827 
R2 0.000 0.033 0.127 0.142 
Number of Firms 40,375 40,375 34,825 34,825 
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Table 4.9 Linear regression on Sales to Value of Assets in Place ratio 
This table presents regression estimates of the effect of a sovereign downgrade on 
Sales to Value of Assets in Place of firms that have a pre-downgrade rating at or 
above the sovereign bound (i.e., treated firms) relative to non treated firms. The 
dependent variable is the ratio of Sales to Value of Assets in Place. Bound is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm has a credit rating equal to or 
above the sovereign rating in year t − 1, and Sovereign Downgrade is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if a firm’s country rating is downgraded in year 
t. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sovereign Downgrade -0.033 0.008 0.045 0.087** 0.046 
 (0.061) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) 
Bound -0.865*** -0.134** -0.102* -0.0317 -0.0200 
 (0.061) (0.055) (0.055) (0.067) (0.067) 
Sovereign Downgrade*Bound -0.011 0.095 0.115 -0.034 0.040 
 (0.199) (0.129) (0.130) (0.142) (0.142) 
Tobin's Q    0.032*** 0.032*** 
    (0.003) (0.004) 
Size    0.082*** 0.060*** 
    (0.005) (0.006) 
Cash Flow    -0.415*** -0.458*** 
    (0.034) (0.035) 
Investment    -0.025** 0.033*** 
    (0.009) (0.010) 
Cash    -0.963*** -0.956*** 
    (0.036) (0.036) 
Leverage    1.280*** 1.281*** 
    (0.031) (0.031) 
Constant 2.085*** 2.072*** 2.236*** 2.751*** 2.667*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.022) (0.039) (0.047) 
      
Firm FE  NO YES YES YES YES 
Year FE NO NO YES NO YES 
Observations 311,157 322,483 322,483 228,394 228,394 
R-squared 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.018 0.021 
Number of Firms   37,194 37,194 30,256 30,256 
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Table 4.10 Linear regression on Selling, General and Administrative Expenses to 
Sales ratio 
This table presents regression estimates of the effect of a sovereign downgrade on 
Selling, General and Administrative Expenses to Sales of firms that have a pre-
downgrade rating at or above the sovereign bound (i.e., treated firms) relative to 
non treated firms. The dependent variable is Selling, General and Administrative 
Expenses scaled by total Sales. Bound is a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if a firm has a credit rating equal to or above the sovereign rating in year t − 
1, and Sovereign Downgrade is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a 
firm’s country rating is downgraded in year t. Robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sovereign Downgrade -0.130*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.016) (0.010) (0.010) (0.002) (0.007) 
Bound -0.124*** 0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.002 
 (0.016) (0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0121) (0.0121) 
Sovereign Downgrade*Bound 0.094* -0.002 0.001 -0.006 -0.004 
 (0.048) (0.031) (0.031) (0.024) (0.024) 
Tobin's Q    0.006*** 0.006*** 
    (0.001) (0.001) 
Size    -0.016*** -0.024*** 
    (0.001) (0.001) 
Cash Flow    -0.432*** -0.418*** 
    (0.006) (0.006) 
Investment    0.0192*** 0.0193*** 
    (0.002) (0.001) 
Cash    0.153*** 0.152*** 
    (0.006) (0.006) 
Leverage    -0.057*** -0.045*** 
    (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant 0.298*** 0.293*** 0.271*** 0.401*** 0.420*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
      
Firm FE  NO YES YES YES YES 
Year FE NO NO YES NO YES 
Observations 415,550 430,030 430,030 302,652 302,652 
R-squared 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.025 0.027 
Number of Firms   43,481 43,481 35,993 35,993 
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Table 4.11 Linear regression on Return on Assets 
This table presents regression estimates of the effect of a sovereign downgrade on 
Return on Assets of firms that have a pre-downgrade rating at or above the 
sovereign bound (i.e., treated firms) relative to non treated firms. Return on 
Assets is the ratio of Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and 
Amortization to the book value of Assets. Bound is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of one if a firm has a credit rating equal to or above the sovereign rating 
in year t − 1, and Sovereign Downgrade is a dummy variable that takes the value 
of one if a firm’s country rating is downgraded in year t. Robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sovereign Downgrade 0.056*** -0.002 -0.001 0.003* 0.003* 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Bound 0.089*** 0.004 0.005* 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Sovereign Downgrade*Bound -0.075*** -0.009 -0.005 -0.004 -0.002 
 (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Tobin's Q    0.007*** 0.007*** 
    (0.002) (0.002) 
Size    0.005*** 0.003*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash Flow    0.312*** 0.310*** 
    (0.001) (0.001) 
Investment    0.005*** 0.004*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash    -0.0191*** -0.020*** 
    (0.001) (0.001) 
Leverage    0.002** 0.004*** 
    (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 0.059*** 0.061*** 0.074*** 0.064*** 0.062*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
      
Firm FE  NO YES YES YES YES 
Year FE NO NO YES NO YES 
Observations 450,434 465,344 465,344 321,709 321,709 
R-squared 0.002 0.000 0.008 0.150 0.156 
Number of Firms   46,573 46,573 38,051 38,051 
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Table 4.12 Linear regression on Operating Return on Assets 
This table presents regression estimates of the effect of a sovereign downgrade on 
Operating Return on Assets of firms that have a pre-downgrade rating at or above 
the sovereign bound (i.e., treated firms) relative to non treated firms. Operating 
Return on Assets is the ratio of Earnings Before Interest and Taxes to the book 
value of Assets. Bound is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm has 
a credit rating equal to or above the sovereign rating in year t − 1, and Sovereign 
Downgrade is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm’s country 
rating is downgraded in year t. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sovereign Downgrade 0.052*** -0.001 0.000 0.005*** 0.004* 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.00205) (0.00207) 
Bound 0.077*** 0.000 0.002 -0.0001 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Sovereign Downgrade*Bound -0.068*** -0.008 -0.005 -0.005 -0.001 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Tobin's Q    0.008*** 0.008*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
Size    0.001*** 0.001*** 
    (0.001) (0.001) 
Cash Flow    0.296*** 0.296*** 
    (0.001) (0.001) 
Investment    0.003*** 0.002*** 
    (0.000 (0.000) 
Cash    0.010*** 0.008*** 
    (0.002) (0.002) 
Leverage    -0.010*** 0.006*** 
    (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.043*** 0.018*** 0.021*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
      
Firm FE  NO YES YES YES YES 
Year FE NO NO YES NO YES 
Observations 450,510 465,393 465,393 321,271 321,271 
R-squared 0.002 0.000 0.010 0.132 0.139 
Number of Firms   46,553 46,553 38,020 38,020 
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Table 4.13 DiD on Sales to Assets ratio around a Sovereign Downgrade 
This table presents difference-in-differences matching estimators in the Sales to 
Assets ratio around a sovereign downgrade. Treated firms have a credit rating 
equal to or above the sovereign rating in the year before a sovereign downgrade. 
Control firms are matched firms using the Abadie and Imbens matching estimator. 
The covariates are country, year, size, investment, Tobin’s Q, cash flow, cash, and 
leverage. The sample consists of 64 treated and control observations. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***,**, and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  Year  before Downgrade Year of Downgrade Difference 
Treated Firms  0.566 0.585 0.019 
 
   
Control Firms 0.752 0.642 -0.110 
 
   
Difference -0.186 -0.057 
 
 (0.123) (0.091)  
Difference in Difference   0.129 
      (0.153) 
 
Table 4.14 DiD on Sales growth around a Sovereign Downgrade 
This table presents difference-in-differences matching estimators in Sales growth 
around a sovereign downgrade. Treated firms have a credit rating equal to or 
above the sovereign rating in the year before a sovereign downgrade. Control 
firms are matched firms using the Abadie and Imbens matching estimator. The 
covariates are country, year, size, investment, Tobin’s Q, cash flow, cash, and 
leverage. The sample consists of 64 treated and control observations. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***,**, and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  Year  before Downgrade Year of Downgrade Difference 
Treated Firms  8.602 7.852 -0.750 
    
Control Firms 7.071 7.703 0.632 
    
Difference 1.531 0.149  
 (0.636) (0.469)  
Difference in Difference   -1.382* 
      (0.79) 
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Table 4.15 DiD on Sales to Value of Assets in Place ratio around a Sovereign 
Downgrade 
This table presents difference-in-differences matching estimators in Sales to Value 
of Assets in Place ratio around a sovereign downgrade. Treated firms have a credit 
rating equal to or above the sovereign rating in the year before a sovereign 
downgrade. Control firms are matched firms using the Abadie and Imbens 
matching estimator. The covariates are country, year, size, investment, Tobin’s Q, 
cash flow, cash, and leverage. The sample consists of 64 treated and control 
observations. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***,**, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  Year  before Downgrade Year of Downgrade Difference 
Treated Firms  1.013 1.276 0.263 
    
Control Firms 1.675 1.769 0.094 
    
Difference -0.662 -0.493  
 (0.341) (0.251)  
Difference in Difference   0.169 
      (0.423) 
 
 
Table 4.16 DiD on Selling, General and Administrative Expenses to sales ratio 
around a Sovereign Downgrade 
This table presents difference-in-differences matching estimators in SGA to Sales 
ratio around a sovereign downgrade. Treated firms have a credit rating equal to 
or above the sovereign rating in the year before a sovereign downgrade. Control 
firms are matched firms using the Abadie and Imbens matching estimator. The 
covariates are country, year, size, investment, Tobin’s Q, cash flow, cash, and 
leverage. The sample consists of 64 treated and control observations. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***,**, and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  Year  before Downgrade Year of Downgrade Difference 
Treated Firms  0.204 0.166 -0.038 
    
Control Firms 0.155 0.145 -0.010 
    
Difference 0.049 0.021  
 (0.032) (0.024)  
Difference in Difference   -0.028 
      (0.04) 
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Table 4.17 DiD on Return on Assets around a Sovereign Downgrade 
This table presents difference-in-differences matching estimators in Return on 
Assets around a sovereign downgrade. Treated firms have a credit rating equal to 
or above the sovereign rating in the year before a sovereign downgrade. Control 
firms are matched firms using the Abadie and Imbens matching estimator. The 
covariates are country, year, size, investment, Tobin’s Q, cash flow, cash, and 
leverage. The sample consists of 64 treated and control observations. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***,**, and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  Year  before Downgrade Year of Downgrade Difference 
Treated Firms  0.150 0.124 -0.026 
    
Control Firms 0.132 0.109 -0.023 
    
Difference 0.018 0.015  
 (0.017) (0.013)  
Difference in Difference   -0.003 
      (0.021) 
 
Table 4.18 DiD on Operating Return on Assets around a Sovereign Downgrade 
This table presents difference-in-differences matching estimators in Operating 
Return on Assets around a sovereign downgrade. Treated firms have a credit 
rating equal to or above the sovereign rating in the year before a sovereign 
downgrade. Control firms are matched firms using the Abadie and Imbens 
matching estimator. The covariates are country, year, size, investment, Tobin’s Q, 
cash flow, cash, and leverage. The sample consists of 64 treated and control 
observations. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***,**, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  Year  before Downgrade Year of Downgrade Difference 
Treated Firms  0.103 0.087 -0.016 
    
Control Firms 0.095 0.074 -0.021 
    
Difference 0.008 0.013  
 (0.015) (0.011)  
Difference in Difference   0.005 
      (0.019) 
 
